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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation research examines the impact of migration on the emotional 
well-being of temporary, low-wage workers who migrate from the Global South to Dubai 
in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Unlike previous research in the UAE, this study’s 
sample reflects a far broader diversity of nationalities and occupations, and focuses on 
those earning in the lowest wage bracket. Their experiences revealed the systemic 
attributes of precarity and the violent structures that perpetuate them.  
My research addresses several substantive debates. I found that rather than 
emigrating for rational reasons—as neoclassical theory of migration posits—the migrants 
in my study tended to rationalize their reasons for emigrating through processes of 
cognitive dissonance. Further, where previous scholarship has tended to conflate issues of 
national, ethnic, and racial discrimination, I disentangle the processes that motivate 
discriminatory behavior by showing how seemingly innocuous references to “nationality” 
can be driven by a desire to hide racial prejudices, while at the same time, conflating all 
as “racism” can reflect a simplistic analysis of the contributing factors. I show how past 
historical structures of colonialism and slavery are manifest in current forms of structural 
violence and how this violence is differentially experienced on the basis of nationality, 
perceived racial differences, and/or ethnicity. Additionally, my research expands theories 
related to the spatial dimension of discrimination. It examines how zones of 
marginalization shape the experiences of low-wage migrant workers as they move 
through or occupy these spaces. Marginalizing zones limit workers’ access to the 
 
ii 
sociality of the city and its institutional resources, which consequently increase their 
vulnerability. 
Individual well-being is determined by stressful events that one encounters, by 
personal and external sources of resilience, and by perceptions of oneself and the stressful 
events. For the migrants in my study, their stressors were chronic, cumulative, and 
ambiguous, and while they brought with them a sufficient amount of personal resilience, 
it was often mitigated by non-compliance and lack of enforcement of UAE laws. The 
result was a state of well-being defined by isolation, fear, and despair. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines the experiences of temporary low-wage migrant 
workers who migrate from the Global South to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). It focuses on the processes of migration and their impact on the emotional well-
being of these low-wage workers. The aim is to better understand the lives of those 
performing the most menial and lowest-paying jobs as well as the society that hosts them.  
The study was motivated by the numerous unofficial accounts of suicidal behavior among 
this population. These accounts represent a minority of workers; however, they are 
indicative of the challenges low-wage migrant workers face and raise questions about the 
immigration policies, how they impact low-wage workers, and the actors who 
operationalize these policies. While the data for this study draws specifically on ten 
months of extensive fieldwork and interviews, my prior ten years of living and working 
in Dubai provide a strong foundation for understanding the circumstances migrant 
workers face.  
Unlike previous research, which focuses on only one migrant group, the 
participants in this study represent a broad diversity of nationalities, occupations, and 
employers, as well as those whose earnings are in the lowest-wage bracket of Dubai. 
Research on temporary low-wage migrant workers in the UAE has tended to focus on 
particular populations, for example, Indians (Clemens 2013), South Asians more 
generally (Kathiravelu 2016), Bangladeshis (Rahman 2011), Filipinos (Parreñas and 
Silvey 2016), Ugandans (Oliver and Malit Jr 2014), and Ethiopians (Pessoa, Harkness, 
and Gardner 2014). Researchers have not, however, examined the experiences of low-
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wage migrants across a broad range of nationalities. Further, unlike other studies, I 
focused on those in the lowest wage bracket. My final sample was composed of forty-
four individuals earning an average of Dh1340 (US$365) per month. Studying this group 
is important because income is directly related to issues such as socioeconomic 
marginalization, residential segregation, quality of housing, and access to urban centers 
and their resources. 
This research is driven by the desire to better understand the emotional well-being 
of this population. It explores the various factors that impact the individual and how. It 
asks: What are the practices, processes, and structures low-wage migrants encounter? 
What are the spaces they must navigate? What roles do family and the home country 
play? What are the beliefs and expectations imposed by self and others? What reduces or 
strengthens resilience? The experiences of my participants often reflected an endurance 
race. I wanted to know what made their lives so difficult and from where they got (or did 
not get) the stamina to persist. These questions are what this dissertation addresses.  
The UAE Context 
The UAE is unique for its high proportion of foreigners to nationals. Of the 232 
million international migrants on the move, the UAE is host to an estimated eight million 
of them (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division 2013). It has the largest number of foreign migrants per capita in the world 
(“International Migrants by Country” 2016). Relative to the US where there are 
approximately seven foreigners for every one hundred citizens, in the UAE, there are 850 
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to 900 foreigners for every 100 citizens.1 In addition, all foreigners who work in the 
country—regardless of profession and socio-economic level—are temporary. They come 
from all regions of the world, but the majority are low-income wage earners from South 
Asia, other Middle Eastern countries, Sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
They are typically engaged in occupations such as construction, roadwork, cleaning, 
security, delivery, agriculture, domestic work, or sex work. The overall imbalance of 
nationals to non-nationals and the high proportion of lower-wage workers2 magnifies 
experiences of exploitation and makes it a useful context for study. 
Although all foreigners living in the country are “migrants,” all are not equal. 
Conditions and experiences of migrants in the UAE are very much class and nationality-
specific, reflecting the high level of stratification in the country. This stratification places 
nationals3 at the top, followed by Gulf Arabs, racially white Westerners, and ending with 
black Africans.4 Of the total number of temporary workers, more than fifty percent are 
employed in low-wage occupations ranging from laborer to service worker (De Bel-Air 
                                                
1. Non-citizens account for 85-90% of the UAE’s total population (The National 2011). In the US, 
non-citizens account for 7% of the total population (“Population Distribution by Citizenship Status” 2017). 
2. There are less well-off Emiratis and relatively poor ones, but none working in jobs that would 
earn Dh1500 (US$408) a month. UAE nationals without a high school certificate are to be paid no less than 
Dh3000 (US$816). The UAE is a very strong welfare state and nationals receive substantial government 
assistance. As a result, it should be understood that all references to “low-wage worker” and to “migrants” 
in general assumes that the individual is foreign and temporary. Further, the term guestworker—the term 
for temporary workers in other parts of the world—is used synonymously, and migrant could be a foreigner 
of any socio-economic level.  
3. In the UAE, the term “Emirati,” “national,” and “local” are synonymously used. At times I 
might use “local Emirati” or “national Emirati” but this is only to emphasize the fact that an “Emirati” is a 
citizen.  
4. Whether or not Gulf Arabs or Westerners—especially those from the US, UK, Australia, or 
New Zealand—rank “first” can depend on the profession. In academia, Westerns would be deemed most 
desirable, but it does not mean they would earn the most. Locals and Gulf Arabs likely would.   
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2015). The US also hosts a great number of low-wage temporary migrant workers; 
however, their overall proportion to the rest of society is quite small. It is a population 
that is fairly hidden. In the UAE, however, because of its size—900 foreigners for every 
100 locals—, this population is quite visible.5  
There are some who argue that Arab Gulf researchers have focused too much on 
issues of vulnerability, exploitation, and exclusion, and that doing so “risks missing or 
underplaying numerous, often unexpected, ways that non-citizens feel belonging” (Vora 
and Koch 2015, 542). I would agree that certain segments of the foreigner population—
especially more affluent migrants who live more comfortable lives—do experience 
“forms of citizenship” (Vora 2013, 176) found in economic, consumer, and urban 
membership within the UAE. Also, certain populations, such as those from India who 
represent some of the largest migrant groups in Dubai, can feel a strong sense of social 
and cultural belonging within the larger framework of the UAE. However, for very low-
wage migrants, participation and belonging in any form is often inaccessible. While 
academic research is needed on multiple fronts and in regard to diverse populations, 
including the poor as well as the wealthy, this dissertation is motivated by concerns of 
social justice and concern about how certain groups in society are marginalized and made 
vulnerable. Ahmed Kanna (Kanna 2011), in the preface to his book on Dubai, writes, 
“Focusing only on the favorable aspects of the ruling dynasties or privileging the 
viewpoints of the already privileged would be intellectually irresponsible” (xi). I would 
                                                
5. The UAE government is, however, slowly making this population more hidden. This is 
discussed in chapter five. 
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concur, and add that not giving significant attention to those who are most vulnerable 
would, too, be intellectually irresponsible.  
Background 
The UAE is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, ranked seventh in GDP 
per capita. The discovery of oil in the 1950s and high oil prices in the 70s led to the 
amassing of wealth and industrialization and an increased need for foreign workers. 
Migrant workers come from all regions of the world and are of all “skill” levels.6 At one 
end of the spectrum is the much smaller segment of higher-waged foreigners. At the other 
is the much more predominate group of low-income wage earners. While high-wage 
professionals come from the Global North as well as the Global South, low-wage workers 
typically come from the regions of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and from the 
countries of Indonesia and the Philippines. The lowest wage jobs are in construction, 
roadwork, cleaning, security, delivery, agriculture, domestic work, and sex work.7  
Low-wage workers from the Global South are stigmatized by restrictions that, for 
example, prevent them from bringing their spouses or children (Babar 2013), or put them 
at risk of having their passports taken by their employers. These are very much class and 
                                                
6. A 2015 report shows that in 2009, from the total number foreign workers, almost eight percent 
were legislators, senior officials or managers and sixteen percent were professional (De Bel-Air 2015) 
7. Women end up in sex work for a number of reasons. According to my participants, those from 
Africa may come on a visit visa in search for work. Unable to find work, they turn to sex work out of 
desperation. Other women, often domestic workers, abscond (run away from their employer) and become 
engaged in sex work so as to earn more money or they do so because of their irregular status. A Nigerian 
participant told me that she knows some women come to Dubai with the intention of doing sex work, and 
some do so with their mothers’ consent. What I am less familiar with are women who were trafficked for 
sex work against their will. A Pakistani participant said that there are many Pakistani women who resort to 
sex work; however, she did not share further details. Sex trafficking is discussed further in chapter four.  
 6 
nationality-specific conditions that do not have as great an impact on those in higher-
skilled, higher-paying positions. 
My personal experience with the country began in 2002 when I migrated from 
Istanbul, Turkey, to Dubai, UAE, to take up a position as an English language instructor 
at Zayed University (ZU), a federal university named after the founder of the country. 
The student body was composed solely of Emirati national women8 and had only opened 
four years prior to my arrival. The country is quite segmented between nationals and non-
nationals, so teaching national women was a great opportunity to engage with the local 
population. It also provided a different vantage point from which to view the parallel 
experiences of three distinct populations: low-wage migrant workers, more affluent 
migrants9 and Emirati nationals. Ten years later, I started my doctoral study. My ten 
years of living and working in Dubai provided a strong foundation for understanding the 
context and carrying out my ten months of intensive fieldwork and interviews.  
History and Development of the UAE 
The area that is today referred to as the UAE is at the eastern end of the Arabian 
Peninsula. External influences on the region came from the Portuguese, Dutch, British, 
Turks, Omani, Egyptians, and Wahabis. The British and Dutch fought over the region for 
                                                
8. Zayed University (ZU) has two campuses, one in Dubai and one in Abu Dhabi. When the 
university opened it served only national women. Eventually it began accepting international students who 
mostly came from other countries in the Gulf. Several years ago, it also began accepting male students; 
however, they have an adjoining, but separate campus.  
9. The terms “expatriate” and “migrant” applies to all who travel to a foreign country to live and 
work. In the UAE, the term “expatriate” is typically reserved for anyone from the Global North or those 
who are affluent professional and highly-skilled workers from the Global South. “Migrant” in the UAE 
often refers to those from the Global South who perform “less-skilled,” low-wage work. It is also common 
in the Gulf to distinguish between “blue-collar workers” and “white-collar workers.” I prefer to use the 
term “migrant” and/or foreign workers for all foreigners working in the country. When referring to those 
migrants who are middle- and upper-class, I often use “affluent migrants” or “the more affluent migrant.”   
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commercial purposes during the middle of the eighteenth century, and eventually the 
Dutch acquiesced to the British. Britain was the ruler for one hundred and fifty 
continuous years, from 1820 until early 1970s (Hay 1959).  
In the late twentieth century, the British consolidated their control over the 
Trucial States10 (Abdulla 1985). They altered societal traditions so as to concentrate 
power in a small select group of rulers (sheikhs) and kept populations separated to 
prevent a stronger confederation; these forms of control led to uncommon hierarchies and 
ethnic stratification (Heard-Bey 2005). The local rulers had little autonomy and the 
British removed those who did not accommodate them. The British, as well, restricted 
trade and retaliated violently when deemed necessary, at one point destroying an entire 
fleet of vessels belonging to one of the central tribes along the Trucial Coast (Hay 1959). 
Their aim over the region was to create “political dependency” (Abdulla 1985, 80).  
Since the time that the Trucial States were colonized by the British, the ruling 
elite of the UAE have been aligned with Western powers and global interests (Kanna 
2010).11 The discovery of petroleum in the 1920s and the increase in oil prices in the 70s 
led to the amassing of wealth and industrialization unlike anywhere else in the world. 
                                                
10. Prior to UAE independence, the British referred to the region as the Trucial States. The area 
was also known as the Pirate or Trucial Coast. 
11. Whether or not British presence in the Trucial States should be defined as colonial is open to 
debate among scholars. Some say that within the Arab Gulf region, “modernizing without totally yielding 
to Western prototypes” led to “minimal social disruption” as the British had very little involvement in the 
lives of the people (Talhami 2004, 1). Thus, the indigenous population was able to maintain and preserve 
many traditional aspects of their life and of their conservative culture. Others argue that the British did have 
a dominating and lasting effect on the region though they never formally colonized any of the Arab Gulf 
states (Abdelkarim 1999). In contrast, Heard-Bey (2005), a historian who has likely written most 
extensively on the region, utilizes the terms “colonial” and “protectorate” when writing about the region 
(295). Franz Fanon (1963) states that the ultimate purpose of colonization is to meet the needs and desires 
of the colonizer; thus, the colonizers construct and dominate the colonized to meet their own ends. Framing 
the relationship between colonizer and colonized in this way, I would learn towards Fanon and contend that 
the UAE was colonized. 
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Building on its past historical experiences, the leaders of the region “espoused a radical 
version of free-trade ideology” (Kanna 2010, 122), particular and appropriate to the local 
context (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010; Buckley 2012; Kanna 2010; Sassen 1996). 
During this time, it went from a population of approximately 70,000 in 1959 to the 
approximately nine million that are present today. The UAE as a whole is still dependent 
on oil revenues. Dubai, however, has expanded its economy. Today the majority of its 
economy is based on tourism, trade, finance, and manufacturing. Many low-wage 
migrants are there to feed the “chronic labour demand” (D. S. Massey et al. 2005, 159) 
created by these industries. The UAE has fed this demand for labor by continuing a neo-
colonial system of labor extraction initiated by the British during their rule. The British 
also established unequal systems of patronage that are still used to manage immigration 
today.  
Importing Foreign Labor 
The nationality of low-wage migrant labor has shifted dramatically since the 
country’s inception. In the first half of the twentieth century, the majority of migrants 
were Arab. However, by the 1980s and 1990s, and at the start of the first Gulf War, the 
numbers were reduced and a trend towards recruiting Indians took over (Abdulla 1985; 
Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; A. M. Gardner 2010b; D. S. Massey et al. 2005). This 
gradual switch happened for several reasons. One was due to the fear that ethnically 
similar Arabs would adapt better to Arab Muslim life in the UAE, and thus would be 
more persistent in their attempts to seek permanent settlement and social inclusion (A. M. 
Gardner 2010b; D. S. Massey et al. 2005). The UAE had no desire to assimilate low-
wage migrants, whether or not they were from other Arab-Muslim countries or other 
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regions of the world. Another reason for the shift in nationality was due to the power of 
migrants to affect the politics of the state to which they have migrated (Zolberg 2006). 
Leaders in the Gulf feared that Arab migrants might cause political instability or demand 
political engagement (A. M. Gardner 2010b; Fargues 2011; D. S. Massey et al. 2005; 
Oishi 2005). Further, it was believed that non-Arabs would be less likely to complain and 
protest against unfair treatment and exploitative conditions (Fargues 2011; D. S. Massey 
et al. 2005; Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). By shifting from a Muslim Arab work 
force “with a moral claim on justice,” to non-Muslim, non-Arab workers, local 
governments could, according to Massey et al., “create a labour market in which open 
discriminatory practices could be more easily sustained” (147). 
In many migrant-receiving countries, the aim is to attract permanent immigrants 
with a common ethnicity (Cornelius et al. 2004; Tsuda 2009, 1999). These populations 
are desired because it is presumed that they will most easily blend in and assimilate. In 
the UAE, the desire is to avoid attracting ethically similar immigrants.12 It does not want 
to extend citizenship for political and instrumental reasons, which can be seen in who has 
access to resources and power (Bartram et al. 2014; A. M. Gardner 2010b). Maintaining 
diversity among immigrant nationalities reduces the potential for any one group to impact 
“ethnic balance and domestic politics,” reducing the opportunity for solidarity which 
could potentially lead to political unrest (Oishi 2005, 50). Since the Arab Spring began in 
2010 and the civil war in Syria in 2011, fears of Arab migrants and political instability 
have risen again.  
                                                
12. The exception to this is religion. Concerns about migrants center on their Arab-ness. 
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In addition to the UAE’s unique imbalance of nationals to non-nationals, it is also 
unique in the granting of legal citizenship. In the UAE—regardless of whether they are 
low-wage or “highly-skilled” professionals—formal citizenship is not an option.13  Those 
who sojourn to the region do not go with any expectations of gaining citizenship because 
it is rarely, if ever, granted (Arsenault 2013; Babar 2013; Bowman 2007; Gardner 2010). 
In the UAE, a blood connection to those deemed the Emirate’s “original inhabitants” 
must often be proven (Arsenault 2013).14 As a result, all foreigners to the region are 
guests (Ferris-Lay 2012; Ali 2010).15 Yet, although all are temporary, there are, for 
example, many middle- and upper-class Indian families who have been in the UAE for 
decades, if not generations. They are in a sense “permanently temporary” (Vora 2013, 
30).16 This is a very particular condition for all foreigners living and working in the UAE, 
and one that creates a sense of vulnerability for most. What set my participants apart was 
the general precarity of their day-to-day lives.  
Vulnerability & Precarity 
Throughout my study, I found that the vast majority of my participants had been 
made vulnerable by the circumstances and conditions of their lives. This led me to 
                                                
13. While it is technically possible to gain permanent residency, it requires large financial 
investments in property and expensive fees. This is probably why it is more common to hear that 
permanent residency is not possible.   
14. Note that I was unable to find any other documentation that supported the necessity for a blood 
connection. The rarity of granting citizenship is, however, widely acknowledged.  
15. Though all who come to the country have temporary guestworker status, their similarities end 
there. Low-wage workers, for example, face many forms of discrimination, from having their passport 
taken, to not being allowed to bring one’s family, to being required to live in isolated camps set apart from 
the rest of society. This is addressed extensively in chapter three.  
16. Similarly, Mahdavi (2016) uses the concept of “im/migration” to highlight the ambiguity that 
is experienced when one is permanently temporary as a result of inflexible citizenship laws (Kindle 
edition). 
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examine how vulnerability—and precarity—might work as analytical devices. 
Vulnerability is defined by the United Nations (2001) as “exposure to risk,” and, though 
they acknowledge as others do that all people are subject to vulnerability, they stress that 
some are much more susceptible to and less capable of coping with its consequences. 
This can be seen most clearly in the economic-insecurity dimension of vulnerability, and 
the risk, poverty, oppression and exploitation that can often accompany it, leaving certain 
individuals and groups more susceptible to harm and injury (Bustamante 2002; Cole 
2016; Fineman 2008, 2010; Kirby 2006; B. S. Turner 2006; United Nations 2001). 
Though the terms vulnerability and precarity are quite similar and are often used 
interchangeably, examining the terms separately helps reveal their usefulness as 
analytical frameworks. Both address issues of uncertainty and instability that emerge 
from conditions that lie outside of oneself (Gilson 2014; Rodgers and Rodgers 1989; 
Waite et al. 2015). However, as analytical devices, the two terms slightly differ. 
Vulnerability is unequally distributed around the world and is experienced in vastly 
different ways. Focusing on the individual helps to expose those experiences and how 
they are differentiated (Waite 2009), and helps make visible the difficulty of transcending 
systems of disadvantage (Fineman 2010). Precarity, on the other hand, comes into play 
when we move beyond description of the individual and to analysis of groups and 
society, and of the precarious experiences that are produced by the labor market, other 
institutional structures, and larger global forces (Waite 2009). It draws attention to “the 
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political and institutional context in which the production of precarity occurs” (Waite 
2009, 422; emphasis in original).17 
While from an ethical and political perspective, the individual’s experiences of 
vulnerability and how we interpret them are extremely important (Gilson 2014). The 
concept of precarity has an advantage as a political tool because it links conditions to 
politically induced global, national, and local structures to the vulnerability of the 
individual. As Paret and Gleeson (2016) explain, “[precarity] connects the micro and the 
macro, situating experiences of insecurity and vulnerability within historically and 
geographically specific contexts” (280). Political, economic, social, and gendered 
processes engage to create the conditions of precarity. These precarious living and 
working situations then create and reinforce individual vulnerability (Lewis et al. 2015). 
Thus, while broader structural, socio-economic systems target and create precarity for 
certain social groups, vulnerability is exacerbated and experienced by the individual 
(Blazek 2014; Butler 2006; Farmer 2004; Lewis et al. 2015; Schierup et al. 2015).  
The living and working conditions temporary low-wage migrant workers face 
have been called the “quintessential incarnation of precarity” (Schierup and Jørgensen 
2016, 949; see also Anderson 2010, Blazek 2015, Jorgensen 2016, Lewis et al. 2014, 
Paret et al. 2016, Strauss and McGrath 2017, Waite et al. 2015). This is because of the 
numerous precarious conditions that low-wage workers generally face. Understanding the 
lives of these workers requires an iterative exploration of the micro and macro. It requires 
moving back and forth between the two, examining the individual experience in light of 
                                                
17. Note that the concept of structural violence in the context of global neoliberalism is discussed 
in the following chapter.  
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broader national and international structures and processes while at the same time 
examining these broader structures in relation to historical events.  
This study was driven by my interest in the lives of low-wage migrant workers 
and was guided by three overarching questions that addressed the processes and 
structures that impact the lives of low-wage migrant workers, the impact of these 
processes and structures on the individual, and the factors that lessen or strengthen 
resilience in dealing with challenging circumstances. What was revealed were multiple 
layers of vulnerability and powerlessness which, when examined more broadly, revealed 
the precarity that is built into the structures that impact their lives. Their experiences were 
individual, but they reflect structures that are common and prevalent to low-wage foreign 
migrant workers in the Gulf. 
A focus on emotional well-being from a social justice perspective has not been 
explicitly addressed in prior research of the UAE. In addition, previous research has 
largely focused on migrant populations from specific regions or countries.18 I build on 
this body of literature and extend it by focusing on a more diverse sample reflecting a 
wide range of different nationalities that all earn in the lowest wage bracket. My final 
sample was composed of forty-four individuals earning an average of Dh1340 (US$365) 
per month. They represent eleven countries and fifteen occupations, with typically only 
one working per employer. Among my sample were a few who were far less vulnerable 
                                                
18. Examples of the regions and countries addressed in the literature include South Asia (Hickey, 
Narendra, and Rainwater 2013; Jureidini 2014; Oishi 2005; Willoughby 2006) India (Breeding 2012; 
Clemens 2013; Kathiravelu 2016; Zachariah, Prakash, and Rajan 2004), Bangladesh (Rahman 2011), 
Pakistan (Marsden 2008), Indonesia (Irianto and Truong 2014) Sri Lanka (Michele Ruth Gamburd 2000), 
Philippines (Parreñas 2015; Parreñas and Silvey 2016), Uganda (Oliver and Malit Jr 2014), Ethiopia 
(Kuschminder 2016; Pessoa, Harkness, and Gardner 2014; Regt and Tafesse 2016), Kenya (Malit Jr. and Al 
Youha 2016). 
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than others, but, over all, what quickly became evident in the course of my fieldwork is 
that if a worker is earning in my designated wage bracket, that person is most likely quite 
vulnerable. 
Dissertation Overview 
The dissertation has seven substantive chapters, an introduction (chapter one), and 
a conclusion (chapter nine). Chapter two addresses the research methodology. There are 
three areas that I discuss in greater depth. The first is locating participants. This was 
challenging because the UAE has become more hypervigilant in warding off any 
discussion that might present it unfavorably; as a result, extra sensitivity and precautions 
were taken during recruitment and interviews. The second issue I discuss in greater depth 
is my use of an interpreter and why using one was essential for this study. Finally, I 
address the responses my participants gave when asked, “How do you feel now?” at the 
end of the interview. This spoke to the isolation my participants experienced and the 
importance of the interview process, beyond the scope of simply gathering data.  
Chapter three addresses the social, economic, and political circumstances, which 
created precarity in their lives back home and motivated migration. It focuses on events 
up until their arrival in Dubai. Some participants went beyond the pre-migration phase 
and spoke at length about their childhood and youth. These stories were helpful in 
understanding the choices individuals made and their ability to adapt to life in the UAE.  
The chapter also examines the literature on structural violence, vulnerability, and 
precarity, and the reasons for and impact of arriving on a visit visa versus an employment 
visa. One interesting finding that emerged in this chapter was the role of cognitive 
dissonance in driving one’s decision to emigrate. Many of the participants in my study 
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knew the stories about working in the Arab Gulf, including extensive debt, being tricked 
and ill treated, and being physically and sexually abused; however, this information did 
not align with their desperate need for a job. So as to reduce this cognitive dissonance, 
they focused on what they believed would be Dubai’s great potential to change their 
lives. They did not migrate for rational reasons, but rather, they rationalized their reasons 
for migrating.  
Chapters four through eight focus on my participants’ experiences in the UAE 
from the point of arrival. They examine the various processes, mechanisms, and obstacles 
that created, heightened, or diminished their vulnerability in the UAE. The first half of 
chapter four addresses the violent structures that are embedded in institutional structures, 
focusing on the kafala (sponsorship) system and its role in increasing migrant precarity. 
This system is the root of the country’s immigration policies and grants citizens a 
significant amount of responsibility and discretion for workers and thus results in migrant 
experiences that are highly variable. For those who are the lowest paid—as were most of 
my participants—the experience is often exploitative and dehumanizing. The second half 
of this chapter focuses on how these various structures induce fear and the power this fear 
has to discipline. The temporary and vulnerable circumstances in which most of my 
participants found themselves, immobilized them psychologically and spatially, 
contributing to greater vulnerability.  
The kafala system and the labor policies that grew out of this system resulted in 
migrants being differentially devalued. Chapter five addresses this and examines 
discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, and ethnicity. For many of my 
participants, the vulnerability that resulted from being differentiated on the basis of race, 
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ethnicity, or nationality—and hence subjugated to inferior positions within the social 
hierarchy and labor market—hindered their opportunities and impacted their security. An 
analysis of race, racism, hierarchies, and the power through which they operate are 
addressed throughout the chapter. These issues are extremely important in the UAE 
because it is a highly stratified country, beginning with nationals followed by Gulf Arabs, 
Westerners, other Arabs, South Asians, and ending with Black Africans.  
An intersectional framework guides the analyses in both chapter five and six. It 
helps to reveal the multiple and overlapping factors that resulted in the oppression my 
participants experienced. Chapter six continues the focus on discrimination, but focuses 
specifically on how it is gendered and how the women in my study were impacted. The 
day-to-day experiences of these women reveal issues and events that were distinctly 
different from those encountered by men. Two of these were more isolated work 
environments and sexual harassment. The International Labor Organization’s (ILO) 
indicators of forced labor are applied to their experiences.  
The differential devaluation discussed in chapters five and six was also spatial. 
Chapter seven focuses on this spatial component. It explores the spaces and boundaries 
that marginalize and exclude migrants of lower socio-economic status. In the first section 
I define the meaning of borders, boundaries and the socio-spatial perspective, introduce 
the concept of zones of marginalization, and explore the processes of spatial segregation 
and exclusion. The next section considers the national borders and political boundaries 
my participants crossed, and the temporariness and uncertainty that resulted in them 
occupying liminal spaces. Subsequently, I examine the various types of accommodation 
occupied by low-wage migrant workers, focusing on their conditions and various 
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locations throughout the city. I then explore why these spaces operate as zones of 
marginalization and the extent to which my participants were able to transgress the 
boundaries of these zones. The final section of the chapter considers who is and is not 
able to cross the boundaries that encompass the marginalized zones and ends by 
advocating for more inclusivity.  
Chapter eight considers the emotional well-being of my participants by focusing 
on the processes and factors that determined it. It describes how potentially stressful 
events or situations are made better or worse depending on what resources and resilience 
one has available, how one perceives the event or situation, and one’s ability to use those 
resources. For many, the inability to positively influence their circumstances resulted in 
depression, which often manifested itself in suicidal thoughts.  
Chapter nine, the concluding chapter, summarizes the main themes and findings, 
discusses the theoretical contributions the study makes, and its limitations. The focus of 
this dissertation is on the worker and the impact of attempting to live within the 
framework of certain policies and structures that are ultimately designed to exploit certain 
groups in society. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This research uses qualitative methods to study the experiences of being a 
temporary low-wage migrant worker in Dubai and the impact of those experiences on the 
individual. The decision to limit the study to qualitative methods was driven by the belief 
that analyzing the individual story helps reveal the collective story (Charmaz 2017), and 
that contextualizing these stories in relation to systems and structures will help us to 
understand how precarity is produced (Camfield, Crivello, and Woodhead 2008; Paret 
2016). This chapter discusses the criteria and process for participant selection, the 
challenges and benefits of using an interpreter while interviewing, the use of 
constructivist grounded theory for data analysis, and reflections of my own role in this 
study and its impact. 
Overview of Study 
Targeted data collection for this ethnographic study occurred over a ten-month 
period, from August 2015 through May 2016. It was carried out in Dubai for two key 
reasons. One is that the UAE—Dubai in particular—has the highest ratio of foreigner 
workers in the world. In addition, my ten years working in Dubai fueled my curiosity and 
desire to better understand the circumstances and dynamics centered around the 
extremely large number of low-wage migrant workers in the city. Finally, I know the 
context quite well. The study was built upon innumerable hours of informal observation 
and conversations that have been on-going since 2002 when I moved to the UAE to 
teach. This span of time proved useful, especially in regard to the UAE’s context and 
culture. However, unexpected changes occurred while I was outside of the country 
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between 2012 and 2015. The country has always been on guard of its reputation. While 
this has been the situation since I arrived there, while I was away it grew and continues to 
grow noticeably more vigilant in protecting its image.  
Prior to returning to Dubai to carry out my research, I gained approval by the 
Instructional Review Boards (IRB) to conduct my research.19 Once in Dubai, I inquired 
into the need for local official research approval in the UAE. An advisor to the Dubai 
Executive Council told me that it was not possible to get official permission because 
there was no entity from which to obtain it.20 With the advisor, I spoke about the 
numerous accounts of suicide among this population, and he said the government was 
aware of the problem.21 He strongly encouraged me to address issues of emotional well-
being. At about this same time, I also had the opportunity to speak with a professor from 
Columbia University who was in the UAE as an educational consultant. He had 
experience carrying out fieldwork in difficult contexts and was knowledgeable about the 
UAE context. He suggested that I gain “local scientific sign-off” for my study. He 
explained that this is a form of secondary review and involves finding a local academic 
who would read and sign off on my protocols. I contacted a national I knew at a 
university in the UAE. She read, gave her approval, and provided a letter to verify.22 
Although my focus was on emotional well-being, I found that among those in my 
study, the issues that determined a person’s well-being and tendency towards suicidal 
                                                
19. IRB STUDY00000840; given March 26, 2014. 
20. Conversation September 15, 2015. 
21. Conversation September 10, 2015.  
22. For issues of confidentiality and the protection of the individual, this letter cannot be included 
with the dissertation. It can be presented in person, but must be retained by the author.   
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thoughts held many similarities. At the heart of both is the need to reveal the various 
factors that impact the individual and how they do so. It requires asking: What are the 
practices, processes, and structures low-wage migrants encounter? What are the spaces 
they must navigate? What roles do family and the home country play? What are the 
beliefs and expectations imposed by self and others? What reduces or strengthens 
resilience? These questions guided my exploration. 
Participant Selection 
Because my goal was a very diverse selection of participants, I used a non 
probabilistic, purposive sampling approach. With this approach the goal is “theoretical 
saturation” (Bernard 2011; Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 2006; Weiss 1995), the rationale 
being that “when further inquiry will add little to the story,” sampling should stop . The 
goal is to avoid unnecessary duplication of like cases. The greater the range achieved 
among cases, the more assurance we can have that the sample includes instances 
displaying greater variation.23 The theoretical sampling I pursued was mainly in regards 
to occupation and country of origin.  
The selection of participants was driven by three criteria. All participants had to 
be residing in the UAE, be non-national, and earn Dh1500 (US$408) or less a month. 
This is not a random amount. Other studies have either failed to delineate the conditions 
of “low-wage” or have utilized a relatively high wage in comparison to the lowest 
bracket. For example, one recent study on low-wage migrants in Dubai defined low-wage 
as those who did not earn the minimum required to sponsor one’s family, Dh4000 
                                                
23. My sampling approach holds some similarities to that advocated by Charmaz’s constructivist 
grounded theory approach simply because of the diversity I sought.  
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(US$1090) per month (Kathiravelu 2016). In addition, I found that there tends to be 
significant difference in the experiences of those who earn less than Dh1500 (US$408) 
and those who earn Dh2000 (US$545) or more.24 These lowest of earners—especially 
those whose accommodation expenses must come out of this amount—tend to encounter 
greater barriers. Extremely low pay is often accompanied by exploitative conditions and 
an inability to send sufficient remittances home.  
Two participants were clear outliers. They earned far higher salaries than the 
others in the study. I chose to keep them as part of the sample because they provide an 
important contrast to those who earned much less. Jean, a Filipina domestic worker, 
earned Dh3500 (US$953) a month including housing, and Rifat, a Bangladeshi personal 
driver, earned Dh5000 (US$1363) a month without housing. In chapter six, I focus on 
domestic work and compare the experiences of my participants who performed this work. 
Jean’s experience is far different from those who earned much less. In chapter eight, I 
look specifically at the emotional well-being of participants. We find a clear relationship 
between salary, conditons, and emotional-wellbeing.25  
Apart from these criteria, what drove my selection was diversity. The selection 
was neither random nor representative. The aim was to interview a wide variety of 
nationalities, occupations, and employers, in order to explore the heterogeneity of their 
experiences as well as their likenesses. Because I was seeking diversity, my sample is not 
                                                
24. There is neither a minimum wage nor any national data to contextualize these wage levels 
nationally. It is not known what percentage of the migrant population earn this amount; however,  it is 
likely to be significant.  
25. Comparing salaries is a bit challenging and inexact. Some participants were provided housing 
and meals, and others were not. The amounts I was told sometimes included the additional money they 
were provided for housing and meals, and at other times individuals did not provide that information.  
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proportionally representative of the low-wage migrant population. A break down of the 
current population in the UAE would result in there being no African nationalities in my 
study. In addition, although all South Asian nationalities and Filipinos would have been 
represented in my sample, I would only have had one or two of each nationality (Snoj 
2015).26 The vast majority would have been Indian and Pakistani. Hence, with the aim of 
heterogeneity, nationalities with small populations were targeted, too.  
The Final Sample 
I achieved a great deal of diversity in my sample (see Appendix A and B). Of my 
forty-four participants, eighteen participants were from five different sub-Saharan 
African countries, twenty-four were from five different South Asian countries, and two 
were from the Philippines.27 Men heavily dominate the UAE population. This is due to 
the high number of low-wage workers who are unable to bring their families. In Dubai, 
the ratio of women to men is three to seven (“Population Bulletin Emirate of Dubai 
2015” 2016). The ratio in my sample was three to four. Again, I was seeking diversity, 
not representativeness. The oldest participant was fifty-two and the youngest was twenty-
three. The average age was thirty-three. Filipinas on average were the oldest and the 
African nationalities were the youngest. Ten of my participants had a grade five 
                                                
26. The UAE government does not publish data on the population by nationality. Thus, 
demographic data are estimates based on information from Embassies in the UAE. The five South Asian 
nationalities that are in my sample have a total population of approximately 5.1 million in the UAE and the 
Philippines has a total population of approximately half a million (Snoj 2015). Demographic data on the 
five African nationalities represented in my sample is even more difficult to come by. There are 
approximately 90,000 Ethiopians, 40,000 Kenyans, and 500 Ghanaians in the UAE (Snoj 2015). If we 
assume that Cameroon and Nigeria each have the same size populations in the UAE as Ethiopia, then the 
five African nationalities represented in my sample would account for approximately 310,000. This number 
is likely much lower. The UAE has indeed decreased its migrant labor populations from other Arab-
Muslim nations. However, it does not appear to have replaced it with a balance of nationalities. See also 
“UAE Population by Nationality (2016).  
27. See Appendix B for a break down by nationality.  
 23 
education or less; fourteen had a sixth grade education or beyond up to a high school 
certificate; and, twenty had more than a high school education. In terms of religion, there 
were twelve Muslims, ten Christian, five Hindus, and two Buddhists. The average salary 
was Dh1340 (US$365) per month. This average includes the two outliers discussed 
above. The lowest salary in the sample was Dh450 (US$123) a month (see Appendix B 
for nationalities, occupations, ages, and salaries of all participants). 
The men in my study reflect a broader range of occupations than the women. This 
is due to the more limited employment opportunities for very low-wage migrant women. 
Many of the women were—or had been at some point—employed as domestic workers; 
other occupations included bus chaperons, hair stylists, and commercial cleaners. Men 
also worked as cleaners of all sort. The various cleaning jobs included window-washing, 
car washing, cleaning of labor camp accommodation. Cleaning jobs or any sort are very 
low-wage. Men were also employed as gardeners and shop deliverers.  Overall, eighteen 
occupations were represented with no more than three working for any one employer.28   
English language skills are another area in which my sample held a great deal of 
diversity. It is notable because it impacted my ability to locate participants—discussed in 
the next section—and whether or not I required an interpreter—discussed later in this 
chapter. I placed my participants’ English skills into five categories: fluent/advanced,29 
                                                
28. Occupations where earning Dh1500 (US$408) or less would have been unlikely include sales 
clerk, gas station attendant, waiter, receptionist, secretaries, or taxi, bus and trailer truck drivers.  
29. While there are differences between the language skill levels of “fluent” and “advanced,” for 
the purpose of this study, the difference is not important. As a result, I use the terms interchangeably. In 
addition, my focus is only on spoken English, not the other skill areas.  
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intermediate, lower but workable,30 quite low, and none. The majority of my participants 
fell either in the highest category or the lowest (Appendix C provides a good visual 
representation of the distribution of English language ability across my participants). 
Many Americans expect migrant Indians to speak English. This is because the majority of 
Indian migrants to the US are more highly educated (Zong and Batalova 2017). The UAE 
also attracts highly educated Indian migrants; however, it attracts an even larger number 
of less educated migrants who have very weak English skills. These migrants, like many 
in my study, come to the UAE to work in low-wage jobs. Among my South Asian 
participants, only one would be considered to be advanced or fluent in English. In 
contrast, twelve of my African participants were fluent. Of the five Africans who did not 
have advanced English skills, four were intermediate, and only one I considered to have 
lower, but workable English ability. Apart from the one South Asian with advanced 
English skills, only seven others had either intermediate or lower but workable language 
skills. One of my Filipina participants had advanced English, and the other 
intermediate.31  
Locating Participants 
Locating participants for the study was a challenge. The central cause of this was 
due to my desire for a very diverse sample. I had to continually seek out new pathways 
when I felt I had a sufficient number of individuals from one nationality, occupation, 
                                                
30. By “lower but workable” I mean that the individual’s English language skills were fairly low, 
but they had a sufficient amount of English to engage in conversation. Overall, only five of my forty-four 
participants were in this category.  
31. There were other interesting differences. All of my participants were either single or had a 
spouse in their home country. Any children were also in the home country. Eight women participants had 
children and eleven men had children. However, all of the women who had children were financially 
responsible for them.  
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and/or employer. The two other key reasons for my challenges were related to language 
and trust. The issue of language speaks for itself. My inability to communicate directly 
with many participants—especially low-wage workers from South Asia—required me to 
rely on others for recruitment.  
A more relevant discussion is around the issue of trust. As I discussed earlier, the 
Dubai government is hypersensitive about its image and how it is represented in the 
media. Many workers in Dubai know about the sensational news reports out of Qatar 
concerning the construction for the World Cup to be hosted in 2020, and workers could 
get fired for speaking with journalists (Black 2015). This made potential participants 
hesitant to engage with me. In most cases, however, this occurred during the recruitment 
phase and I was told about it later. In one instance, my interpreter and I had gone together 
one evening to recruit and potentially interview. He had apparently convinced a man to 
come, but once in my car it was clear to me that the man was quite anxious and really did 
not want to be there. I smiled and told him he did not need to stay. The man left, and 
afterwards, my interpreter said the man was worried about the authorities finding out.  
In addition, my identity as a white Westerner raised questions in the minds of 
potential participants. A few told me later that they had been concerned that I might be 
CID, undercover police. A young male Nigerian who was quite doubtful that I would 
even turn up for the interview said, “white people don’t really want to talk to blacks.” 
While these individuals were concerned about problems with authorities, this man was 
addressing issues of racism, which black Africans encountered frequently in Dubai. This 
is discussed at length in chapter four.   
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For these reasons, I was only able to recruit a small number of participants on my 
own. One was a Nigerian security guard at the university where I used to work and with 
whom I was able to speak to privately, another was an Ethiopian security guard whom I 
regularly saw on my morning dog walks, and the third was a young Indian man who 
delivered groceries in my neighborhood. Two of these men had university degrees and 
the third had two years of university experience. Otherwise, I used my personal networks, 
my interpreter, and previous participants to locate participants. 
My own personal networks included friends and previous colleagues. Through 
these networks I interviewed ten participants, two African, one Filipina, and seven South 
Asians. All but two I was able to interview on my own. Of the seven South Asians, four 
were Pakistani women. Two I could interview one-on-one. One of these two was Wafa, a 
young nurse who had recently graduated from university and come to Dubai to join her 
mother. Wafa acted as the translator for her mother and for another woman who was a 
distant cousin.32  
My Nepali interpreter, Tarun, was central to recruitment. Overall, he was able to 
connect me with fifteen individuals. He found two African participants whom I was able 
to interview one-on-one, but mainly, he was central to recruiting South Asian participants 
from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, countries where Hindi (or Urdu) is spoken. 
Sometimes Tarun would locate participants on his own and sometimes we went together. 
When he did it on his own, he would go hang out in parts of the city where he knew large 
                                                
32. Issues of honesty are often in question when a family member is the interpreter. I believe the 
women were quite forthright. One of them freely discussed the suicidal feelings she had experienced in 
Pakistan. Wafa’s mother did not, but my engagement with her and the stories she shared showed that she 
was an emotionally and psychologically strong woman. While she was clearly poor and had had to 
struggle, her life experiences had not been nearly as harsh and trying as the cousin’s had been.  
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groups of South Asians congregated on Fridays, the Muslim religious day and the day off 
for many workers. Often areas where people congregated were near central bus stations. 
Tarun would get to know the person, follow-up with one or more phone calls, maybe see 
the individual again, and encourage him or her to be interviewed. Another approach was 
for Tarun and I to drive to one of the labor camps on Friday afternoons. I would sit in the 
car, and Tarun would search for potential participants. One place where he often found 
success was at the ATM machines, which some workers had difficulty understanding. 
Tarun would help them and then continue chatting with them. Sometimes we would 
interview immediately and other times he would get their phone numbers and follow up 
with some calls, eventually asking the individual to interview. Sometimes one of these 
participants would connect Tarun to another potential participant. In general though, this 
was not a successful method. Often the only individuals these participants knew were 
others who worked for the same company and/or performed the same job. With my aim 
for diversity, snowball sampling of this type was not so useful. Over the course of the ten 
months that Tarun worked with me, he became quite gifted at gaining the trust of 
strangers. However, while Tarun was excellent at locating participants and interpreting 
for them, we discovered that having him interpret for an individual whom I had found 
through a third party was not a good idea. Two unknown bodies—Tarun and mine—
understandably failed to gain their trust. Only one man was interviewed under such 
circumstances. In most cases, Tarun’s good relationship reflected positively on me. 
My final approach to findings participants was through previous participants. 
Sixteen participants were found this way. As I mentioned above though, snowball 
sampling in the sense of participants connecting with others they knew was not always 
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successful because of their limited networks. As a result, several months into my field 
work I began paying Dh50 (US$13.50) for each individual a previous participant found, 
so long as she or he fit the parameters of my study and filled a gap in terms of nationality 
and occupation. Because of this need, if a prior participant was interested in helping, he 
or she had to actively recruit in ways similar to Tarun’s. This necessitated time and 
energy, which I felt required compensation.  
In all cases, when a potential participant was found through another person, I 
asked that this individual be the one to initiate contact. I did this because I did not want 
individuals to feel pressured into meeting me. In the context in which I was carrying out 
fieldwork, I felt this would be ethically wrong. I knew that some had concerns about the 
risk of participating in an interview. In addition, I believed that the socio-economic 
imbalance between low-wage workers and myself could make an individual feel 
pressured to interview. Once a potential participant made the first step and contacted 
me—typically through WhatsApp—, I took over responsibility for maintaining dialog. In 
some cases, an interview might be arranged immediately, and in others we would “chat” 
through WhatsApp for a few days while I answered questions about who I was and what I 
was seeking. For the vast majority of my participants, I believe potential participants only 
contacted me because of the trust they had in the person who had “recruited” them.  
Remunerations 
Participants were given Dh100 (US$27) for their participation. With this money, I 
also gave a small bag containing juice, fruit, and a granola bar. Remuneration in the 
amount of Dh100 (US$27) was suggested by a man whom I had hoped would assist as a 
interpreter, but could not. When I asked him how much he would recommend giving as 
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compensation, he quickly responded and said Dh100 (US$27). With this amount, he said, 
they can eat for ten days. (That would be US$2.70 a day, an amount that does not go far 
in Dubai and would rarely cover the cost of meat, fruits, or many vegetables.) 
The Interviews 
None of my interviews could be conducted where the participants lived because 
most were in accommodation shared with an average of ten others. In addition, I did not 
want my presence to be cause for any problems. Coffee shops or other venue could prove 
too noisy, too distracting, and not private enough. I needed to ensure that we were not be 
overheard. I also wanted to ensure there were no security cameras, which are quite 
prevalent throughout Dubai. As a result, almost all of the interviews were held in my car. 
This worked out quite well. Within the confines of my “mobile” office, I could better 
ensure that the interview took place in a risk free environment. After I picked up my 
participant, I drove us to a location where I felt sure we could proceed unobserved. 
Another reason the car worked well was because of the high temperatures in Dubai. The 
air-conditioned car kept my interviewee and myself comfortable. The most important 
benefit of being in the car was the cocooned environment it created that lent a feeling of 
protection. Interviews lasted between forty and ninety-five minutes and averaged sixty-
five minutes. One outlier was 180 minutes long, but this took place over three 
consecutive days.  
The Content and Style of Interview 
The aim of my study is to better understand the experiences of temporary migrant 
workers earning in the lowest wage-bracket in Dubai, and the impact of those experiences 
on their emotional well-being. To better understand their lives in Dubai, I asked my 
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participants to speak not only about these experiences, but also about life in their home 
countries and the process of coming to Dubai (see Lee and Pratt 2013). This broader lens 
helped me to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the various vulnerabilities my 
participants encountered throughout their lives, and how these vulnerabilities may have 
accumulated and “compounded” (Lewis et al. 2015, 58), and in so doing impacted their 
well-being.  
At the beginning of each interview, I explained the aim of the project, what the 
interview would involve, that their anonymity and safety were my primary concerns, and 
that I would pay them for the interview.33 When Tarun my interpreter was present, the 
participant and I sat in the front of my car. Tarun would sit in the backseat. Leaning 
forward, he would be the voice that connected us. After gaining my participant’s consent 
to carry out the interview and record it, we would proceed.  
There was certain content I wanted participants to address whether on their own 
or through more targeted questions (see Appendix D for the complete interview 
protocol). This included information about the home country (including where they were 
from, their families, and communities), about the migration process (including how they 
had learned about the UAE, their reasons for migrating, and who had assisted them with 
funding their migration and acquiring a visit visa or employment visa), and about their 
experiences in Dubai (including what their work and accommodation was like, what was 
most challenging, and what motivated them to endure their circumstances). There were 
                                                
33. With my thirtieth interview, I also began telling them that I would not be able to help them 
further financially. This was due to my twenty-ninth interviewee, a Filipina security guard, having texted 
me the evening after the interview to say she needed a loan so that she could repay a debt. There was only 
one more participant, a Nigerian man, who also asked for money. It was surprisingly few considering the 
circumstances which most of my participants were in.  
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also specific aspects of emotional well-being that I wanted to explore. These topics 
included the interviewee’s sources of stress, sources of emotional support, coping 
mechanisms, general emotional state, and self-appraisals about oneself and one’s life.  
At the beginning of the interview, I would say, “I would like to hear about where 
you come from, the process of coming here, and your experiences here. You can begin 
where you would like.” 34 This allowed participants to freely speak and attend to those 
issues they felt most relevant, resulting in stories that were richer and which revealed the 
complexity of their lives (Camfield, Crivello, and Woodhead 2008). It also allowed 
content to emerge on its own, without prompting or prodding. After interviewees finished 
their story, I would then turn to a more semi-structured style of interviewing. For the 
more loquacious speakers, I waited and did not interrupt their narratives, asking the 
needed questions after they had finished. For those who were more reticent, I continually 
asked, prompting questions, encouraging them to say more. If this level of involvement 
was required, I would actively insert questions about well-being between those dealing 
with life experiences. 
Transcription of Interviews 
Immediately following each interview, I made field notes in scratch form, noting 
down the location of the interview and any challenges that had arose, such as the need to 
move the car halfway through the interview to avoid the sun or because I felt passerbys 
were paying too much attention to us. Later that day or the next morning, I elaborated on 
                                                
34. It took a few interviews before I was able to begin an interview in this way. At first I felt a 
need for great structure and control, and would ask them to start by telling me about their home country. 
Some did not want to do this because that was not what was most important to them. I learned fairly 
quickly that it was important to give the participant control over his or her story.  
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my field notes and began transcription. I carried out transcription myself because of the 
many different accents that could make comprehension a challenge. For interviews that 
required an interpreter, I transcribed only the English portions of the recording. Thus, the 
voices being transcribe were my interpreter's and my own. My interpreter was not able to 
be involved with transcription or with checking over the transcriptions due to the amount 
of time it would have required, and his own work schedule. 
I attempted to involve participants in validation; however, their circumstances 
made this quite difficult. Half of my participants did not speak a sufficient amount of 
English, and even those who were fluent simply did not have the time. To those I knew 
could read, I always asked if they would like to see the transcript and if they could let me 
know if I had made in errors during transcription. I new there was the possibility of errors 
because of the strong and varied accents that my interviewees had. I also said they should 
feel free to add information if they remembered something else they might like to add. 
Most were happy to receive it and said that they enjoyed seeing their life written before 
them. None gave me critical feedback, but one man did write an additional two pages 
about a series of events that happened when he was quite young. The information was not 
really pertinent to my study, but I do believe it was cathartic for him to write it. In 
addition, quite a few of my English-speaking participants wanted to remain in contact 
with me. Many of them have very isolated lives in Dubai, and maintaining contact with 
me was their connection to the outside world. As they had shared their stories with me, I 
was also one of the few who knew their story and had shown empathy.  
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Using an Interpreter in the Interviewing Process 
This study is unique in including a wide range of culturally distinct participants 
all of whom were performing jobs that earned extremely low-salaries. However, this 
uniqueness created challenges due to the various languages spoken. Rather than ignoring 
the challenges of interpreter-assisted interviews, as many studies do (Jones and Boyle 
2011; Merry et al. 2011; Williamson et al. 2011), I address it here.  
There are several reasons why researchers are disinclined to use interpreters. One 
is the potential for lost or sanitized meaning. This is due to an interpreter attempting to 
modify a response because he or she believes it either reflects his or her own country 
negatively or is concerned that the interviewee’s response might be offensive to the 
interviewer. Lost meaning can also be the result of poorly skilled interpreters or 
interpreters working in a third language, which is neither the interviewer’s or interpreter’s 
first language. It can also be lost due to cultural misunderstandings. A final challenge that 
many have in using an interpreter is locating participants.  
Without question, the interviews I carried out one-on-one without an interpreter 
were better. The conversations were more private and intimate; I was better able to 
respond empathically and use silence to communicate; I could be certain that the question 
was framed how I wanted; I was able to obtain greater depth; I could follow-up with 
participants after the interview if the participant was agreeable. The list could go on and 
on. Yet, while one-on-one interviews in my own language are ideal, restricting myself to 
this would have greatly impacted the type of study I carried out by limiting who I could 
interview and thus include. An exploratory study of this type in this setting has not been 
carried out. It has not been done for good reason, but those reasons and the fear that some 
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sort of standards would be forsaken if attempted simply results in loss of another kind.  
Researchers agree that if the aim is to better understand the diverse experiences and 
perspectives of migrants from different cultures and who speak different languages, an 
interpreter is crucial (Kosny et al. 2014; Merry et al. 2011). Following, I discuss some of 
the interpreter-related factors that I found to have a positive impact on an interview. 
One important factor was having an interpreter who was familiar with the culture 
(Kapborg and Berterö 2002; Merry et al. 2011; Williamson et al. 2011). My interpreter 
Tarun was able to speak with individuals from Nepal, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. 
Because he was Nepalese, he served as my cultural interpreter as well as my linguistic 
one. In addition, Tarun had experienced some of the hardships that my participants had 
endured. He had a university education, but like several of my participants, had come to 
Dubai to work in a job requiring far less education. He had lived in shared 
accommodation in the labor camps and, as a security guard, had worked outdoors in the 
heat.35 Because Tarun had experienced in at least some small ways the systems and 
challenges that our participants had faced, he could often fill in the gaps and help me 
understand how certain systems worked. Tarun’s own experiences gave him empathy for 
our participants and made him interested in and committed to the study.  
Another key factor for successful interviews is to spend a sufficient amount of 
time preparing the interpreter prior to the interviews (Jones and Boyle 2011; Kosny et al. 
2014; Williamson et al. 2011). One advantage to having a non-professional interpreter 
was his “trainability” and openness to advice. Prior to starting the interviewing process, I 
                                                
35. Tarun was lucky. An unexpected encounter with an Emirati man—who unbeknownst to Tarun 
was his employer—resulted in his promotion and opportunity to work in his field. 
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spoke extensively with Tarun about the aims of my research, the participants I was 
seeking, what he should and not say to them when sussing out their suitability prior to 
recruiting them, and the importance of not pressuring them to interview if they were 
clearly uncomfortable with and feared the prospect. We also spoke about the interview 
protocol, issues of consent, and how I wanted him to engage during the interview. In 
addition, prior to the first interview, Tarun translated the interview guide so that we could 
discuss concepts and terms to be sure we were both on the same page and to be sure that 
they would be accessible to the participants. It was in many ways a learning experience 
for the two of us, but because of his inexperience he was comfortable with our need to 
shift gears at times and reconsider our approach. 
Finally, building trust and rapport with participants is important (Merry et al. 
2011). Because Tarun had the time, interest, and familiarity with my target population, he 
was able to locate participants and build a relationship with them before we interviewed. 
It was the trust they developed in him that enabled the interview. I would argue that 
participants liked me because they liked him. The rapport and trust that Tarun build was, 
for example, what allowed a young woman to admit to being sexually abused by her 
employer.  
I would, of course, not dismiss the advantages of a professional interpreter. There 
were, however, some excellent advantages to having a non-professional. Tarun and I 
spent a great deal of time together. As discussed earlier, his work allowed him to spend 
Fridays helping me recruit participants. He stayed committed to assisting me throughout 
the entire ten months of my fieldwork, and he personally felt compelled to continue until 
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we had reached our target. A professional translator would likely not have the time or 
inclination to engage in many of these ways.  
Further Reflections on the Interviewing Process  
There are many factors that impact the success of an interview in terms of its 
richness and depth. They, of course, include the skill and personality of the interviewer 
and interpreter and the context within which one is attempting to carry out these 
interviews. But I also found that it could include the interviewees’ level of education, 
how they had been socialized, and the opportunities they had had in their home country. 
The interviews I carried out one-on-one in English without an interpreter were usually 
with more educated participants. These individuals, regardless of their nationality, were 
competent in describing and elaborating, and as a result their interviews had much more 
depth.36 Education, however, was not the only determinant. For example, the second 
interview I carried out was with Tarun my interpreter. It did not seem to go well. The 
interview was with Rashma, a Nepali woman with a high school education. The interview 
felt like pulling teeth. After transcribing it, I decided to request a second interview as I 
assumed that its quality was the result of my and/or my interpreter’s yet-to-be-fully-
developed interviewing skills or interpreting skills. But I do not believe it was due to 
either. The second interview with Rashma was much like the first. Throughout the two 
interviews I learned that Rashma was from a very, very poor family. The family appeared 
to have poor dynamics in terms of the emotional and psychological support it provided 
                                                
36. In Dubai, South Asians and Filipinos dominate among low-wage workers. As a result, there 
are many more of them and they often—though not always—have a stronger network of friends and are 
able to share accommodation with those friends. As a result, they have more people they can share their 
thoughts and concerns with. Africans, on the other hand, were often “the odd man out” in that they were the 
sole African in a room of Indians or Bangladeshis.  
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for one another, and it seemed like the family in general was very isolated from any 
broader community. I do not believe anyone had ever asked Rashma to talk about the 
events that occurred in her life, much less what she thought or felt. In contrast, there were 
some participants from South Asia who had very little formal education (grade four or 
five) and no English, yet who were very expressive and reflective. These many complex 
variables impacted the quality of the interview and also made it challenging to judge why 
some were richer than others. 
Prior to beginning my interviews, I was uncertain what the impact these 
conversations would have on my participants. I knew that research has shown that the 
opportunity to speak at length about one’s most difficult life experiences can improve 
mental well-being (Biddle et al. 2013; Smith, Poindexter, and Cukrowicz 2010; Jorm, 
Kelly, and Morgan 2007). These studies show that the interviewing experience can be 
cathartic and provide validation of one’s experience (Biddle et al. 2013; Weiss 1995). My 
own uncertainty was quickly replaced with confidence. Beginning with the first 
interview, I learned that the impact of the interview was positive. At the end of each, I 
asked, “How do you feel now?” The responses were insightful, showing how much they 
needed to share their experiences. Words such as “glad,” “better,” “happy,” fresh,” and 
“free” were used to express the impact that our conversation had had. Many of them 
mentioned how helpful it was to be able to tell another about the pain they felt. Sophie, a 
Cameroonian woman, said, “[I’m] a little better. … I don’t know. Somehow, talking 
about it. It’s painful, but I really never had a chance to bring it out. … I just wanted to 
speak to somebody, bring it out.” Muhammad, a Bangladeshi man, said—with a big 
smile on his face—that I reminded him of his mother. (I took this as a positive sign.) 
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While almost all had expressed feelings showing that they felt affirmed and in a better 
emotional place than before we had spoken, one was not. Tarun translated a Bangladeshi 
man’s thoughts, “Now he’s feeling okay, but now he’s worried about his family.”37 I took 
this as a negative sign of the impact. Fortunately, he was the only participant. For at least 
half of my participants, the simple invitation to speak was like opening the floodgates. 
The frustrations and sadness they contained inside and very often shared with no one else 
came flooding out. I explained to Gabriel, a twenty-six-year-old Nigerian man, what the 
study was about and gained his permission. He said, “I want to know where I am starting 
from; when I came to Dubai?” I said anywhere. From there, Gabriel spoke non-stop for 
four single-spaced lines of typed text.  
Some participants said that the interview had given them hope. One young man 
said he had agreed to the interview because he had been told by a previous participant to 
do the interview because “She gives you encouragement.” I never told interviewees that 
they deserved more, that they could surely get a better job, or that their luck would soon 
turn; yet, simply by being listened to—being there for them for those few minutes—they 
had felt encouraged.  
Informal Interviews & Conversations 
Beyond the interviews I held with my targeted population during my ten months 
of fieldwork, I had numerous other extended conversations. Early on, I was trying to 
determine whether the current political dynamics and tension I sensed around the 
                                                
37. This man had a very tormented soul, and sounded as such throughout the interview. He had 
convinced his father to sell their home so he could emigrate, and the home had been lost. While his 
response to having the interview was not fully positive, his interview went on for an hour and a half. 
Overall, I think the process was cathartic for him.  
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government and their concern for negative representation had indeed intensified. I spoke 
with a number of individuals whom I felt would have insight, including an advisor to the 
Dubai Executive Council, and a mix of university instructors, professors, deans, and a 
provost. They confirmed that the political climate in Dubai had shifted and that carrying 
out research would require some delicacy. Many presumed that I was being too cavalier 
about my fieldwork and the safety of my participants. However, after discussing the 
precautionary measures I was taking, they always concluded that I doing more than 
enough.  
To learn more about the experiences of low-wage workers, I spoke with an 
individual who owned a factory and another who was the general manager for a 
construction company. I also met with a man who was psychiatrist and director of 
residency at a local hospital.  I spoke at length with individuals who founded, ran, or 
simply volunteered for NGOs, which served low-wage workers. I attended a three-day 
workshop organized by a training center in Dubai on the issue of migrant rights and 
business ethics, and an educational workshop organized by this same training center and 
the government. In it, workers were taught about the laws and policies that were in place 
to assist workers.38 
Participant Observation  
The years of living and working in Dubai prior to beginning my doctoral study 
provided extensive opportunities for observing and engaging with the local population 
and migrants of various socio-economic levels and for following the local news. Those 
                                                
38. Events such as these were extremely frustrating. Those providing the training knew that 
employers could easily circumvent these laws and policies, and that complaining could easily result in 
employees being terminated. Yet, they continued to tell workers to do so.  
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ten years provided a strong foundation for my ten months of fieldwork which included 
more purposeful participant observation.  
My work with a local NGO was the main avenue for participant observation, as 
well as a way to better familiarize with my target population (Merry et al. 2011).39 The 
NGO where I volunteered focused its attention on serving workers who lived in the labor 
camps. During my ten months of fieldwork, I was the main coordinator for organizing 
worker health checks. This involved planning, attending, and participating as a volunteer 
at theses events. While attending the events, I was able to do extensive observation and to 
see where they prepared their meals and ate, the inside of rooms, and the general 
conditions of their lives.  
A good number of the men I met in those camps would have qualified to be 
participants in my study; however, I chose not to select participants from those locations 
where the NGO held events. Though the founder of the NGO had said it would be okay 
for to do so, and many there would have been suitable, I did not want to take the chance 
of bringing harm to the organization because of the government’s potential angst in 
regards to this study. The chances of this happening were likely very small; however, as 
with all of the choices I made in carrying out my fieldwork, I chose to err on the side of 
caution. 
The NGO events were a good opportunity for me to see how the labor camps 
were designed. Within a labor camp are hundreds of compounds. Each compound has 
                                                
39. Note, however, that by simply moving through daily life in Dubai one is able to observe the 
lives of low-wage workers. They are ubiquitous. Every apartment building has security and cleaners. There 
are low-wage cleaners, gardeners, shop deliverers, car washers, construction workers everywhere. All could 
very well have been earning wages similar to my participants.  
 41 
multiple buildings for accommodation. A company typically owns or rents a compound 
and typically houses anywhere between three or four hundred to thousands of employees. 
Though I interviewed many who lived in labor camps, I did not visit them there. Entering 
a compound requires passing security. As a white woman, my presence would have been 
memorable. I did not want to draw attention to what I was doing or to the participants 
who had engaged with me.  
On Fridays, I would also have extended periods of time to observe the common 
spaces within the labor camps. Tarun and I would visit one of the labor camps late in the 
afternoon. It was not uncommon for me to stay sitting in the car for a couple of hours at a 
time while I waited for him to seek out potential participants. From my car I could 
observe activities, such as the setting up of a small late afternoon market, and groups of 
men sitting around talking. In general, there was not a lot to occupy oneself with in these 
camps, apart from the company of others.  
Other locations where I was able to observe low-wage migrants came when I 
accompanied participants to various locations in the city. This would include visits to 
Immigration, the Ministry of Labor, and country consulates, as well as social get-
togethers. I maintained a quite lengthy in-person relationship with a group of six 
Pakistani women.40 Two of them, Jasweer and her adult daughter Wafa, I saw regularly 
                                                
40. Quite by coincidence the women in the group were Christians, not Muslim as are the majority 
Pakistanis. I was introduced to one of the women’s employers. The employer was Muslim and she 
employed two Pakistani women. One was Muslim and one was Christian; her name was Edna. On Fridays 
after church Edna met up with her church friends. The women invited me back to the room where one of 
them rented bed space. This woman, Jasweer, shared the room with Ghaziyah, a Pakistani Muslim woman. 
(Being able to share a room with only one other person is quite unusual and did not last long. Jasweer 
typically rented bed space in rooms with six to eight others.) Jasweer’s daughter, Wafa, had recently 
graduated from nursing school and had come to Dubai to join her mother. Both Wafa and Ghaziyah spoke 
lower level but workable English and acted as interpreters within these group settings. 
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over the course of my fieldwork, and I visited them in the various rooms where they 
rented bed space. In about the span of a year, they moved rooms seven or eight times, 
continually in search of a more affordable or comfortable space. These social get-
togethers provided excellent opportunities for observing and learning about their lives. 
Data Analysis 
My data was in the form of recorded interviews, memos, notes from observations, 
and WhatsApp exchanges that often continued after the interviews.41 Interviews were 
between forty and ninety-five minutes and averaged sixty-five minutes. One outlier was 
180 minutes long. Following each interview, I began to transcribe it the same day or the 
following. This was important because it informed how I approached subsequent 
interviews. After the first two interviews were transcribed I discussed them with a 
professor in Dubai who was familiar with the context and target population. 
From the start I regularly reviewed transcripts searching for common themes, and 
memoing further about ideas I wanted to explore in future interviews. I did not, however, 
begin to do more formal coding until I received training in Atlas.ti qualitative data 
analysis software in February 2016.42 This occurred six months into my fieldwork. When 
I first began, the codes were very descriptive and topic oriented. After several transcripts, 
I felt I was not capturing the experiences of my participants. In May of that year I 
                                                
41. Pseudonyms were used with everyone and in all forms of documentation. Real names and 
contact information were saved in SecureSafe, a secure cloud storage service. In addition, to protect myself, 
I used a VPN when examining websites or emailing what might be seen by local authorities as questionable 
topics or trigger words.  
42. Prior to using Atlas.ti, my coding consisted of reading and re-reading the transcripts and 
making notes about potential codes, categories, and emerging themes, and information that needed further 
explanation.  
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attended a qualitative research conference and was introduced to several approaches to 
data analysis, including Kathy Charmaz’s constructivist grounded theory method.43  
Grounded theory is a method of analysis originally developed by Glaser and 
Strauss in the 1960s in reaction to positivist quantitative research and the dominant hold 
it had. In the 1990s, Strauss in collaboration with Corbin moved away from Glaser’s 
more rigid approach to analysis and to one that was looser and more pragmatic. In the 
1990s, grounded theory took a constructivist turn. While maintaining Glaser and 
Strauss’s pragmatism and its iterative approach to analysis, the new conceptualization 
was inherently more flexible and started from the position that “social reality is multiple, 
processual, and constructed” (Charmaz 2014), a principle that guided has guided my 
study from the beginning. 
The key elements I took away from Charmaz’s workshop were the need for an 
iterative process that focused on processes, not descriptions. This meant looking at what 
was happening and what people were doing. Constructivist grounded theory involves a 
fairly deliberate process of initial coding followed by more focused coding. In essence, it 
is moving from more concrete references to more abstract ones. Because I was using 
Atlas.ti, I found that the easiest way to do this was to create two separate projects, one for 
initial coding and one for focused coding. I did not do initial coding of all of the 
transcripts. Rather, I carried out initial coding of four or five transcripts and then stopped 
to reflect on the categories that were emerging and to synthesize codes that were 
                                                
43. Charmaz contends that theoretical sampling should be based on conceptual and theoretical 
development. My sample selection did not intentionally adhere to this approach. I only began exploring her 
work more deeply after my data was collected. However, while my selection of participants was not carried 
out with this in mind, the diversity I was attempting to capture in my sample and how I allowed previous 
interviews to guided future ones held similarities to her approach.  
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repetitive. I used Atlas.ti network views to create mind maps for sorting codes related to 
individual participants and thinking about categories and themes. Using the codes that 
had been synthesized from the first few transcripts, I then did an initial coding of four or 
five more transcripts, continually adding codes as needed. At that point I studied the 
codes more deliberately, again using Atlas.ti’s network view to focus on the most 
frequent and/or significant codes, determining which made sense together and what 
categories they formed. I then started my second Atlas.ti project to carry out focused 
coding. I continued doing only focused coding on subsequent transcripts unless I 
encountered transcripts that had very different processes occurring, in which case I 
returned to the first Atlas.ti project and began with initial coding.  
After completing the focused coding of all of the interviews, I reviewed each 
transcript, noting the experiences and themes that were most prominent and wrote a one- 
to two-page summary about that participant, including any pertinent quotes. I printed 
these out and physically cut them into small segments that I proceeded to sort. I sorted 
them into categories that I had already determined while also creating new categories and 
themes that had not yet emerged, synthesizing and re-grouping as needed. I went through 
the same with all of my memos. It is through this process that the chapters for my 
dissertation evolved.  
Positionality & Reflexivity 
My interest in pursuing doctoral study in justice studies and issues related to 
migration were driven by my experiences in the UAE. Yet, my desire to pursue research 
on low-wage migrant workers has always sat uncomfortably with me. It would have been 
easier to explore the white Western employers of domestic workers or the unique and odd 
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practices of racial and nationality-based discrimination that occur in Dubai. These would 
have been much more “comfortable” pursuits and I likely would have been a more 
suitable researcher in the eyes of many, but they dealt little with issues of social justice 
and marginalization. Further, they were not issues that drove me, and they certainly 
would not have driven me through the processes of doctoral study.  
The cross-cultural interactions that took place with my target population pressed 
me to always be cognizant of my position as a white middle-aged American woman 
raised in an upper-middle class household.  My goal was not to attempt to escape my 
outsider status or “otherness.” That was impossible. Rather, my aim was to increase my 
status as an ally. However, while I know that an ally was important, after several 
interviews I learned that what was most needed was a confidant. The individuals I spoke 
to were in desperate need for such a person. One participant told me that he and others 
like him could not share their private—and what many felt were humiliating—lives with 
others. Whether driven by experience or assumptions, he would not tell others about his 
low-level work, pay, or where he was living because he believed it would be told to 
others and laughed about. This was not only among my more educated participants; those 
with little education did similarly. The result was that low-wage workers hide from 
family and friends in their home country and local friends the substantive aspects of their 
lives, the aspects that were the hardest to bear and endure. They knew that I would not 
laugh, tell anyone, or show judgment.  
Listening closely to my participants’ stories helped my participants feel that they 
were being heard and helped me notice when part of the story was not being told. For 
example, in my interview with Mercy, a thirty-two-year-old Nigerian woman, it became 
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apparent to me that she was skirting around the topic of sex work and/or sexual abuse. I 
could imagine that admitting to such involvement to anyone—much less a researcher of a 
different nationality—would have been incredibly difficult. I told Mercy that I knew 
there were a lot of women who come to Dubai and then cannot find work, that they 
become desperate, and feel like their only alternative is sex work, or that they are put into 
circumstances where their only option is to allow themselves to be sexually violated. I 
then asked her if she had had to face such a choice. The transcription of her response 
filled a page with single-spaced text. Mercy and I returned to the topic of sex work later, 
and I asked if she had ever met someone who had come to Dubai with the intention of 
working in the sex trade. She replied that she didn’t like to associate with such people. I 
felt that she feared Nigerians looked bad to others. I said that I understood that life in 
Nigeria was incredibly hard, and that some had no alternative, and that, “desperation 
leads to desperate means.” Again, this opened the door to her sharing.  
In another example, it was my good fortune that Tarun my interpreter also strove 
to be a trustworthy ally and confidant. In our interview with Sunita, a young Nepali 
woman who was working as a domestic worker, she told us that she had been “tortured” 
and mentioned a couple of ways. I asked her if there were other ways they tortured her. 
She became very quiet and did not speak, staring out the front window of the car. Such 
silences make the story irrelevant. The details unneeded. In my head I had answered the 
question long before she did. She eventually spoke. Rape … on a weekly basis. Such 
moments of honesty would have been impossible with just any interpreter. Tarun showed 
an amazing amount of compassion for the young woman.  
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Overall, I was amazed by the amount of self-disclosure, driven by what I 
presumed was the need to “get it all out.” I knew it was the intensity of their 
circumstances and suffering that resulted in an utter desperation to unburden themselves. 
In many ways, at the point of the interview, my position was as a nameless other who, as 
Yabani said, would not come back to haunt them with the stories they had told. Some 
confided in me because of the enormous racial, national, and social gap between us. With 
others, I bridged this gap through my desire to be there, to listen, and to not judge. I did 
not need to be an insider or lessen my otherness. I needed to be compassionate.  
Conclusion 
The substantive chapters of this dissertation follow my participants from their 
home countries and through the migration process of gaining entry and working in the 
UAE. I provide a descriptive account of their experiences and the factors that influenced 
them, and ground these experiences in current and historical events. The aim of this 
exploration is to better understand how my participants’ experiences impacted their 
emotional well-being, and what factors aided or hindered their ability to flourish. The 
following chapter is the beginning of this journey. It focuses on their home country and 
the factors that motivated their migration to the UAE.  
  
 48 
CHAPTER 3 
 
VULNERABILITY: THE JOURNEY FROM HOME  
 
When I was in Nepal, I didn’t have enough money, and my parents were 
jobless, so I had lots of problems when I was in Nepal. I wanted to study, 
but I didn’t have money. I stopped my education at that time. I couldn’t 
study because of my sister. I had a responsibility to my younger sister. 
That’s why I came here. I wanted to stay in Nepal, actually. But my sister 
still study so I need to give her money. Because of that I came here.44   
 
Rashma, a 28-year-old Nepalese women 
 
There is only one reason why I left Nigeria…. It is because of job. That is 
the only problem. My country is very okay…. We take fresh food, fresh 
vegetables, every time, fresh meat, but there is no money. That is the only 
problem. No jobs…. … You are free to build your own house, if you have 
money.  
 
Yabani, a 30-year-old Nigerian man 
 
Then husband was always very bad. Drinking, drinking, drinking so much. 
I was working so much. I can't work like that. That's why I came to Dubai. 
My mama and father only looking after my three children. That's why I 
came. My father just died now. My older girl big now. Any problem can 
happen. What to do? Take care of girl. Now I return to my home country. 
 
Danjua, a 33-year-old Sri Lankan woman 
 
The vulnerability my participants experienced did not begin in Dubai. It began in 
their home countries. It was the precarity of their lives that drove them to leave their 
families and friends in hope of something better. Some left home because they were 
unable to find work. Others left in hopes of finding better work so that their children or 
their siblings might go to school, so that a parent might be able to receive the medical 
treatment needed, so that they would not be destitute when they were no longer able to 
work. This is the first chapter of five that looks at vulnerability and its cumulative aspect. 
                                                
44. Tarun my interpreter translated for Rashma. He often did so using the third person. I have 
changed it to the first person.  
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Their vulnerability began in their home countries, and for most, their migration increased 
it.  
This first chapter focuses on the factors that motivated my participants’ 
emigration and the challenges they encountered in the process of migration up until their 
arrival in the UAE. It examines the hidden historical structures and systems that can 
violently impact the less powerful in society, propelling them to seek work elsewhere. 
Framing these structures and systems as violent brings attention to the harm that can 
result when certain groups are exploited to the advantage of the powerful. They are time 
and space specific, yet also historical in terms of their links to the past. Historical-
structural processes also provide the foundation for explaining other factors that 
propelled my participants along the path to migration, such as the role of segmented 
markets, social networks, misperceptions, and deception. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of emigration bans, and the desperation that drove my participants to 
circumvent such governmental obstacles. 
Historical-Structural Processes 
Almost all of the reasons that motivated my participants to emigrate are rooted, at 
least in part, in historically entrenched political-economic systems. The structural 
vulnerability and dislocation that individuals and groups experience begins with global 
macro-level forces which shape national institutions and local conditions. Identifying the 
roots of this structural violence and how it operates in the lives of migrants can reveal 
how structural violence works. This chapter begins with an overview of structural 
violence and then discusses it within the framework of the historical-structural approach 
to migration.  
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Structural Violence 
Structural violence is a multifaceted concept that has been explained in a variety 
of ways. However, central to all has been a desire to expose the unjust systems that result 
in some groups being privileged and others oppressed. Johan Galtung coined the term 
“structural violence” in the late 1960s. In his book Peace by Peaceful Means, he explains 
that structural violence is the violence that occurs when wealth and power exploit or 
oppress others, and standards of justice are not upheld (Galtung 1986). This inequality 
and injustice is often the result of institutions. Elise Boulding, a contemporary of Galtung 
and fellow peace educator, defined structural violence as “the patterning of social 
institutions that results in violent oppression and injustice for victim sectors of society, 
whether locally, regionally, or globally” (2000, 161). As well as being institutional, 
structural violence is also global, historical, economic, political, and systemic. Philippe 
Bourgois (2004) captures these elements. He explains that structural violence is 
“[c]hronic, historically entrenched, political-economic oppression and social inequality, 
ranging from exploitative international terms of trade to abusive local working conditions 
and high infant morality rates” (426).  
These explanations show the complexity of structural violence and the difficulty 
in explaining it. Structural violence is a condition as well as a cause and an effect of that 
condition. Its roots are both visible and invisible, as are its consequences. It is a 
“ubiquitous experience” (Quesada 2011, 390), observable among the multitudes, as well 
as individually. It is the process of creating oppression and injustice, and it is the 
oppression and injustice itself. It is both a conceptual tool and a condition to be 
interrogated. As a tool, structural violence can provide a framework for the analysis of 
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power (Gardner 2010), and of the mechanisms that create inequality. As a condition, it 
can be examined to reveal the social processes that structure and sustain increasing global 
disparities and human rights abuses (Farmer 2004). It can help us to understand how 
certain individuals and groups are made structurally vulnerable (Quesada, Hart, and 
Bourgois 2011). 
A central feature of structural violence is that it is often invisible. Physical 
violence is direct violence. Its source and its target are both clearly identifiable. In 
contrast, when violence is structural, it is impersonal. The source and manner in which it 
manifests itself are often hidden. Galtung (1969) explains that while the perpetrator of 
direct physical violence is typically known, with structural violence the individual may or 
may not be known. The perpetrators are often not known because the violence is the 
result of unequal power built into structures (Galtung 1969), which in themselves are 
difficult to identify. Sociologist Cecilia Menjivar (2011) adds that the consequences of 
structural violence only becomes visible when talked about because it is through speaking 
and discussion that the violence becomes recognizable.  
Yet, while we say that structural violence is hidden and invisible, this is typically 
because we do not interpret homelessness, poor health, hunger, poor housing, 
deportation, lack of health insurance, and poor pay as “violence.” They are problems or 
issues to be addressed, but not the result of violence. Framing these “problems” as 
violence is an analytical device that works to emphasize the “avoidable” harm that comes 
from unjust systems (Farmer and Rylko-Bauer 2016). In all, structural violence is a way 
to look at the world and its interconnections and interdependencies. The political, 
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economic, and social structures that we create have implications. They grant power and 
comfort to some at the expense of others, often leaving them structurally vulnerable.  
Historically Constituted Structures 
The affluent often view an individual’s economic circumstances as the result of 
one’s own failings (or success) and independent of broader circumstance. Anthropologist 
and physician Paul Farmer (2005) explains that although individuals and families do 
indeed have agency, that agency is mitigated by external structures that determine the 
distribution of resources. Systems and structures are historically constituted. They are 
rooted in slavery, colonialism, and patriarchy—institutionalized systems that evolved 
with the “events” of direct violence (Galtung 1986). Galtung explains that over extended 
periods of time, direct violence “seeps down and sediments as massive structural 
violence” with some in the position of privilege and others without (Galtung 1986, 200). 
Galtung (1969) writes that he devised the idea of structural violence in response to the 
US’s lack of awareness of the lasting impact of colonial inequality. Colonialism (and 
slavery) initiated the flow of human and raw resources from the poorest to the richest 
countries. These structures are behind the imposition of racial stratification found in 
much of the world today and are behind the unequal distribution of wealth (Farmer 
2005). They are central to the processes that have “shap[ed] contemporary patterns of 
violence across the world” (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004, 5) and have been 
maintained by corporations, banks, and lending institutions that control the economy 
(Menjivar 2011). The conditions of poverty have been systematically created and 
maintained, and play a significant role in labor migration and the perpetuation of 
precarity. 
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Migration within a Historical-Structural Framework 
Labor migration is often thought to be a choice. However, like poverty, migration 
is quite often the consequence of historically derived macro-structures that limit choice 
through perpetuation of inequality. Although migration is typically used as a strategy to 
escape poverty, often it simply “perpetuates” what they were hoping to escape (Menjivar 
2011, 53). These factors are central to the historical-structural theories of migration 
(Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Khondker 2010; D. S. 
Massey et al. 2005; Sassen 1988; Glick Schiller 2009; Wise and Covarrubias 2009).   
Wallerstein’s analysis of the historical-structural factors that contribute to 
migration holds many similarities to Galtung’s theory of conflict. Both of their analyses 
help to explain the neoliberal ideology that was behind the rapid increase in structural 
inequalities and the precarious conditions faced by low-wage workers globally (Beneria 
2000; Benería, Deere, and Kabeer 2012; Menjívar 2011; Muñoz 2008; Parreñas 2008; 
Wise and Covarrubias 2009). This ideology was the impetus behind structural adjustment 
polices that were behind the rapid increase in structural inequalities and the precarious 
conditions faced by low-wage workers globally (Beneria 2000; Benería, Deere, and 
Kabeer 2012; Menjívar 2011; Muñoz 2008; Parreñas 2008; Wise and Covarrubias 2009). 
“Developing” countries were required to privatize, liberalize, and deregulate national 
industries, open borders to the flow of capital and goods, ease labor law restrictions, 
increase exportation, and make cuts in social spending (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 
2014; Centeno and Cohen 2012; Muñoz 2008). The resulting poverty and lack of 
opportunities led to increases in international migration. The Arab Gulf has benefited 
 54 
from these processes, and Dubai in particular has quite effectively integrated neoliberal 
capitalist systems into its policies (Buckley 2012; Harvey 2005; Springer 2010).  
All of my participants were from countries that have had structural adjustment 
programs imposed on them by World Bank and International Monetary Funds. However, 
if asked about the source of the problems in their country, there is little knowledge of 
these programs and their impact on the political or economic problems in their home 
countries. Instead, blame was typically given to their respective governments, with 
corruption typically named as the chief culprit, especially by my African participants. 
Many of them held their governments responsible for their inability to find jobs. Nina, a 
twenty-eight-year-old woman from Cameroon, was about half way through her three-
month visit visa when we met. Nina had a university degree in marketing. Cameroon, she 
said, “is a peaceful country. It’s nice, but there are no jobs. You go to school, come out, 
and it is like you have not gone to school. […] Corruption has taken everything. … 
There’s nothing in Cameroon. … You just go to school and then you come out and leave 
[the country] …” Broader factors that might have motivated this corruption were not 
mentioned. Similarly, when I asked Jean, a forty-five-year-old Filipina woman, if she 
thought that problems in her country were caused by international conditions, by outside 
powers, she said, “I don’t think so.” She continued, 
I think the problem is the government. And secondly is the population. It’s 
a lot. And right now I’m looking… I’m a little bit scared [for] the 
Philippines, actually, because of the government. They are not focused for 
the poor people. What can they do for these poor people? And now if you 
see the news, the life is getting worse, worse, and worse. And the big 
problem right now in the Philippines is the drug. Of course, especially the 
drug mostly go to the high school life. For the new generation. And what 
happen to them if they do not finish the school for the study? I think 
people on the road doing naughty things because it’s worse. And the 
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people is using drug. They’re not thinking the right. They’re thinking how 
to make the money. For me right now it’s going worse and worse. … And 
a lot of people is no job. And a lot of people is I don’t know.45 
 
Not only were the problems in her country due to her own government, she also appears 
to hold society responsible for the excessive increase in their population. She also blames 
drugs, but does hold a specific party responsible for them.  
Migration Networks 
In migration theory, social networks are the connections between would-be 
migrants wanting to go abroad and experienced migrants and potential employers (D. S. 
Massey et al. 2005). These migration networks are determined by the amount of social 
capital to which one has access. Factors determining this range from the country or 
region from which one comes to who one knows and the amount of resources to which 
that person has access. These factors are at least in part rooted in global structures that 
have determined who has greater or lesser access to networks.  
 Social capital is a type of resource and, like a financial resource, it can be traded 
for other forms of resources, such as cultural, human, and economic resources (Coleman 
1988; de Haas 2010; D. L. Swartz 2013). Social capital is a relational resource that is 
defined by its function (Coleman 1988). One such function is the production of migrant 
networks (de Haas 2010). In this form, social capital is location-specific and can provide 
potential migrants access to information about the destination country and to others who 
can facilitate their migration (de Haas 2010; D. S. Massey et al. 2005). Potential migrants 
“draw upon” their social capital to access migration networks and the resources that these 
                                                
45. Jean’s discourse is an interesting contrast to most of my participants’. Jean was the farthest 
outlier in my sample in terms of salary, and was quite happy with her situation. I see her relaxed, coherent 
speech as a sign of her good living and working conditions. She had no story that had to be told.  
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networks can provide (de Haas 2010). Doing so supposedly reduces the financial, 
psychological, or emotional cost of migration.46  
Strong and Weak Networks 
The strength of migrant networks can be examined in terms of the strength of the 
tie that a potential migrant has to a network. Network theorist and sociologist Mark 
Granovetter (1973) described a strong tie as one involving family and friends and a weak 
one as being composed of acquaintances. He explains that the strength of the migrant 
network tie is important because it can determined whether or not one is able to secure 
work with a good employer, as well as the mount of support a new migrant receives in 
the host country.  
More recently, Kuschminder (2016) adapted this framework in her research on 
Ethiopian women who had worked in the Middle East as domestic workers. For the 
context of her study, she defined a strong tie as one in which the potential migrant knew 
about the network prior to ever migrating, trusted it, and was connected to it either 
through family or friendship. A weak tie existed if prior to the decision to migrate the 
individual had no relationship to the network, and as a result the relationship between the 
individual who migrated and the network ended once the individual arrived in the host 
country. Her aim was to compare the experiences of her participants to determine which 
tie they had used and whether one was more beneficial than the other. Kuschminder 
(2016) found that among the Ethiopian women in her study, strong or weak ties did not 
                                                
46. When considered from the perspective of the migrant who is providing the resources, Portes 
argues that the impact of social capital on migrant networks is not always positive; it can be negative for 
such reasons as being exclusionary, making excessive claims on group member, and requiring conformity 
[Portes; de Hass]. This study is focused on the migrant and her or his experience.  
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make that great of difference and that the women who had emigrated on strong ties or 
long duration still faced a great deal of uncertainty and did not necessarily have better 
outcomes. 
Because my study on low-wage migrant workers in Dubai targeted individuals 
earning Dh1500 (US$408) or less a month, it is unsurprising that among the many factors 
that contributed to their experiences, the individuals (often in the guise of official or 
unofficial recruitment agents) who assisted them were the result of weak ties, both in 
strength and duration. Of my forty-four participants only nine had what might be 
considered strong networks of long duration. These individuals typically had family who 
had migrated to the UAE or who were still in the UAE. For two of these eight, the notion 
of a strong network begins to crumble when explored further. Rashma, a twenty-eight-
year-old woman from Nepal, was brought to Dubai by a brother, with whom she was not 
close. Analyn, a forty-eight-year-old woman from the Philippines, was brought by her 
sister, who immediately departed back to the Philippines once Analyn had arrived. She 
appeared to have tricked Analyn into staying in her stead.  
Ability and Desire to Mobilize Resources 
Focusing solely on the strength of one’s network tie in terms of strength and/or 
duration can ignore other factors that impact the effectiveness of these ties. Social capital, 
according to Bourdieu’s original definition, had two distinct parts that according to de 
Haas are often forgotten in their application to migrant networks (de Haas 2010). One 
part, de Haas explains, is the assumption that the experienced migrants who are 
approached for information or assistance are in fact able to mobilize the resources that are 
needed by the potential migrant. The second part is that the experienced migrant has a 
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desire to assist the potential migrant. Having the capacity to assist and the interest in 
doing so are both essential elements.  
One of my participants demonstrated that a strong tie of long duration is not 
always effective, and as Bourdieu wrote, the ability to mobilize resources is just as 
important. Negasi, a thirty-year-old Ethiopian man, provided a good example and shows 
the need for both to be met. I interviewed Negasi in about his fifth year of being in Dubai. 
The previous year, he had brought his brother to Dubai so that he could find employment. 
He said, 
My brother lost his job, [in Ethiopia]. I had to help my brother. I brought 
him here with a visit visa. We tried for one month to get him a job here. I 
paid for his house rent [bed space]. I spent almost 9 or 10,000 dirhams for 
him. I saved that money in crazy ways. […] He actually got a job. They 
interviewed him. They liked him. He’s an accounting graduate and he’s 
got a lot of experience. So in Spash [a clothing retail store] they gave [him 
a] five day [trial] to try him out. They like him. They said they’ll give him 
visa, but he has to go [exit the country to get his visa]47. His [visit] visa is 
already going to expire. I don’t have money to send him. I don’t even 
have… We suffered a lot to make him stay. I don’t have money to send 
him and stay in a hotel. It’s too much. So he had to go back [to Ethiopia]. 
I’ll try it another time. … 
 
Negasi had no more money to give; his resources had run out. He had a strong, long-term 
relationship with his brother, and he had a very strong desire to provide assistance. 
However, without the needed financial capital he was unable to provide all of the funds 
required.  
In addition to Bourdieu’s two-part definition of social capital showing the 
importance of both the capacity and desire to help another, an additional element that 
                                                
47. The process of exiting the country for an employment visa is discussed later in the chapter.  
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seems to play a role in the success of migrant networks in the UAE is how they were 
historically developed.  
Historical Implications 
Migrant networks are the meso-level structures that bridge the micro-level 
elements of individual and family unit with macro-level analysis of globalization and its 
relation to labor markets and inequalities (de Haas 2010; Castles and Miller 2009; Oishi 
2005).  Factors such as colonialism, occupation, and labor recruitment, according to 
Castle Et al. (2014), “play a crucial role in the initiation of migration processes” (40). 
After migration to the region has been established, meso-level social, cultural, and 
economic structures then come into play and can become self-perpetuating (D. S. Massey 
1990). The precedence for these self-perpetuating systems arise from historical patterns 
of inequalities.  
The UAE provides an interesting example of migrant networks dying out and 
reemerging as a result of past historical-structural processes of migration. The 
experiences of my participants showed that the availability of strong networks—in terms 
of the strength of the relationship—was often tied to nationality and very likely to the 
historical relationship between their home country and the UAE. The strength—or 
weakness—of current social networks can be found in part in the UAE’s experiences 
with colonialism and slave trade. The first resulted in strong networks for Indians and 
Pakistanis and the latter in weak networks for Africans.  
During the colonial era, the British began importing indentured labor from India 
and Pakistan to the Trucial States. Junaid Rana (2011) in his examination of migration, 
race, and labor among Pakistanis, contends that the logic and conditions that undergird 
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today’s system of migration from India and Pakistan to the UAE parallels this indentured 
period. Following this period, the migration pathway that had been established by the 
British continued. They played a significant role in establishing and maintaining a reserve 
of labor from this region and their strong networks.  
In contrast, though the trans-Sahara slave trade lasted much longer,48 it did not 
result in strong social networks for Africans in the UAE today. In the early part of the 
twentieth century, importing of slaves was greatly reduced as a result of global economic 
forces (which led to the collapse of the date and pearl industries) and the availability of 
new sources of slaves (which were cheaper and less risky to import from Baluchistan and 
Persia) (Hopper 2015). In addition, following increased oil wealth, leaders granted 
manumission (freedom) to many slaves, including those from Africa. Upon manumission, 
the Africans were often incorporated into families and slave trade from East Africa 
ended, severing the Gulf’s relationship to Africa in terms of labor import and creating a 
greater need for workers from India and Pakistan. The impact of these earlier policy 
choices can be seen most clearly in the strong migration streams from India and Pakistan 
and weaker ones from Africa.49  
This differentiation by nationality can be seen among my participants. For 
example, seven women specifically migrated to the UAE to work as live-in domestic 
workers. Prior to coming, three had strong social networks and four had weak networks. 
Of the three with strong networks, two were from Pakistan and one from the Philippines. 
                                                
48. The “trans-Sahara” slave trade by Arab traders is said to have gone on for much longer than 
the Atlantic slave trade, with “possibly even larger numbers” [Lucas 2013, p1] 
49. In contrast, the Philippines has no significant historical connections to the Arab Gulf. 
However, since they began migrating to the region in the 1970s, their networks have become quite strong 
and their status among others from the Global South quite high.   
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All three had personal connections with others living in the UAE or came with the family 
with whom they had already been working, In the UAE, the work conditions for these 
three women ranged from acceptable to very good. The strong networks through which 
these women came were capable of providing resources necessary for migration and to 
secure (what they deemed) acceptable employment. 
The other four women came from Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Kenya. While Nepal and 
Sri Lanka have stronger and longer systems of migration than sub-Saharan Africa, they 
are far weaker than India and Pakistan’s. These four women came through “official” 
agents, and their work conditions ranged from very difficult to abusive. These women 
lacked strong social networks to facilitate and provide resources for their migration as 
well as strong social networks of support that could be relied on within Dubai. Finally, 
unlike other studies that showed women having stronger personal networks (Hondagneu-
Sotelo 1994; Oishi 2005; Vlieger 2014), my study showed no strong gendering of 
networks. Equal numbers of men and women had—or did not have—access to strong 
networks. Networks were far more likely to differentiate on the basis of nationality, as 
was earning potential, which will be discussed in chapter five. 
Many factors related to migrant networks had the potential to positively or 
negatively impact my participants. One was the strength of the network in terms of 
migration flows and its generally resiliency. Migrant networks from sub-Saharan Africa 
were quite weak due to being interrupted by the end of the slave trade and the time it took 
to evolve into “free” trade. Another is the network tie itself—who the entity is, its 
closeness to the potential migrant, the duration of the relationship, the ability to provide 
resources, and the interest in doing so. One other factor not discussed here is the human 
 62 
capital that a migrant held and the potential networks to which such capital might provide 
access. For many, this was relatively little. This is touched on later in this chapter, and in 
greater depth in chapter five.50  
Economic Factors and Cognitive Dissonance 
Central to economic theories of migration is the “push-pull” framework. This 
framework focuses on the economic factors (as well as, for example, the environmental 
and political factors) that “push” individuals to leave their countries, and the 
corresponding “pull” of host countries who are in need of labor. Although economic 
reasons played a significant role in motivating almost all of my participants to migrate, 
theoretical assumptions about the benefits of migration and how it works as a motivator 
of migration conflict with the experiences of my participants.  
The push-pull model is the basis for the neoclassic theory of migration. This 
theory sees migration as central to the development of countries in the Global South. As 
workers migrate to the higher-wage countries, workers in the lower-wage countries 
become scarce, causing wages to rise in these sending countries. In the higher-wage 
countries, as more workers become available, wages decrease. It is presumed that, over 
time, the flow of migration would have an equalizing effect between countries and reduce 
                                                
50. Coleman (1988) explains that human capital is the result of education, reading, and being 
brought up by well-educated parents. Social capital is relational. For migrants, it is having a relationship 
with someone in the network. For children, it is parents being available to them. The human capital of the 
well-educated parent only has value if it is paired with social capital, the relational availability of the parent 
for the child. If there is not social capital, then the human capital that the parents could potentially have 
supplied is squandered. Social capital, on the other hand, can compensate for a lack of human capital. 
Helen, an Indian woman who cleans for us once a month, was a good example of this. Helen had stopped 
school at the age of ten. When her own daughter was in school, she would bring her homework to Helen for 
help. Her daughter’s education was in English, which Helen had a limited proficiency in. Helen would take 
her daughter’s textbook to her friend who would both translate and explain the content to Helen. Helen 
would take notes in her local language and then return to her daughter and explain the homework to her. 
Helen traded her social capital for human capital so as to support her daughter. 
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the economic disparity between them. Research, however, has shown that a reduction in 
economic disparity due to out-migration to be untrue (Castles, De Haas, and Miller 2015; 
Glick Schiller 2009; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Khondker 2010; D. S. Massey et al. 2005; 
Sassen 1988; Wise and Covarrubias 2009). Further, critics of the push and pull of 
economic and labor needs contend that the theory ignores how other factors interact and 
explain migration (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). These other factors, such as 
deception and socio-political and socio-cultural factors, are discussed later in this chapter.  
The neoclassic theory of migration also presumes that individual migrants are 
rational, informed decision makers who have “perfect knowledge” of the economic 
conditions in the destination country; it also contends that individual migrants are able to 
calculate the cost-benefits of migration and are free to make and act upon their decisions 
based on this knowledge (D. S. Massey et al. 2005). I did not find this to be true.  
Ideally, everyone wants to be seen as rational, informed decision makers, but in 
reality, this is often not the case. Rather than making decisions based on rational or 
complete information, individuals will ignore certain information that is not in their 
favor. Festinger (1962) referred to this process as “cognitive dissonance.” Cognitive 
dissonance is the mental discomfort we experience by trying to hold competing thoughts 
in our mind (Tavris and Aronson 2008). These competing thoughts are unsettling. Thus, 
our minds try to reduce this discomfort by rationalizing thoughts and/or behaviors so that 
the two align, or so that the one that supports our desires prevails.  
The concept of cognitive dissonance resonates frequently in the stories my 
participants shared about why they decided to emigrate. Many felt desperate to improve 
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their conditions in their home countries.51 They also had heard vague stories about the 
difficulties of working there, but this information did not align with their desperate need 
for a job and the stories of success. Their desperation drove them to rationalize away the 
risks that emigration involved in favor of its potential. They wanted to believe—wanted 
to be convinced. As a result, they allowed themselves to get “carried away.” Sophie, a 
twenty-five-year-old Cameroonian woman said,  
When you stay back home, you see some people come back. They are 
from abroad. Or the people are back here and you see they are to like, their 
parents can get the TV screen, they are able to buy better furniture, take 
care of their parents. I’m like maybe I can come here and give a try.  
 
Focusing on the positive stories—or the stories they presumed were positive—was one 
way my participants reduced cognitive dissonance. They focused on stories about 
individuals who “made it big” and “made it sound easy,” and an image of the host 
country in which “people just dish up money.” They focused on images that dazzled—not 
the Dubai with line upon line of men dressed in blue jump suits waiting to board buses 
without air conditioning after long days toiling in the sun with temperatures known to 
reach forty-five degrees centigrade and above and with humidity in the nineties. They 
also reduced dissonance by belief in themselves. Where others had failed, they believed 
they would success that their education, background, or personal traits would put them in 
a better position to succeed. (This is discussed in chapter eight.)  
These attitudes and beliefs as well as a lack of strong networks resulted in my 
participants not being fully informed about the UAE or the process of migrating there. As 
                                                
51. Kuschminder (2016) found that women in Ethiopia were fully aware of the harsh living and 
working conditions in the Middle East before going. However, they chose to migrate in spite of them out of 
desperation.  
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a result, simply learning about Dubai and its potential for work, and/or learning that a 
visa is in fact easily accessible triggered their interest, and as de Haas (2010) writes, 
provided them with the “aspiration to migrate” (1593).52  
Images that dazzle accumulate in the mind. Once one’s mind has been sold and 
the decision has been made, the ability to reason logically is reduced.  Perceptions and 
desperation intermingle, and one hears only that which will reinforce and confirm his or 
her bias. Confirmation bias is the tendency to selectively confirm pre-existing beliefs, in 
this case, the decision to emigrate. The role of cognitive dissonance in motivating 
migration contradicts neoclassical economic theory. Most of my participants’ reasons for 
migrating were rooted (at least in part) in economic reasons. Cognitive dissonance simply 
reflects the more human side of decision-making and the role that emotions—especially 
desperation—play. My participants did not migrate for rational reasons—they 
rationalized their reasons for migrating. 
Misconceptions and Deception 
The tendency towards cognitive dissonance invites stories that affirm one’s 
desires and needs, making one especially vulnerable to misconceptions and deception. 
Research has shown that international labor recruiters, future employers, and migrants 
themselves engage in widespread deception and various degrees of misinformation, 
reinforcing the processes of migration (A. M. Gardner 2012; Mahler 1995; Menjívar 
2000; Tsuda 1999; Ullah 2016). Stories of deception were common among my 
participants, too, as were stories about the misconceptions they had held. These elements 
                                                
52. For example, without family living in the US, most if not all of my participants would be 
unable to get a tourist visa. In the UAE, this is not the case. Almost anyone can receive a tourist visa if they 
can gather or borrow the required funds.   
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resulted in choices and actions that more often than not increased the vulnerability of my 
participants. This section begins by discussing the association between social networks 
and the potential to hold misconceptions and/or be deceived. It then discusses the roots of 
various forms of misconceptions and deception. 
Strong social networks link communities in the home country to communities in 
the host country. These networks explain why some migrants are better informed about 
the availability of jobs and pay, as well as being better informed about the living and 
working conditions in the host country. Access to social networks reveals why the 
Indians and Pakistanis in my study tended to know more about the UAE and/or Gulf and 
the conditions of working there. They are better informed because of friends and family 
members who have previously emigrated. Many grow up assuming that they too will 
emigrate or that it is, at the least, a potential path they might take. Almost all of my 
African participants, as well as several Nepalese and Bangladeshi participants, lacked 
strong social networks. As a result, they tended to have more misconceptions and be at 
greater risk of being deceived.53 
Misconceptions about the Ease of Finding Work 
Misconceptions also motivated many of my participants to emigrate. Participants 
spoke about observing the clothing and possessions of others in their community whom 
they knew had migrated to the Gulf. Inability to speak directly to these strangers (as a 
result of cultural restrictions on with whom one can engage) resulted in my participants 
assuming that jobs in these countries paid well. These observations were often reinforced 
                                                
53. There are, of course, many other complexities involved that determine the strength of one’s 
networks. An Indian from, for example, a rural part of India where emigration is not common, will have 
networks that are just as weak as those from Cameroon. 
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by tourism advertisements in the media. They assumed that the lifestyles they observed 
were obtainable by anyone with an education, skills, and experience. Thoughts such as 
these were most common among my African participants. Mike, a thirty-six-year-old 
Nigerian man, and Nina, the twenty-eight-year-old Cameroonian, provide good examples 
of this. Mike’s reason for coming to Dubai also explains his assumptions about his 
qualifications being transferable. He said:  
I was working as a bank official for the United Bank for Africa. [I have a] 
post-technic degree, a diploma. … 4 year degree, equivalent. In business 
administration. I can function as a (incomprehensible) I can work in 
administration, markets, I know all… That’s what I did in Nigeria. So 
when I lost that job, I had to come to Dubai. Back home I [had been] 
looking for a job for almost 3 years. I could not get a job. Somebody 
introduced to me Dubai, UAE. There are a lot of opportunities there. Why 
sit at home being jobless. Come to Dubai. It was the year 2013. I fled to 
Dubai. So I came to Dubai with a three-month visit visa. So I’m getting to 
this place. It was a different level playing ground compared to my country. 
 
I asked Mike what he meant by “a level playing ground,” and he said, “Coming here I 
thought that I could just use my qualifications to apply for any job I like. [But,] it wasn’t 
like that.” Reasons for why Dubai is not a level playing field are discussed in chapter 
five. 
Nina had a degree in marketing. She had observed others in her community. She 
said, “They left Cameroon, they came here, and they succeeded. They had their jobs, 
made their money, and came back to Cameroon.” Not knowing any better she assumed—
as one with a university degree would—that it would be possible to work in her field of 
study. Further, because Africans lacked access to official and well-networked recruitment 
agencies, they believed that they had a better chance of finding a suitable job if they were 
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able to engage with employers in person.54 These misperceptions were often the result of 
taking at face value what they saw and failing to question and ask critical questions. 
When I asked Gabriel, a twenty-six-year-old university graduate from Nigeria, why he 
did not do better research before emigrating, he said, “You get carried away with the idea 
of going.” This ties back to confirmation bias. Not only desperation, but also fantasies 
about a new life confirm one’s choices.  
In contrast to participants from Africa, those from Nepal or Bangladesh had 
similar weak social networks. They, however, only came on work visas. It may be that 
they knew they would be more vulnerable in Dubai because they were less formally 
educated and did not speak Arabic or English. Or, perhaps it was because no one told 
them to go on a visit visa.  
Being Deceived about the Job and Conditions 
Misconceptions can arise because of what was sees and presumes about others’ 
experiences and from what one sees in the media. It can also be due to deception. 
Overall, migration was more often motivated by deception, than by other forms of 
misconceptions. The two central culprits in spreading deception were agents and low-
wage migrants themselves. As mentioned above, deception is a common tactic among 
unofficial agents. All of my participants had to engage with a recruitment agency, 
middleman or sub-agent of some form, regardless of whether they came on a visit or 
employment visa. Most often my participants would not know whether the agency they 
                                                
54. In their home countries, the Africans in my study lacked strong social networks, official 
recruitment agents, and agents representing specific companies, making it difficult—or impossible—to 
access good employment opportunities. As a result, they were more likely than other nationality groups in 
my study to arrive on a visit visa rather than an employment visa.  
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went to was official or whether the individual who was assisting them was a legitimate 
representative, a con artist, or a fairly honest person just trying to earn extra money. For 
those from small remote villages, the agent might be a local from the same village or 
even a neighbor with connections. My participants might refer to these individuals as 
“agents” or “middle-man” and it was only after further prying that I understood them to 
be a neighbor. Some of my participants did know they were dealing with unofficial 
agents; however, relying on them was necessary if they were from a remote region. The 
middle-man was needed to connect one with an official agency in the city and to assist 
with documentation. In the best circumstances, large companies send recruiters to cities, 
typically in India, Pakistan, and Nepal, to organize and hire for their specific company. 
None of my participants came through this route, though I did speak with employers who 
recruited in this way. These companies are typically larger, better run, and have better 
conditions. Hence, they were not the companies my participants worked for. 
Just as my participants embraced their misconceptions about potential jobs and 
salaries, they seemed to gullibly trust the information that recruitment agents imparted. 
Similar to those who had misconceptions, it was those who lacked strong social networks 
that were most often deceived. Negasi, a thirty-year-old Ethiopian with a degree in 
English and a minor in history, said that his friends painted a rosy picture of Dubai, 
telling him “great things” and reinforcing his desire to come. One friend told him, “You 
can make money easily and the living conditions are good.” Negasi said that men (like 
his “friends”) come back from Dubai and want to be agents in hopes of earning extra 
money. They say what they need to in order to entice people to migrate. Abir, a forty-
two-year-old man from Bangladesh with a fifth-grade education, was told by an agent, 
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who was a fellow villager, that he could work as a salesman in a supermarket. Upon 
arrival in Dubai, he discovered that he would be a construction worker.  
The problem of misinformation is extremely prevalent and unrelenting because so 
many migrants—as well as other actors—engage in its perpetuation, including my 
participants. Their participation resulted in a vicious circle in which potential emigrants 
in their home countries remained ignorant of the realities and challenges many face in the 
UAE. The positive and negative aspects of this deception on the individual migrant and 
why my participants engaged in it are discussed in greater depth in chapter eight. 
Socio-Political & Socio-Cultural Factors 
Socio-economic factors were essential to motivating my participants to come to 
Dubai; however, as many scholars contend, such reasons are far from the only factors 
(Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002; Michele Ruth 
Gamburd 2000; A. M. Gardner 2012; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Khondker 2010; Lutz 
2010; D. S. Massey et al. 2005; D. S. Massey 2003; Oishi 2005; Parreñas 2008; Sassen 
1988; Tsuda 1999). Gardner (2010, 2012) describes a complex scenario of diverse socio-
political forces, including civil war, armed conflicts, risk of armed attacks, as well as 
issues of governmental corruption and access to electricity and water. As discussed 
earlier, many of my participants, too, spoke of governmental corruption. Others 
mentioned downsizing or factory closures due to scarce supplies and electricity cutoffs. 
Additional factors were socio-cultural in nature. Ankit, a forty-eight-year-old man 
from Nepal, said that, in his country, societal attitudes and values were changing resulting 
in longer migrations. Parents could no longer count on their adult children to care for 
them in old age. This resulted in workers today needing to work later in life and hence 
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stay overseas longer than their predecessors. Other reasons for migration were due to 
unchanging, inflexible societal attitudes. Toben, a thirty-five-year-old Nigerian man, 
wanted to live in a society where he could freely interact with women. Unfortunately, due 
to his socio-economic status, this freedom was pretty much inaccessible to him in Dubai, 
too. Similarly, Ghaziyah, a twenty-nine-year-old Pakistani woman, had a university 
degree. Her father had been in the navy and it sounded as if she had had a fairly well-to-
do family and a comfortable life. I first met Ghaziyah with the group of other Pakistani 
women. Ghaziyah said she had come to Dubai in search of adventure and freedom. While 
she did find adventure, it was far from what she had hoped for and it included little 
freedom. In Dubai, she found herself living temporarily on the streets and being 
continuously and aggressively harassed by men.55 
For all but Ghaziyah, the need to migrate was a complex layering of historical 
factors with economic, structural, and social ones. These accumulative vulnerabilities 
resulted in unstable, insecure, and precarious lives that subsequently motivated their 
emigration. For some, the desperation that drove their decisions to emigrate persisted 
despite their governments’ attempt to prevent them. This is explored in the following, 
final section of this chapter. 
                                                
55. Interestingly, though the other Pakistani women were Christian, Ghaziyah was Muslim. At the 
time we first met, Ghaziyah was sharing a room with one of the other Pakistani women. However, when I 
met her to interview, it was in a room that she had moved into with a Pakistani man whom she said she was 
engaged to marry. 
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Emigration Bans 
Entering the UAE is fairly easy for those from the Global South because visas are 
reasonably priced and easy to acquire.56 Problems arise not because of the UAE, but 
because of sending countries, who create obstacles to emigrating. These sending 
countries will sometimes prohibit—through an emigration ban—certain groups from 
migrating to a particular host country. Globally, women who perform “unskilled” 
domestic work are most often targeted for these bans, reflecting the gendered nature of 
such policies and their social construction (Oishi 2005; van Naerssen and Asis 2015). 
(Pande 2014, 379). 
Restrictions on the mobility of women can be interpreted in different ways. One is 
as a way for a country to protect its women from abuse. This gendered classification of 
domestic work sees these women as being less capable and more ignorant, and hence in 
need of “surveillance and protection” (Pande 2014, 379). Bans can also be seen as a way 
for governments to demonstrate their moral authority (Oishi 2005). Women who have 
limited formal education and want to emigrate for domestic work are prevented from 
doing so by their protector, the government (Kodoth 2016). Women, as a result, are dealt 
                                                
56. In the UAE, visit visas can be sponsored by family, hotels, and tour operators, are valid for 
thirty-day visa for Dh500 (US$135) or a ninety-day visa for Dh1000 (US$270). Nationalities requiring visit 
visa also require a Dh1000 deposit, refundable upon departure, and the purchase of a round-trip plane 
ticket. Some countries, such as Kenya, are also required to provide proof of sufficient funds for the duration 
of their stay in the UAE. The process for acquiring a work permit for the UAE is about the same whether 
one is applying for a job from outside of the UAE or from within. First, the UAE company, institution, or 
person who will be the sponsor (and who is typically also the employer) must provide a potential new 
employee with an offer letter signed by the employer and with a clear and comprehensive description of the 
terms and conditions. The offer letter must then be signed by the potential new hire. For new hires, who are 
in the “unskilled labor” category, a fingerprint must also be given with the signature (Bedirian 2015). This 
is then given to the Ministry of Labor for approval. After this the worker is allowed into the country. Upon 
arrival the worker signs his employment contract, which must mirror the terms and conditions of the offer 
letter. Contracts are typically for two years (Bedirian 2015; Kapur 2016).  
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the unequal burden of representing their country through the maintenance of their 
morality (Espiritu 2003; Guevarra 2006; Parreñas 2008).  
State officials deem these bans worthwhile, even though evidence shows them to 
have limited effect and to lead to greater vulnerability (Kodoth 2016; Levine-Rasky 
2011; Murray 2012; Oishi 2005). Individuals who are desperate for work circumvent 
these obstacles, which often results in greater vulnerability. Negasi, the thirty-year-old-
man from Ethiopia, a country that somewhat uniquely bans low-wage workers of both 
genders, said that from what he had observed, emigration bans simply “open doors for 
more suffering.”  
Citizens who want to circumvent their government’s emigration ban can easily do 
so by transiting through a third country. However, this often requires the use of 
unlicensed brokers, paying more exorbitant fees, entering on a visit visa and, specific to 
women, risking physical and/or sexual abuse. Then—assuming the migrants are lucky 
enough to have found jobs after arriving in the UAE—they must then exit the UAE in 
order to switch that visit visa to a work visa. Because of the home country ban, this visa 
change must be done in a third country. The closest and cheapest third country for this 
purpose is the Iranian island of Kish. Negasi explained that needing to exit and go to Kish 
resulted in “a lot of Ethiopians stranded in Kish” waiting for their employment visas to be 
processed, a wait that can last two to six months or more.57  
                                                
57. Other countries represented by my sample have or had travel bans to the UAE in the past, but 
they did not impact my participants. Kenya previously banned citizens from emigrating to the Gulf to do 
domestic work in 2012, and then lifted the ban in 2013 (Malit Jr. and Al Youha 2016). It did not impact the 
Kenyans I interviewed. My interviewees came prior to these restrictions. Bangladesh banned the emigration 
of women performing “unskilled” and “semi-skilled” labor in 1997, and ended the ban in 2003 (Canada: 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2013). This also did not impact my participants. 
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In my sample, only two nationalities were directly impacted by such emigration 
bans, those coming from Ethiopia (as discussed above) and Nepal. Nepal ended its 2012 
travel ban on allowing domestic workers to emigrate to the UAE and reduced the 
restriction on age requirements from 30 to 20 (Ahmad 2015b). For the two Nepalese 
women I spoke to, Sunita and Maya, the removal of this ban came too late. They were in 
their mid-twenties when they came to the UAE and the ban was still in place. These 
women most likely entered on visit visas even though their agents, who were most likely 
unlicensed, had secured a specific job for them.58 One of them, Sunita, described 
traveling to India with her agent, who then purchased her a round-trip ticket to Kenya, 
with a layover in Dubai.59 Verté, an NGO that addresses exploitative labor practices, 
reported in 2012 that the Nepali emigration ban was increasing the number of women 
being trafficked. These two women certainly fell into this category. Neither of these 
women was trafficked for sex work, but the circumstances of their migration and the 
conditions of their forced labor mark them—and many of my participants—as trafficked, 
nonetheless. This is discussed in depth in chapter six. 
                                                
58. It was difficult to ascertain how the women exactly came or what their status was upon entry 
to the UAE. Typically one must exit the country to convert their visit visa to an employment one, but 
employers sometimes have other avenues they can take.  
59. The logistics of this journey do not make the most sense. Sunita herself seemed a bit confused 
as to how the system had worked. She probably did enter on a visit visa, but she was not sure when or how 
she had acquired her Emirates ID card—the ID that shows that one is legally in the country—because she 
had never left the country to switch her visa to an employment one. It is now possible to pay a large sum to 
have this process taken care of within the UAE, but I do not believe this was possible when Sunita arrived. 
Her employers might have had the right connections—“wasta”—, but as they were middle-class, this seems 
unlikely, too. 
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Conclusion 
While the factors that motivated my participants to emigrate align with much of 
the literature on the Arab Gulf, there were also findings that contradict or extend it. 
Consistent with previous research, historically entrenched political-economic systems 
were at least tangentially related to why most of my participants felt the need to migrate. 
This study did, however, make evident the disparity of networks based on historical 
patterns of migration, social capital, and national and racial identities. The findings from 
this study also put in question the neoclassic theory of migration that positions migrants 
as informed, knowledgeable decision makers. My participants were not motivated to 
emigrate for rational reasons. Rather, when faced with information that should have 
quelled their desire, they rationalized why emigrating was still the best option or they 
simply avoided seeking information that contradicted their decision.  
In addition, as other studies show, economic circumstances were an essential 
factor, but far from the complete story. A wide range of sociopolitical and sociocultural 
factors also played important roles. Further, as studies on the Gulf and elsewhere show, 
misconceptions and deception were factors of emigration. The cognitive dissonance that 
drove my participants to rationalize away negative information about the Gulf and to 
uncritically hold misconceptions reduced their ability to scrutinize the information they 
were provided by deceptive recruiters and employers. Their misconceptions were often 
due to these deceptive tactics, but the media and enticing stories told by previous 
emigrants also fed them. Desperation was a central factor in motivating my participants’ 
migration. Some left home with employment visa and contract in hand, and others left 
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with the belief that jobs could easily be found. The following chapters address the 
enormous obstacles that most encountered.  
  
 77 
CHAPTER 4 
 
VULNERABILITY: LIFE IN DUBAI 
 
THE KAFALA SYSTEM & FEAR 
 
Let me tell you something. We actually don’t know about the law that 
much. We have no idea. You’re scared. We don’t have information. We 
don’t have that time. If we were to work 8 hours, I would have time to 
research on these kinds of things. … Now I’m staying on this side of 
Dubai [in the labor camp] … just to know a little bit of this. Over here to 
get Wi-Fi, we just rent it. We can’t put it on your laptop. And the 
information provided on the Internet, it’s not complete. … For me, I was 
told that after one year you can do whatever [but that’s not true]. 
 
Michael, a 32 year-old Kenyan man 
 
Vulnerability begets vulnerability and, as such, it is an accumulative process, the 
result of precarious conditions building one on another. Though individually experienced, 
it is the commonality of those experiences that reveal the precarity and inequality of 
social systems. Because vulnerability is cumulative, this chapter and the following three 
build on the previous chapter. They focus on my participants’ experiences in the UAE 
from the point of arrival. They examine various processes, mechanisms, and obstacles 
that created, heightened, or diminished their vulnerability in the UAE. Structural violence 
does not occur in isolation. Rather, it is part of interconnected systems that oppress and 
disadvantage.  
This chapter addresses two key contributors of vulnerability in the lives of my 
participants, UAE labor laws and the fear they induce. The first half of the chapter 
addresses UAE labor laws, including those laws that support the kafala (sponsorship) 
system. This system grants an inordinate amount of control to the kafeel (sponsor) who is 
often also the employer. In conjunction with other laws that are often quite ambiguous, 
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the system has the potential to empower or reinforce vulnerability. For the low-wage 
migrant workers in my study, it was usually the later. The first half of the chapter focuses 
on the violent structures that are embedded in institutional structures. They are intended 
to disadvantage and create vulnerability. The second half of this chapter focuses on how 
these structures induce fear. As Michael said at the beginning of this chapter, “We have 
no idea. You’re scared.” Michael was referring to the immigration laws. Not 
understanding them resulted in fear. This fear further increased their vulnerability. For 
many of my participants, the power that employers possessed led to fear. This fear led to 
docility, which in turn allowed exploitative structures to go unchecked. The production of 
fear resulted in vulnerability, which led to an unending iterative cycle of fear and 
vulnerability.  
The System of Kafala and Immigration Labor Laws 
The kafala (sponsorship) system is the backbone of immigrant policy in the UAE 
and is the aspect of the Gulf migration regime that is addressed most extensively by 
scholars (Ali 2010; Babar 2013; Fernandez 2013; Longva 1999; Mahdavi 2013; Sönmez 
et al. 2011; Truong 2012; Vora 2013; Zachariah, Prakash, and Rajan 2003; Zahra 
2015)60. All foreigners who are working in the country—regardless of socio-economic 
standing and regardless of whether the individual was granted an employment visa in the 
home country or after arriving on a visit visa in the UAE61 –must be sponsored by an 
                                                
60. For additional discussions of the sponsorship system, see: Buckley 2012; Castles, Haas, and 
Miller 2014; Fernandez 2013; Gardner 2010b, 2014; Khalaf and Alkobaisi 1999; Malit and Naufal 2014; 
Massey et al. 2005; Migrant-Rights.Org 2015; Murray 2012; Sa 2004. 
61. If one is working (legally) in the UAE, it should be assumed that he or she has an employment 
visa. It is “illegal” to work on a visit visa.  
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Emirati national directly or indirectly through a business/institution or placement agency. 
These companies and agencies must be majority-owned by a national.62 
The historical basis for the kafala system is uncertain. Some say that it evolved 
out of the tradition of requiring guests to have their safety and welfare guaranteed by a 
local (Fernandez 2013; D. S. Massey et al. 2005; Migrant-Rights.Org 2015; Zahra 2015). 
According to a specialist with the International Labour Organization (ILO), the aim—
then as is now—was to make “it incumbent upon nationals to look after non-nationals” 
(Dickinson 2013). It is also possible that the kafala system is a remnant of British 
colonialism and the systems of control it established. Regardless of its historical roots, 
the kafala system’s principles were incorporated into the UAE’s labor laws. Those 
aspects of the law that are based on the kafala system blur the line between state and 
private control, and grant the sponsor a large degree of control over all aspect of a 
worker’s life. The power granted to private citizens over those deemed “other” is 
reminiscent of the US a century ago. As John Matteson, a professor of English, stated, 
“Slavery [in the US] was a form of privatized law enforcement. . . . What [slavery] did 
was take a number of the powers that are typically reserved to the government—the 
power to discipline … the power over another person’s life—and it conferred those 
powers on private individuals” (Edwards 2014). The resemblance between this and the 
powers that the kafala system imparts to its citizens is strikingly similar. Both reflect the 
essence of structural violence and the basis for what makes groups vulnerable. 
                                                
62. Emirati, national, and local are synonymous. A non-national is a foreigner, which is 
synonymous to migrant or guestworker. All foreigners working in the country are temporary migrants, 
regardless of their socio-economic status.  
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The kafala system is problematic because it obscures the role of the government 
and grants the kafeel (sponsor) an inordinate amount of power. First, the kafala system 
creates a structural system that hides the role of the government. This system delegates 
control and regulation of foreigners working in the country to Emiratis, who act as kafeel. 
The kafeel is in essence the “middleman” between government and foreign workers of all 
socio-economic levels (Fargues and De Bel-Air 2015). Further, the manager, supervisor, 
or boss figure—who is typically a foreign worker—acts as another middleman between 
lower-status foreign workers and the kafeel. As a result, the role of the government—and 
the role of Emiratis in general—becomes hidden through at least two layers of separation. 
It is the invisibility of this mechanism—a central feature of structural violence—that 
results in foreign workers blaming their foreign intermediaries for their exploitative 
conditions.  
The kafala system is also problematic because of the power it grants the kafeel. 
Kathiravelu (2016), whose research focused on South Indians working in the UAE, 
contends that the kafala system results in migrants being “stripped of much of their 
agency” and unable to contest any mistreatment or abuse (71). This is not because the 
kafeel can make extensive legal decisions regarding foreign workers, but rather because 
the Ministry of Labor typically responds positively to requests made by the kafeel. The 
kafeel can legally terminate (fire) a foreign employee, but he or she can only request that 
an employee receive a temporary employment ban that forbids working anywhere in the 
UAE for six months or a year. Deportation and immigration bans are possible but less 
likely. This is because the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs 
 81 
(DNRD)—referred to by most as Immigration—deals with deportation and immigration 
bans, and they require more severe infractions, such as criminal activity.  
The Ministry of Labor (MOL) handles termination and employment bans, which 
are the major concerns of migrants.  If foreign workers have been terminated and/or 
given an employment ban, it does not mean they will be deported. The employer cannot 
force workers to leave the country. Rather, workers are granted a one-month grace period 
before they are expected to depart the country. During this one-month, individuals who 
have only been terminated can legally search for a new job. If they overstay the one-
month grace period, they pay a fine. The fine is relatively inexpensive, but must be paid 
before one can receive a new employment contract or before he or she exits the country. 
It is not uncommon for workers to overstay their grace period by several months. 
Immigration is not concerned with why a worker’s employment visa was cancelled or 
how long the person stayed in the country after the visa was cancelled; they simply want 
the fine paid. 
UAE Labor Laws 
Other aspects of UAE labor law apart from the kafala system are also 
problematic. Revisions to these laws in January 2017 provided some improvement but 
still left many of the former problems. One of these is the ambiguity of the law, which 
can leave even the experts unsure of its intent. Other difficulties are in relation to who 
can and cannot terminate their contracts and the assumption that employers and 
employees have equal bargaining power. Even with the changes, the outcome of many 
UAE labor laws is still the production of vulnerability and fear for low-wage workers, 
both by the regulations they create and by the ambiguity of those regulations. 
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Difficulty in understanding and correctly interpreting the law is not just a problem 
among the presumably less educated migrants. The ambiguous language used in official 
governmental decrees is problematic for legal experts. Recently on their website, a 
lawyer based in the UAE provided a fairly good explanation of new legislation. I 
emailed and asked him some additional questions. He wrote in response, 
In my four years here, I have found that one of the biggest—if not the 
biggest—challenge in being an adviser in the UAE is the lack of 
consistency in the application of the law and the ability of the relevant 
Authority/Department/Ministry to amend or even ignore parts of 
the law.  I have some sympathy with the media because the reputable 
organisations try to report accurately, but it’s not always possible to pin 
down what is the right answer. Sometimes it’s the right answer one day 
and then wrong the next! I’ve even been given two different answers on 
the same day from two different Ministry officials! We always try to 
check the position twice or even three times through separate personnel 
before we advise clients because there is so much scope for differences in 
application of law or unannounced changes to the Ministry’s 
requirements/policies.63 
 
Other lawyers writing in Dubai newspaper columns also hint at the challenges 
associated with interpreting the law. In response to questions by readers, law columnists 
will write that “due to the ambiguity” of the law, they are not able to give better guidance 
or cannot give a conclusive answer. If lawyers have difficulty interpreting and applying 
the law, it will certainly be difficult for the layperson. This ambiguity in how laws are 
written led to confusion and fear, and resulted in inaction among many of my 
participants. Most preferred to err on the side of caution rather than chance the loss of 
their job. 
                                                
63. Email communication February 8, 2017.  
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The Ambiguity of “Skill Level” 
A specific example of an ambiguous law is related to how employment visas are 
classified. In the UAE, workers are categorized by “skill level.” Level 1 is the highest and 
5 is the lowest. Workers who are level 1 should have a university degree or higher. They 
are considered professionals. Skill-level categories 4 and 5 are “unskilled.” Official 
decrees, news outlets, and those who write commentary on the law use this terminology. 
Commentary on this topic typically refers to those in category 4 and 5 as being “unskilled 
labourers.” The meaning appears quite straightforward. To qualify for skill level 1, a 
worker must have a university degree. As a result, low-wage workers who have a 
university degree assume that this includes them; regardless of the current work they are 
performing. These individuals reasonably assume they are not “unskilled labourers” 
because they have university degrees. However, this is not the case. One’s actual 
qualifications—the education and experience foreign workers bring with them—are of no 
concern. Skill-level is a reflection of the work one has been hired to preform. It is an 
employment-based system, not a skill-based system.  
The term “skill level” creates a great deal of confusion and angst among 
foreigners who are typically from the Global South and who are employed in low-wage 
jobs. This confusion can be “heard” in numerous online blogs. In these blogs, well 
educated foreign workers who signed contracts to perform low-wage labor ask repeatedly 
if certain rights and protections apply to them since they, too, have university degrees. 
For example, a Filipina woman who had not yet migrated to the UAE asked the following 
question in a public blog post, 
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Hi, I'm from the Philippines and about to go to Dubai to work as an 
assistant teacher. In my contract, it stated that I belong to skill level 4 or 5. 
I'm a degree holder of bachelor in elementary education, but why is it that 
I belongs to this skill level worker?64 
 
As the author apparently does not know that skill level is directly associated to pay. The 
minimum salary for those in Level 3 is Dh5000 (US$1361) a month. There is no 
minimum salary for skill levels 4 and 5. I would presume that the individual discussed 
here had been offered less than Dh5000. This person was lucky because she thought to 
raise this question before emigrating. More often, foreign workers are already in the UAE 
and locked into a contract before they become aware of the skill level distinction and its 
impact. Or, if they do know, they feel they have no choice but to accept the job. My 
participant Gabriel faced this choice. 
Gabriel was a twenty-six-year-old Nigerian with a university degree in geology. 
He was working as a cleaner for Dh800 (US$218) a month when I met him. I interviewed 
Gabriel for a total of three hours. He is the one who, when we first met to interview, 
spoke non-stop for four single-spaced lines of typed text. The words flooded out of him 
in an often frantic and jumbled manner. When I met him, it was during his second 
sojourn to Dubai. The first time, all of his colleagues had been terminated (let go) from 
the catering company where he had previously worked. Prior to leaving the UAE after 
being terminated, Gabriel secured a job as a security guard. He then returned home to 
wait for his new “security” employment visa. After waiting three months, the visa came; 
however, it was a “cleaning” visa, not security. He agonized over what to do, but in the 
                                                
64. See http://emiratesdiary.com/uae-labour-law-2/skill-level-1-2-3-mol-uae-labour-law  
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end he accepted. He said, “I thought, … what will I do here [in Nigeria]?! … I’ve been 
home! When I got home, I saw the way people are struggling…” 
New Legislations 
In January 2016, the UAE ushered in new legislation regarding certain labor laws. 
The new legislation was seen to bring greater transparency to the labor laws and fairness 
to foreign workers. One of the new laws, Ministerial Resolution (MR) 766, addressed the 
conditions under which a foreign worker has the right to terminate his or her current work 
contract, and the right to acquire a new one to work for another employer. Previously, if 
foreign workers broke their contract, it was likely that they would also receive an 
employment ban (Bobker 2015). The new legislation ended the risk of an employment 
ban; however, the right was only given to groups of foreign workers reflected in certain 
“skill levels.”  
Confusion arose for many reasons. One was local newspaper headlines. The 
headlines were misleading for low-wage workers because they made it sound like the 
new changes were for everyone. For example, a Gulf News headline read: “Workers free 
to move between jobs, says ministry,” and a Khaleej Times headline read: “Ban-free 
labour market in UAE from today.” 
Confusion was also due to the wording of the law. Resolution 766 gives several 
instances in which a worker can terminate the “employment relation” in order to get a 
new “work permit.” One of these instances states, 
The two parties (worker and employer) mutually consent to terminating 
the contract during the course of its term, provided the worker has 
completed a period of no less than six months with the employer; the latter 
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provision is waived for workers that qualify for skill levels 1, 2 and 3, as 
per the ministry’s classification65 (MR 766; emphasis added). 
 
The resolution states that after six months of employment, all foreign workers can 
terminate their contract if their employer agrees, and that the six-month provision is 
waived for those who “qualify for skill levels 1, 2 and 3” The resolution does not say that 
the provision is only for those who are currently employed in jobs classified as skills 1, 2 
or 3 (i.e., the higher skilled). Foreign workers with high levels of education but working 
in low-wage jobs in the UAE reasonably presume that the law also applies to them. There 
does not appear to be any less confusion for those working in low-wage jobs.  
MR 766 is also problematic in its assumption that workers have a balanced power 
relationship with their employers. The resolution states that with mutual consent 
workers—in this case, workers of all skill-levels—can terminate their contract. We might 
question if higher-wage workers hold such bargaining power with their employers, but 
certainly lower-wage workers would not. Gabriel, the one who felt he had no choice but 
to accept a cleaning visa, provides a good example of the weak bargaining power a low-
wage worker has, even for someone who is highly educated. 
Upon arriving back in Dubai and going to the company, Gabriel said that the man 
who was to be his boss was shocked and confused as to why a well educated person with 
excellent English skills would have taken a cleaning job. Over time, Gabriel’s boss 
agreed that Gabriel should be allowed to pursue more appropriate employment 
opportunities and agreed to release him from his contract after he completed a year with 
the company. (The minimal requirement is only six months.) Gabriel continued working 
                                                
65. The resolution can be found at www.mohre.gov.ae/handlers 
/download.ashx?YXNzZXQ9ODgx. 
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as requested, and, in his time off, he interviewed and found a better job. On the day when 
he was to receive his no-objection certificate (NOC) from the cleaning company, he was 
told that they had decided not to let him go. His ability to speak English fluently and his 
education were useful to the company. If an individual who is highly educated is unable 
to persuade his employer to be compassionate, it is difficult to imagine that the majority 
of low-wage workers who have much less education would be in a position to come to a 
mutual agreement that is to their benefit.66 
Another new piece of legislation at the start of 2016 was Ministerial Resolution 
764. This resolution dealt with offer letters. Offer letters are a type of preliminary 
contract in which the employer states the salary and benefits. Typically the employee 
signs and agrees to the offer while still in his or her home country. Upon arriving in the 
UAE, the worker is asked to sign a formal contract. The difficulty lies in employers 
substituting contracts and inserting new terms once the new employee arrives in the 
UAE. Quite a few of my participants suffered from the practice of contract substitution. 
When they arrived in the UAE, they learned that the job conditions were far different 
from what they expected, and often even the job was different. Below is an example of 
how this can work.  
Manish was a twenty-eight-year-old man from Nepal. When I met him, he had 
been in the UAE for almost one year and was desperate to return home to his wife and 
three daughters. In Nepal, Manish was recruited directly by an agent representing the 
company for which he was currently working. Translating for Manish, Ujan, another 
                                                
66. These events happened several months after I interviewed Gabriel. He told me about the 
events through WhatsApp and when we would meet up too chat. These conversations were not recorded.  
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interpreter67 who assisted me, said, “He doesn’t know what work he is coming to, but the 
mediator, the guy who sent him told him that you are working inside the airport as a 
trolley person, and that you can get extra tips as well from the passengers, so in a month 
you can earn more that 2000 AED.” 
In a rush, prior to departing the airport in Nepal, the recruiter had Manish and 
fourteen other men who were destined for the same company sign their contracts. It was 
not until the men arrived in Dubai that they discovered that they had signed on to be 
building cleaners and that they would be paid Dh450 (US$123) a month. Upon learning 
this, they tried to complain to the company, who told them they would have to pay 
Dh1500 ($408)—more than three months salary—to be released from their contracts, and 
if they did so, they would “just kick you out from out camp [accommodation].” Being 
thrown out of one’s accommodation would be a difficult prospect for most, but for those 
whose labor camp accommodation was outside of the city in the desert, who never had 
the opportunity to venture into the city, and who spoke little to no English, it must have 
seemed impossible. 
MR 764 attempts to rectify the practice of contract substitution and now requires 
that a standard employment contract signed in the home country be used as the offer 
letter. The letter must then be submitted to the Ministry of Labor before they grant an 
entry permit for the employee. No changes are allowed to the final contract that they sign 
after arriving in the UAE. The goal is to “ensure that new employees do not relocate to 
the UAE on false promises” (Chaudhry 2016). With the new legislation, a quick signing 
                                                
67. Ujan was also a Nepalese man. He had wanted to be a interpreter but after one interview we 
decided that the location of his accommodation was too inconvenient and his work schedule was too 
unpredictable.  
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of the contract would no longer be possible. Employers have to submit the contract in 
order to obtain the work permit that allows foreign workers into the country. The new law 
is a step in the right direction. However, there are still those falling through the cracks. 
Since my formal interviews ended in May 2016, I have maintained contact with 
several of my participants who continued to be informants.68 One told me in February 
2017 that he was hearing stories about how some employers were circumventing this new 
law by having offer letters and contracts forged with signatures and/or fingerprints.69 
Apparently the government was not checking to see if the signatures on the two contracts 
were consistent, or if they were even signed by the individual who was now the new 
employee. Some recently hired low-wage individuals working in the UAE had, he said, 
never even seen, much less signed, a contract. As a result, the outcome is not much 
different than when Manish had his contract substituted. 
Overall, revisions to the labor laws were—according to the government and 
media—seen as bringing greater transparency and fairness to foreign workers. 
Nonetheless, the workers I spoke with were still encountering serious challenges. One of 
the biggest shortcomings, even for higher-wage workers, is the assumption that the power 
balance between employer and employee is sufficiently balanced to allow for fair 
negotiations and a mutual agreement. Further, the lack of true anonymity for those low-
wage workers who are bold enough to submit a complaint is a severe limitation. Current 
law and policy, even with the new resolutions, still result in very precarious 
                                                
68. Because of their stronger language skills and for other cultural reasons, these participants have 
tended to be Africans. 
69. Fingerprints are acceptable for skill level 4 and 5 jobs.  
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circumstances. As long as the policies that govern the existence of workers are designed 
to disempower and be ambiguous, and the structural systems that empower the kafeel 
and/or employer remain embedded in institutional structures and hidden from sight, then 
the violence that feeds structural vulnerability will persist.  
The Production of Fear 
There is a pattern in the perpetuation of vulnerability and fear, a circularity that is 
reinforced and repeated. My participants escaped the precarity of their lives in their home 
countries through migration. Once in the UAE, they feared being unable to earn and remit 
a sufficient amount for their families. Fear grew out of knowledge of their temporariness 
as a guestworker and potential for being terminated and temporarily banned. Once low-
wage, temporary migrants are subjected to vulnerability, their fear—fear of losing their 
job, fear of being cheated out their wages, fear of not being able to support their 
families—causes them to remain in that situation instead of escaping it; thus making 
them more vulnerable. These fears led my participants to do everything they could to 
hold onto their jobs. While the vulnerability of their families back home may have been 
reduced, the vulnerability experienced by my participants in the UAE increased. It 
increased as employers took advantage of a system designed to induce not only precarity, 
but also complacency through fear.  
The first half of the chapter addressed the structural injustices my participants 
faced. The second half considers how these injustices produced fear, increasing the 
vulnerability of my participants. First, it begins with a discussion of how migrant workers 
are disciplined by family members into persevering under exploitative conditions. It then 
discusses the role of being terminated and banned as a disciplinary mechanism in the 
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cultivation of fear, the processes of becoming “illegal” in the Gulf, and the impact of fear 
on the choices low-wage migrants make. The aim is to address the mechanisms that 
produce fear. The impact of these mechanisms on my participants is taken up in chapter 
eight.  
Mechanisms for the Production of Fear 
Structural violence is intentional harm whose source is unidentifiable or hidden. It 
is holds similarities to Foucault’s (1977) concept of  “disciplinary power.” This power, as 
Foucault describes it, is an invisible structural mechanism designed to maintain inequality 
and to meet the aims of the wealthy and powerful. The government—and the various 
elements that disperse its power—train bodies to achieve its goal. This goal is the 
production of a labor force, which is achieved through disciplining of bodies to be 
submissive, docile, and complacent. When society is effectively trained, the “docile 
body” is normalized and produced automatically.  
Among the low-wage migrant workers in my study, the disciplinary power of the 
state produced fear, which in turn produced docility. The state, however, remained 
hidden, allowing employers to act for them. I heard many examples of how employers 
attempted to discipline their employees. For example: If an employee challenged his or 
her employer, the employer would respond harshly to the individual so as to deter others 
from doing likewise. My participant Mike provided a good example of this. He was the 
thirty-six-year-old Nigerian man with a four-year diploma and seven years of banking 
experience. When I met Mike, he had just completed his contract working as a high-rise 
building window washer. A year previous to our interview, several of Mike’s co-workers 
had not been paid for several months so they had gone to the Ministry of Labor to 
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complain. Mike said, “They went to Labor to complain. It is over one year now.… They 
[the Ministry of Labor and/or the courts] will call him [the employer]; he will not come. 
… So I have 3 staff [co-workers] who are overstaying for over one year now.” They 
could not leave because they required an end of contract letter of no objection from the 
employer to be able to exit the country. Mike too had not been paid for the last five 
months of his contract; however, because of his co-workers’ experiences, he had not 
complained to the Ministry of Labor. He had feared not being able to escape when his 
own contract concluded.  
Emu, a twenty-four-year-old woman from Ethiopia, told a story similar to Mike’s. 
She worked in a very small salon and earned Dh1000 (US$270) a month. The previous 
year one of her co-workers had gone to the Ministry of Labor to complain about non-
payment of wages. Emu said, 
We afraid [of] her [the employer]. The one girl, when … she [the boss] 
didn’t pay … she [the friend] went to Labor. Then she [the friend] told 
them [Labor]. She [the employer] didn’t pay me. We don’t have day off 
and something. They [Labor] call my boss. […] My boss call the police. 
She knows the police. They got her [my friend]. Then she go to prison. 
She didn’t do anything. She [the boss] knows. She live here 20 years or 
something. She know everything. And then she [the friend] go back to 
Ethiopia. She didn’t get any money… … It’s too hard. … 
 
Emu said that after this incident her employer told the remaining three workers that the 
same would happen to them if they complained. These threats and the examples made of 
co-workers immobilized the employees who remained—despite their excessive hours and 
workweeks, threats, and minimal wages. For both Emu and Mike, the impact of their 
employers’ words and action resulted in fear and inaction, making them docile and 
complacent. Structural violence is found in the “disciplinary power” of the government. 
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Their mechanisms of oppression and marginalization work through the employers and 
often go unseen by the workers. 
The kafala system is an excellent example of how unseen disciplinary power of 
the state manifests itself through the sponsor/employer, but the power of the state can 
also be perpetuated “diffusely” through a variety of other non-state actors, including 
recruiters, the media, one’s family and friends, and the migrants themselves. Fernandez 
(2013) provides an analysis of migration intermediaries in facilitating the emigration of 
Ethiopians to the Middle East. She refers to the ways in which state power is manifested 
as a “decentered approach to regulation” (Fernandez 2013, 814). With this she means that 
regulations are not only operationalized through government action, but that, “regulation 
occurs within and between other social actors,” too (816). She takes a decentered 
approach so that we are better able to “recognize and explain how regulation may be 
diffused through society” (816). Like Bourdieu and Foucault, her aim is to take the lens 
off the state, an entity that is often assumed to be the central regulator of policy, and re-
focus it on the operations of others. Both Bourdieu and Foucault argue that power is 
dispersed not only by state institutions, but also by what Bourdieu would describe as 
more subtle, hidden forms of power—power whose origins are often misperceived 
(Swartz 2013). Foucault, similarly, would argue for the need to examine “a wide range of 
technologies of control” that go beyond the government (Fernandez 2013, 816). 
Other actors who can operationalize and perpetuate the powers of an exploitative 
state include the family. Analyn, the forty-eight-year-old Filipina woman, whose sister 
had quickly departed Dubai once Analyn had arrived and signed a contract, was subjected 
to a family that seemed to exploit her. She said,  
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Unfortunately, I do not want to stay here, but my mom, she tell me, ‘If you 
will come back in Philippines, what you will do there? At your age, you 
cannot work in the office of anywhere. So you will come back for selling 
fish?’ And then I tell okay as long as I am not disabled, I will not come 
back… Because no one will give her medicine. Because she has diabetes, 
and who will give food for my mom… 
 
Analyn’s mother used her ability to manipulate her daughter into doing what she wanted. 
Her mother’s words could perhaps be interpreted less critically; however, the stories 
Analyn told about her past left little likelihood of this. When I asked Analyn what had 
had the greatest influence on her growing up, she told me about her experience of getting 
in a fight with another child. She said, “My mother tell to my enemy [another girl] that 
she is beautiful and I’m ugly; that’s why she’s [Analyn] fighting with you [the other 
girl].” Later, when Analyn was to marry, Analyn said while crying, “When I got married 
at twenty-one, she [her mother] didn’t give me her blessing.”  
Analyn’s mother attempted to manipulate her through guilt trips, but, more often, 
my participants created guilt on their own. Whether out of love, a fear of bringing shame 
on oneself, or both, these individuals were terrified of failing their families. Michael 
began this chapter talking about how immobilized he and others were by their situations 
and the fear this engendered. He was a thirty-two-year-old Kenyan man who had 
completed high school and attended (but not finished) technical college. He had a 
daughter, whose mother had left her, and, before deciding to emigrate, he had gotten 
remarried to a woman he was confident would love his daughter and care for his mother. 
Throughout his interview, Michael spoke several times about his fear of going back with 
nothing, to nothing. He said, 
When you’re coming here, you’ve used all of your savings. … You’ve 
sold things because you’re coming to make it big. So after a month I went 
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back. After your time elapses [visit visa expires], you go back. And I went 
back to nothing [job-wise]. …  So I went back to nothing. At the back of 
my mind I just told myself … I’ve seen some people making it. Because 
every person you meet, oh, you’re going to make it! Don’t worry. 
 
Two sentences later, he said again, “I did not want to go back to my family with nothing.” 
Near to the end of the interview, he spoke of it again, 
You don’t go back after … after you fail here, after you think you’ve 
failed here, you don’t go back. You don’t go and expose yourself, like 
something has happened. You persevere. 
 
I asked him why he could not go back. He said,  
 
What do you go back to? You’ve taken all of their money. You’ve taken 
all of their savings. … You’ve taken your mom’s savings. … You’ve 
taken all of your savings. … Whatever she had … 
 
Among temporary low-wage workers in the UAE, the production of fear is quite easy. 
The inequities and oppression created by state actors are perpetuated knowingly and 
unknowingly by a variety of other actors ranging from the employer to the self. For 
Michael, it was the knowledge that one is failing not only oneself, but an entire family 
that has often borne the debt of migration (A. M. Gardner 2010a). It was the fear of going 
back with nothing, to nothing.   
Temporariness as a Mechanism for Cultivating Fear 
In the UAE, two specific mechanisms are commonly used by the state to cultivate 
fear and hence docility. They are temporariness and expendability. For my participants, 
knowledge of one’s own temporariness was a significant cause of fear. Rosewarne (2012) 
contends that temporary migration is built on institutionalized structural inequalities that 
are inherent to the condition of temporariness. Dauvergne and Marsden (2012) agree. 
Building on Arendt (1998), they contend that temporary migrant work and its related 
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programs are inherently unequal; thus, ideologically, temporariness produces relations of 
domination between worker and employer.  
Domination according to Iris Young (1990) is a condition that results from 
individuals being unable to control both their actions and the conditions within which 
they act, and that a relation of domination is the unjust control of power over others. 
Among temporary guestworkers, it is the employer who dominates. This domination is 
structural because the control and power are institutionalized conditions (I. M. Young 
1990). Workers—all of whom are temporary in the UAE regardless of their socio-
economic level—know that they have been made docile and that they are temporary and 
disposable.70 Negasi, my Ethiopian participant with a university degree, spoke of this 
impotency. He said, 
I cannot go back. I have nothing to go back to. … You know… That 
sometimes… You feel like talking… When you’re upset in work… Like 
when you are treated unfairly, you cannot do anything about it. If they 
cancel you, so you go back and then you face a bigger problem than 
this…. and I just … … [his voice drifts off]. 
  
Expendability as a Mechanism for Cultivating Fear 
In the UAE, termination from one’s job often (but not always) coincides with a 
temporary six-month or one-year employment ban. This ban does not mandate that one 
must exit the country.71 However, low-wage migrant workers cannot afford to stay in the 
UAE if they are not earning money. As a result, workers who are banned are left with 
two choices. They can either become irregular or they can exit the country. Irregular 
                                                
70. Middle-class professionals are not immune from the fear this creates. 
71. The Ministry of Labor decides whether or not a worker should receive an employment ban. 
Immigration decides whether a worker should be deported. Labor and Immigration apparently store 
information on different databases resulting in each being unaware of the other’s actions. 
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status is quite risky and typically results in a lifetime immigration ban. I had participants 
who were willing to take that risk and others who were not. Those migrants who are 
unwilling to take this risk must then exit the UAE. As a result, being terminated and 
temporarily banned often have the same emotional and psychological impact as being 
temporarily deported.72  
The fear of being banned/deported prevents low-wage workers from complaining 
about their working or living conditions. Being terminated and banned are not a direct 
result of making a complaint. Doing so, by law, would not be allowed. Rather, an 
employer/sponsor can, for example, terminate a foreign worker a month after the 
complaint was made or not renew the individual’s contract when it expires. Knowledge 
of their employer’s ability to do this arouses fear and complacency. Thus, it is not the 
actual deportation—termination and ban—that disciplines: rather, it is the threat and 
belief that one is viewed as expendable which works as a coercive and self-censoring 
device (De Genova 2002; A. M. Gardner 2010b; Menjívar and Abrego 2012; Wicker 
2010).73 
                                                
72. This also helps explain why my participants and many others often refer to “deportation” even 
though the actual penalty of deportation is unlikely if one has not performed an egregious act.  
73. Deportation is used as a mechanism of control among undocumented migrants in the US 
(Bourgois 2009; De Genova 2013; Gonzalez 2013; Menjívar and Kanstroom 2013; Quesada 2011) and in 
Europe (Andrijasevic 2010; H. Castañeda 2010; Wicker 2010). It was also used as such among those in my 
study who were irregular. Similarly, deportation can also be used as a mechanism of control among 
migrants who have regular—but temporary—status. Studies to this effect can be found in the US (Benz-
Rogers 2014; Hahamovitch 2013; Johnston 2010), in Europe (Bridget Anderson and Rogaly 2005), and—
as has been well-documented—in the Arab Gulf (A. M. Gardner 2012; Irianto and Truong 2014; Kakande 
2013; Mahdavi 2013; Malit and Naufal 2014; Truong 2012). Further, the kafala system is typically viewed 
by those in the West as a deviant system. However, it is not. The diversity and scale to which temporary 
foreign workers are used in the UAE sets it apart. However, tying low-wage temporary migrant workers to 
employers can also be found not only in the UAE, but also in the US (Apgar 2015; Bauder 2006; Benz-
Rogers 2014; Delgado-Wise, Márquez, and Gaspar 2015; Hill 2011), Canada (Foster 2012; Hill 2011; 
Strauss and McGrath 2017; Valiani 2012); the UK (Bridget Anderson and Rogaly 2005; Scott 2015); and 
parts of Europe (Mannon et al. 2012; Pajnik 2012; Plewa 2013). Castle et al. (2015) argue that it is 
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The knowledge of one’s temporariness and expendability was heightened for the 
Bangladeshi men in my study. The UAE government had an immigration ban on 
“unskilled” Bangladeshi migrants. Those who had jobs could stay, but they could not 
legally change employers, and no new hires were allowed to enter the country. These 
restrictions increased the exploitability of this population. If Bangladeshis are 
terminated, they either leave the country or stay with irregular status, and hope to find 
jobs where the employer will pay cash. My participant Sumon had been terminated 
several months before our interview. Tarun, my interpreter, translated for Sumon. He 
said,   
He [Sumon] has no visa, and he cannot go back to his country now. … … 
He is living in Dubai for the last 6 years. … … About 3 months ago his 
visa expired and his company did not renew. … … He was working with 
the same company the whole time. … … He has to renew it [the 
visa/contract] every two years, and the company charged him 3000 to 
renew the visa. … … 800 dirhams [was his salary being paid]. … … He 
renewed it twice. … … They were asking 3000 dirhams to renew the visa. 
He says he has no money. … … The second time he paid for the visa. … 
… Two years ago he went to Bangladesh and the company gave him the 
[round trip] ticket. And so after he came back, the company deducted the 
ticket expenses from his salary, and visa, too. 
 
Sumon spent more than four months of his salary on the cost of the visa and flight ticket. 
When Sumon’s contract expired three months prior to meeting us, his boss decided to let 
Sumon go. Over the last few years the economy has been contracting. However, state 
mechanisms make it quite easy for companies to grow or deplete their workforce, 
making it easy to respond to such changes.  
                                                                                                                                            
becoming more and more common for governments to revitalize old guestworker programs. They write, 
“governments everywhere seem to be looking back to the old guest worker model or the contract labour 
models used in Gulf oil economies and some Asian labour-importing countries, to introduce new systems 
of what is euphemistically labelled ‘circular migration’” (2380). 
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The reasons why workers are unable to leave their employment are not always 
clear. Often it is a combination of reasons and actors—the result of lies told by employers 
that leave workers uncertain of their rights or fearing prison and/or deportation. Other 
times, it is laws that are ambiguous or too complex to be understood and followed, or 
laws that are simply not upheld and enforced. And still at other times, it seemed that 
participants were simply so overwhelmed by their circumstances that they were frozen 
into inaction. The reason for inaction—or what often looks like complacency by those on 
the outside—was driven by fear and a sense of disempowerment. Anderson and Rogaly 
stated, “The greater the hostility that migrant workers fear they may encounter, … the 
greater their vulnerability” (2005, 4). As the degree of my participants’ fears increased 
over the prospect of becoming more vulnerable, their condition of vulnerability 
increased, too.   
Conclusion 
The kafala system has received the most attention by researchers on the Arab 
Gulf. Further discussion of it in this chapter had two purposes. On one level, I have 
hopefully framed and considered it and related issues in a way that can deepen 
understanding. Secondly, it provides the necessary foundation for understanding the 
chapters that follow.  
While there is little new information that can be provided about the kafala system, 
there are aspects of it and its related immigration laws that needed further explanation. 
This included a discussion of the on-going ambiguity of UAE laws that perplexes not 
only low-wage workers, but also lawyers, and how this obscurity increases the structural 
violence that enables exploitation. The increased vulnerability that results is then further 
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heightened through temporary status and the power with which employers are granted to 
make workers expendable.  
The focus of this chapter has also addressed the mechanisms and structures that 
cultivate fear. This (and an awareness of UAE laws) is foundational to examining how 
discriminatory processes work (chapters five and six) and how foreign workers are 
physically and psychologically marginalized (chapter seven). Explanations for how the 
current system of governance works provides the framework for understanding the 
impact of this system on my participants and their ability or inability to counter it 
(chapter eight). Finally, while the kafala is without question problematic, also important 
is the apparent difficulty the government has in enforcing laws that have been designed to 
prevent and protect worker exploitation and abuse. Better implementation is possible, and 
this is discussed in the conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
VULNERABILITY: LIFE IN DUBAI 
 
RACE, ETHNICTY, & NATIONALITY 
 
First of all my name is Kendra. I’m 24 years old. I’m from Kenya. I 
came to seek green pastures in Dubai, specifically in Abu Dhabi, as a 
housekeeper through a recruitment agency. Something happens in these 
recruitment agencies. It’s like a slave trade. 
 
Focusing on the individual experiences of my participants helped expose the 
violent structures that create precarity for temporary low-wage migrant workers. It 
showed how labor laws and the kafala system oppress low-wage workers and that these 
oppressions were somewhat uniformly experienced. Discriminatory practices, on the 
other hand, were applied unevenly, resulting in a wide range of experiences among low-
wage workers. The various social categories—and potential areas for discrimination—
that constituted the experiences of low-wage workers included race/ethnicity, gender, 
socio-economic status, religion, education, type of employment, migration status, and 
nationality.  For my participants, two aspects that stood out in particular were the often-
overlapping attributes of race, ethnicity, and/or nationality and the role of gender. These 
two factors determined which jobs and salaries they could access, and defined their 
working and living experiences. This chapter focuses on the role of race, ethnicity and 
nationality. The following chapter addresses gender discrimination.  
Regardless of whether the focus of analysis is on race, class, gender, or any other 
aspect of identity, examining the experiences through an intersectional framework is 
useful because it helps identify oppression and its related mechanisms, and shows how 
institutional structures work to advantage some groups at the expense of others (Dill and 
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Zambrana 2009; Utt 2017; Yuval-Davis 2006). An intersectional framework reminds us 
that our various identities never exist alone; that they always function in relation to other 
aspects of identity. They work together in particular spaces and at particular times to 
either oppress or privilege. Focusing on the categories that are used to construct 
difference is important because it is on the basis of these categories that difference is used 
to justify oppression (D. S. Massey 2008; McDowell 2008). It can be argued that 
focusing on a single social dimension of identity as an analytical category of analysis 
takes the focus off other attributes and, in doing so, creates exclusion (Bauder 2006). I 
would agree that ignoring other dimensions of identity is problematic; yet, highlighting 
those aspects of identity that play prominently in a particular context is an indicator of 
their significance as mechanisms of oppression and makes them deserving of attention. 
For many of my participants, discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, and/or 
nationality were central to the structural violence they encountered. It reinforced and 
strengthened institutionalized systems of precarity, increasing their individual 
experiences of vulnerability. 
This chapter focuses on nationality as a basis for discrimination and its 
relationship to racial and ethnic discrimination. In certain instances, I enclose 
“nationality” within quotation marks to signify how the word can in certain 
circumstances camouflage the presence of discriminatory attitudes towards race and 
ethnicity.  I begin by discussing why nationality is so often and commonly referenced in 
the UAE, how these references might be masking other prejudices, and why it is difficult 
to identify them. I then examine the historical roots for discrimination in the UAE to see 
how this might inform contemporary understandings. Finally, I attempt to tease apart the 
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various overlapping discriminatory processes experienced in Dubai so that we might 
better understand the challenges they present and reveal why my South Asian participants 
perceived much less discrimination than my African ones. 
Role of the Nation 
Much of the literature on immigrants and discrimination focuses on the “nativist” 
attitudes of the “native” citizenry (Guia 2016; J. G. Young 2017). Nativism is applicable 
to countries that have extensive cultural diversity as a result of mass immigration together 
with historical experiences of nation-building (Guia 2016), two features common to the 
UAE. However, nativism also typically involves anti-immigrant discourses (Guia 2016). 
Such discourse is, of course, found in the UAE, but in far less amounts than in, for 
example, the US or Europe, often because of their concerns with permanent immigration. 
More importantly, while nativism might be seen as relevant to the local Emirati 
population, it does not explain the type of discrimination my participants experienced in 
the UAE. The attitudes of nationals are important for understanding the overall context 
and treatment of migrants, but they are less important to the day-to-day experiences of 
low-wage workers because they typically encounter few nationals. My participants’ 
interactions were with those who were temporary foreigners like themselves.  
I focus on nationality as one form of discrimination because of its link to nation. 
The term nation is used as a synonym for a country in several ways: as a bounded 
territory, as a political entity embodied in a state, and as a cultural entity (Loveman 
1999). Among my participants, and likely among most foreigners in the UAE, making a 
connection to one’s “nation” is not due to a sense of nationalist ideology. Rather, it 
reflects the need to be viewed by others, as well as oneself, as connected to a physical 
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place. Further, that place represents a cultural entity composed of such attributes as 
language, religion, and traditions (Loveman 1999), and in this sense can overlap with 
ethnic background. Connecting oneself to a nation provides a strong sense of identity 
(Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003), and is central to how low-wage foreign workers group 
themselves in the Arab Gulf (Rana 2011).  
“Nationality” as Identity 
Dubai is the temporary home to over two hundred nationalities, and many of the 
challenges low-wage workers encounter revolve around their national identity and how it 
is perceived. It is one of the most important—if not the most important—dimension of 
one’s social identity, as well as the basis for discriminatory practices. In a society that 
hosts such a broad range of nationalities, discriminatory practices would be expected. 
Thus, in dealing with populations that earned the lowest wages in Dubai, it came as no 
surprise that participants in my study would bear the brunt of this discrimination.  
In my initial interviews, I did not focus on discrimination. However, after about a 
third of the interviews had been completed, it began to emerge as a topic, and, 
subsequently, I began to pursue this line of inquiry.74 Of the thirteen South Asians who 
either brought up issues related to discrimination or whom I specifically asked, only four 
said they faced discrimination. In contrast, of the fourteen Africans, thirteen said they 
encountered discrimination. Neither of the two Filipino women discussed it. That my 
participants faced discrimination was expected, but that so many did not, was quite 
surprising. Why had so few South Asians experienced discrimination, or rather, if they 
                                                
74. This approach is common in the constructivist approach to grounded theory. When new 
meaning and experiences emerge, we follow to either see where it might go or develop deeper into analysis 
(Charmaz 2014). 
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had, why were so few unaware that they had? My ten plus years of living in Dubai had 
taught me that Indians—a nationality with whom I had interacted frequently in the 
university setting and with the other volunteers at NGO I assisted—faced a high degree 
of discrimination. Why did those in my study say they did not face it? While it is likely 
that more structural sources of discrimination would go unnoticed, were they also 
unaware of overt acts of discrimination? When I mentioned to professional Indians I 
knew that the Africans in my study encountered much more discrimination than the 
South Asians, why were their immediate reactions ones of cold annoyance?  
To understand the various forms of discrimination in Dubai and attempt to make 
sense of them, one must gather an inordinate amount of information. Some of this 
information deals with knowing the social identity of those involved—where they were 
raised, what passport they held, where they had studied, what degree they had, what job 
they had, what salary they earned—, and other information deals with the specific context 
of the discriminatory act—where in Dubai the interaction took place, what style of 
clothing one had worn on that day, and, perhaps most importantly, who was interacting 
with whom. All of these factors come into play and are important in order to determine 
whether discrimination would be experienced, and if so whether it would be based on 
national identity, cultural identity, racial identity, socio-economic status, gender, religion, 
or some combination of the above.  
Nationality Deemed Nondiscriminatory  
Part of the challenge of identifying the prejudices that motivate discriminatory 
treatment is that some prejudices can hide beneath a discourse of “nationality.” They can 
hide beneath it because references to nationality are deemed innocuous. One reason for 
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this is the common belief that governments should have the authority to decide who can 
and cannot enter their country. This practice legitimizes discrimination on the basis of 
nationality, and, as a result, nationality is often not perceived as discrimination in the 
same way as gender or race-based discrimination. 
Further, in the UAE, it is commonplace for the media to include the nationality of 
relevant individuals in their news stories. For example, a review of articles in the crime 
section of a local newspaper provides the following illustrations.75 “All [of] the four men 
are from African countries.” “Five men and one woman [were] from Hong Kong…” 
“[Police] found the twenty-six-year-old Pakistani driver sitting in the back with the girl 
and kissing her.” Locals, too, are included, as in the following: “four Emiratis convicted 
of traffic offences [are] to work as petrol station attendants and gardeners.” The repetition 
with which UAE residents are informed about nationality develops the desire to know 
this harmless information, repeat it, and thus reinforce it further.  
Finally, certain statements—which are oddly and unexpectedly factual—can mask 
prejudices, normalizing and making acceptable what is often biased or discriminatory 
information. For example, in the UAE, statements such as “Indian maids are more 
expensive than Sri Lankan ones” are factually correct. The information is based on the 
(recommended) minimum salary requirements determined by respective embassies. 
When statements such as these become commonplace, then comments such as, “Indians 
are far better maids than Sri Lankans” and “Nigerians are all a bunch of hustlers”76 are 
                                                
75. All examples are taken from the April 12, 2017, edition of the newspaper.  
76. This statement is one that potential employers might make and which is meant to be 
derogatory. According to my African participants, Nigerians are least desired among sub-Saharan Africans. 
Interestingly, to Peter, a twenty-seven-year-old Nigerian man who lacked formal education, the ability to 
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easily incorporated into societal discourse and the prejudices they reflect go 
unrecognized. Through the discourse of “nationality,” foreigners and locals in Dubai lose 
sight of what is considered discriminatory treatment in general, and even what would be 
considered racist views. As a result of the muddled awareness this produces, the ability 
(or even the need) to consider the specificity of “nationality” and how it is being used is 
lost.  
Conflating Nationality & “Race” 
The above examples show how discourse around nationality can seem innocuous 
and make it difficult for the layperson to determine whether someone is discriminating on 
the basis of race or nationality [Howard]. Journalists, government officials, and scholars, 
on the other hand, can lean to the opposite extreme when they conflate racism with 
nationality. When this is done, with little explanation of why, they lose the opportunity to 
examine what the actual prejudices are that motivate these two very different forms of 
discrimination and what role history has played.  
In the UAE, news sources and officials have been found to equate racial 
discrimination with nationality. For example, referring to what a senior UAE labor 
official had said, the Gulf News wrote that “Employers commit racial discrimination 
when they offer jobs on the basis of race, nationality or any personal attributes” (Salama 
2005, emphasis added). The official—or at least the journalist’s interpretation of what the 
official said—clearly sees discrimination on the basis of nationality to be a form of 
                                                                                                                                            
hustle was positive. When he said, “I think like a Nigerian…. I am a hustler,” I asked what he meant by 
that. He shared his positive interpretation, “A hustler is somebody that can find his way out. Like he can do 
anything. He can aim at big money, maybe washing a car. He can see all these cars, and you tell me to 
wash them in 3 hours. I can do it. In 3 hours I can do it, but pay me good money. [It means] you have in a 
strength of working.” 
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racism. More recently an article in Middle East Eye stated that Arab world is quite racist, 
though they [the UAE] deny it (Nashed 2017). The author wrote that the “racial 
hierarchy” of domestic workers placed Africans at the bottom and Filipinos at the top 
because of their lighter skin. In the author’s view, too, all low-wage migrant workers 
were racialized in the Arab Gulf, and they are racialized on the basis of skin color.  
Similar to the media, past studies on temporary low-wage migrant workers in the 
UAE and/or Arab Gulf has often conflated nationality and race (Aguilar Jr. 1999; A. M. 
Gardner 2010b; Silvey 2004; Truong 2012). These researchers contend that in regards to 
low-wage migrant workers, who were often South Asians and Filipinos in their studies, 
referencing nationality is often a way to mask racial prejudices and provide justification 
for hiring choices and salary amounts. This research seems to lack clear explanations as 
to when and why it is appropriate to label discrimination against low-wage workers as 
racist. In contrast, a study on the women who employ domestic workers in the US does 
explain how it arrived at such a conclusion.  
Moras (2010) and Yeoh and Huang (2000) provide examples of how in the case 
of domestic workers, employers often reference nationality to avoid appearing racially 
discriminatory. Moras’s (2010) research explores racial and ethnic relations. She argues 
that in the case of foreign domestic workers in the US, nationality is typically code for 
racial prejudice. She gives both historical evidence as well as an analysis of her 
interviewees’ discourse. In interviews with white American women who employed 
women of color—mainly Latinas—and African American women who worked in their 
homes, she explored the dynamics of their relationship. Moras examined the very specific 
discourse used by her participants to determine that their use of nationality was 
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camouflage for racial discrimination. Moras, a white woman herself, found that the white 
employers were extremely reticent to talk about race.  She contends, that in an attempt to 
hide what appeared as racist views, her interviewees used “cultural difference and 
national origin” as “markers of racial difference” and “preference” (241). A similar 
analysis seems to be lacking in Gulf scholarship. Yeoh and Huang DATE had similar 
findings. In their research on domestic workers in Singapore, they found that non-citizens 
are often treated in a way that “conflates notions of ‘race’ and nation’” (1153). 
I found strong similarities in the UAE. In 2013, I carried out a small study77 
involving five American women in Dubai who worked outside of the home and 
employed domestic workers from the Global South. It is quite common in the UAE for 
white women from the Global North—as well as middle and upper-class women from the 
Global South—who work full time to employ fulltime live-in domestic help to both clean 
and take care of their children. In my interviews, I asked the women (who were the 
employers) if they preferred that their domestic workers were of a particular nationality. 
“AJ”78 said, 
Well, my preference has always been, not always been, but over the years, 
I’ve come to prefer Filipina maids because they tend to have better 
English and they tend to just understand you better. There’s sweeping 
generalizations and I almost am embarrassed to talk about them but 
Filipinos have a reputation for being more honest. And I just like them. 
Being more honest and cleaner which is really kind of, yea, I’m 
embarrassed to even say that, but, yeah… 
 
“MK” another employer stated, 
                                                
77. This study was carried out in 2014 as part of a course for my doctoral degree. The study 
involved in-depth interviews with five American women. The interviews were carried out over Skype, 
recorded, and then transcribed.  
78. I have used the initials of my participants in place of their names. 
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I definitely needed a Filipina because first of all they are very friendly and 
smiling and clean, but second of all, and I know this is going to sound 
very racist, so you can just, you know, make sure my names not on this. I 
really cannot stand the smell of Indian spices. It gives me a headache and I 
had an Indian woman that I was trying out before Mercy [her maid] and 
even she smelled like spice herself, you know she had that spicy smell and 
very different perfume. 
 
While it is unclear whether AJ was aware of the racial undercurrents to her “sweeping 
generalizations,” MK was fully aware that such comments were racist. Whether in the 
UAE, Singapore, or the US, it is clear that prejudiced views are being hidden—
consciously or unconsciously—by references to nationality, an attribute deemed by many 
to be innocuous. 
In the Gulf context, it may be that scholars and journalists see racism in the way it 
operates, and racialization as the marking of others as different, regardless of their 
physical characteristics and how they may be similar or different to the dominant groups 
(Aulette 2016; Grosfoguel 2016; Weiner 2012; Wimmer 2013). They might also contend 
that the attitudes, which they describe as racist, lead to discriminatory treatment of those 
deemed inferior, and that utilizing racial concepts carries greater weight and is more 
powerful than other descriptors. Audre Lorde states that racism is “the belief in the 
inherent superiority of one race over all others and thereby the right to dominance” 
(Lorde and Clarke 2007, 45). In the context of the UAE, one need only substitute 
nationality for race. The end result is the same: some are deemed inherently superior and 
others inferior. These views may be legitimate claims. However, since these scholars and 
journalists do not explain why all references to nationality should be understood as being 
rooted in racial prejudice, we are left to conjecture.  
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Further analysis can show us how people perceive racial differences as well as 
how they perceive references to nationality. From the examples given throughout this 
section, it is clear that knowledge and opinions run the full gamut, from those who are 
unaware that references to nationality carry with it any discriminatory prejudices 
whatsoever to those who contend that it is all driven by racial prejudices. 
Historical Roots of Discriminatory Processes 
The UAE’s past experiences with colonialism and the slave trade can help explain 
how society is organized today and why certain nationalities are favored and others ill-
treated. These roots inform today’s hierarchies and are a fundamental axis for organizing 
society. The past also helps explain the complex and contradictory ideas about skin color 
today, why the focus is on nationality, and the bifurcation of society into national/non-
national.  
An Axis for Organizing Society 
Ethnicity and perceived racial differences were both elements used to stratify 
populations during the period of colonization. Aulette (2016), a racism scholar, explains 
how colonial powers imposed systems and classifications onto foreign populations, 
which created the precedents for current stratification. She states that just as the colonial 
powers divvied up Africa into artificial states, they then divvied up the people within 
those states into artificial tribes that reflected their own ideas about how tribes should be 
structured. Tribalism in its present form was the result of colonial intervention (Lentz 
2000 referenced in Aulette 2016; Nagel 1994). Prior to that, groups in the regions were 
characterized by their flexibility and mobility. Colonizers granted leaders from the 
 112 
hierarchical tribal structures they created, granting them control over resources and 
people, so as to add them in their rule.79  
Tribal systems reflecting the British’s desired hierarchical style likely did not 
exist in the Trucial States either. Abdulla (1985), an Emirati political scientist, states that 
the economy at that time prior to British involvement was based on “primitive, pastoral 
subsistence” and “tribute-paying formations,” and that “the UAE’s pre-integration stage 
of development was complex and cannot be reductionally described as tribal” (75). The 
organizational structures put in place by British colonial powers are still in place today. 
Power is consolidated—in the hands of only a few leaders—and hierarchies are steep.  
British and American employers maintained the organizational structures put in 
place by British colonial powers. They segregated and restricted interactions between 
Indians and local Arabs, and paid wages that were systematically lower than that paid to 
British and American workers (Heard-Bey 2005; D. S. Massey et al. 2005). With 
independence, stratification altered with, of course, locals becoming the dominant power. 
Rulers gave preference to hiring foreign Arab workers who shared similar language and 
religion, rather than to Indian labor that the British and Americans preferred.80  
                                                
79. According to Aulette (2016), conflict arose when the people whom these tribal leaders were to 
rule over decided that observing this newly appointed leader was not in their best interests. This resulted in 
the leaders turning to force and corruption to gain control and to maintain their image. It also led to 
divisions, which the colonial powers exploited, and to the now too familiar reference to “interethnic” 
conflict and rivalries. Aulette explains, “These so-called tribes did not really exist, and the British were not 
meeting with legitimate leaders. But, the myth of tribes created a façade of legitimacy to their exploitation. 
The [British] concept of tribes, however, eventually became real, even in the eyes of the people who were 
supposedly members of one or another tribe. By the twentieth century, the idea of clear cut ethnic 
boundaries dividing people into identifiable tribes became real” (Aulette 2016, 59, emphasis added). 
80. In the first half of the twentieth century, the majority of migrants were Arab. However, by the 
1980s and 1990s, there was a shift towards Indians and other South Asians. As discussed in chapter one, 
this was primarily driven by political concerns. 
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The British institutionalized structures that essentialized the racial and ethnic 
difference between the dominant group and those below (Desmond and Emirbayer 2009; 
Fredrickson 2002) and, in the process, legitimated the use of power by those in control 
(Memmi 1965; D. Swartz 1998). Power grants agency and the ability to control one’s 
circumstances. It is distributed through resources which result in individuals and groups 
either having their agency enhanced or constrained (Walter, Bourgois, and Margarita 
Loinaz 2004). Today, the UAE’s method of dealing with its foreign population “echo” 
that performed by the British during their colonial presence; the British provided a 
“template” for handling foreign labor (A. M. Gardner 2010b, 48). This template along 
with the kafala system informed current stratification.  
Roots for Preferring Light Skin Color 
Racial discrimination on the basis of skin color likely has roots in the UAE’s 
experience with African slave labor. Long before and throughout British presence in the 
Trucial States, African labor was brought to the Arab Gulf region through the slave 
trade.81 This trade ended as a result of global economic forces, which made the cost of 
trade prohibitive.82 Slaves were later trafficked from an alternate region, but this too 
ended with the increase in oil wealth in the early part of the twentieth century. At that 
                                                
81. It is estimated that the trans-Sahara slave trade began much earlier than the trans-Atlantic one, 
and that more Africans were trafficked through this route than across the Atlantic (Lucas 2014). 
82. Some claim that the trans-Sahara trade to the Trucial States was brought about by the British 
(Heard-Bey 2005). Historian Matthew Hopper (2015) contends that it was due to global economic forces in 
the first quarter of the twentieth century. These forces, as referenced in chapter three, led to the collapse of 
the date and pearl industries in the Arab Gulf region, which in turn resulted in the decline of the African 
slave trade. The fall of the date industry was due to the mass amounts of date seedlings taken back to the 
US and cultivated. Japan out did them in the pearl industry. In addition, at the time of economic collapse, 
new sources of slaves became available from Baluchistan and Persia. Importing from these regions was less 
costly and risky than bringing labor from East Africa. These events challenge the popular myth that the 
British Royal Navy brought an end to slavery in the region. Rather, the British did little to stop the slave 
trade.  
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time, leaders granted manumission (i.e., freedom) to many slaves, including those from 
Africa. Upon manumission, former slaves would typically be incorporated into society 
and took the family name of their former masters. In the UAE at that time, racial identity 
was traditionally based on paternal descent rather than skin color. However, with time 
and colonial occupation, skin color began to matter along with genealogy.83 Hopper 
(2015), a historian who focuses on the history of East Africa and the Arab Gulf, writes, 
While it is true that in the Gulf today one’s racial identity is most often 
determined by that of one’s father and grandfather rather than one’s skin 
color, skin color does matter (or there would not be so many skin-
lightening clinics in Dubai). Put simply, in the Gulf race matters alongside 
genealogy. […] the Arab identity contains an internal hierarchy that 
influences perceptions (Hopper 2015, 217; italics in original).84  
 
Emiratis lay claim to their position of power and dominance through multiple 
identities, which are then influenced to differing degrees by skin color. Emiratis believe 
that as Arabs they are racially different from other groups, and—more importantly—that 
as “Gulfies” (citizens from the Gulf), they see themselves as both racially and ethnically 
different from other Middle Eastern Arabs. People from the Gulf can identify other 
“Gulfies” by their physical appearance, and this perceived difference is tied to individual 
families. There are also clear cultural and historical elements that set the Gulf apart from 
other Middle Eastern countries. Those from the Gulf view themselves as above other 
                                                
83. Kowner and Demel (2014) contend that the preference for light skin may actually go back 
much further than the colonial era. It can be found in societies around the globe, even those that had limited 
contact to the West. Regardless, colonialism certainly reinforced attitudes about and preference for lighter 
skin. 
84. The UAE government does not keep statistics on specific nationalities. See: 
http://original.fcsa.gov.ae/ Somewhat current estimates for a handful of African countries in the UAE can 
be found, but this data has limited use in creating a clearer picture of the reduction of Africans coming to 
the region in the early twentieth century during the economic collapse, and the more recent increase in the 
past twenty to thirty years. See: http://www.bq-magazine.com/economy/socioeconomics/2015/04/uae-
population-by-nationality  
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Arabs because of their regional affiliation (to the Gulf) as well as their individual country 
affiliations.85 The importance of these various elements—Arab Gulf racial identity and 
ethnicity, regional affiliation, Emirati nationality and ethnicity—varies, depending on the 
location, with whom one is interacting, as well as other aspects of identity, such as wealth 
and education.86 
Skin color, as Hopper mentioned above, is also a component of an Emirati’s 
perceived racial identity. In the UAE, the color line is quite context dependent. Within 
Emirati society there is a wide range of skin tones owing to the manumitted slaves who 
were incorporated into families and society. As compared with the US, the UAE has done 
well—at least on the surface—of integrating former slaves into society and providing 
economic opportunities.87 (In the UAE, African-Emiratis do not make up the bulk of the 
poor as they do in the US, nor are they referred to as “African-Emiratis.” This aspect of 
identity is not spoken about.) However, skin color is still important, and this can be seen 
in the hierarchies of eligible marriage partners (Hopper 2015). Outside of Emirati society, 
and in relation to non-nationals, Emirati nationals—regardless of their skin color—
generally take precedence, resulting in the bifurcation of society and the emphasis on 
                                                
85. In the past, tribal ethnicity—based on familial ties—was a predominant attribute in 
determining status; however, the government has gone to great lengths to shift this to a focus on Emirati-
ness. However, as of the mid-nineties, there was still a high degree of stratification along tribal and family 
lines, and based on the Emirate in which one resides (Sabban 1996). 
86. The content for this paragraph is based on conversations with “Gulfies.” Those I spoke with 
believe that most “Gulfies” would agree with the descriptions given. I might add that the region has its own 
hierarchies, with Saudi Arabia at the top, mainly because it is the center of Islam, followed by either Qatar 
or the UAE. However, this is likely in flux due to the current conflict in the Gulf, in which Qatar is being 
ostracized by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait. Oman and Bahrain are at the bottom of the hierarchy.  
87. Hopper (2015) has suggested that it may have been the period of economic collapse of the date 
and pearl industry and the sense of shared experience of hardship and destitution that lessened the social 
gap between master and slave, allowing for easier incorporation into society.  
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nationality. So again, whether or not skin color—racially based discrimination—is 
factored into determining whether one’s status is above or below another’s depends on 
who is interacting with whom. 
Contemporary Divisions 
In the UAE today, overt references to either ethnicity or perceived racial identity 
are avoided through the discourse of nationality. At its most basic, the emphasis on 
nationality bifurcates society along national and non-national lines. Emirati citizenship 
ensures privilege and hierarchy. This is maintained through the kafala (sponsorship) 
system, which marks all foreigners in the country as temporary.88 Those who migrate to 
the UAE do not go with any expectations of gaining citizenship because it is rarely, if 
ever, granted (Arsenault 2013; Babar 2013; A. M. Gardner 2010b). In the UAE, a blood 
connection to those deemed the Emirate’s “original inhabitants” must often be proven.89 
Thus, except in rare cases, all foreigners to the region are guests (Ferris-Lay 2012; Ali 
2010).90  
Segmentation 
Once bifurcated, the ranking of non-nationals places other Gulf Arabs at the top 
followed by white Westerners, especially those from Britain and the US, and next by 
                                                
88. Note, however, that temporary can go on for some time. There are some families who have 
been there for one or two generations. They are best described by Fargues (2011) as having “permanently 
temporary settlement” (280).  
89. Note that I was unable to find any other documentation that supported the necessity for a blood 
connection. The rarity of granting citizenship is, however, widely acknowledged.  
90. Though there are some similarities between all foreigners who come to work in the country, I 
do not want to suggest that a Westerner’s experience comes even close to that of a low-wage migrate from 
a developing country. These individuals, for example, face many forms of discrimination, from having their 
passport taken, to not being allowed to bring one’s family, to being required to live in isolated camps set 
apart from the rest of society.  
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other racially white Westerners. From there in descending order would be Arabs from 
other Middle Eastern countries, and then Filipinos, South Asians, and black Africans. 
There are a myriad of other factors that move one up or down the social hierarchical 
scale. They included perceived racial identity and gender, the country one migrated from 
as well as where one grew up, education, religion, and the socio-economic status one 
brings, and one’s social status within the UAE. All of these are significant determinants 
of privilege and discriminatory treatment.  
Anti-Discrimination Law 
In July 2015, the summer before I began my fieldwork, the UAE 2015 Anti-
Discrimination Law went into effect. This law prohibited “all forms of discrimination on 
the basis of religion, belief, sect, faith, creed, race, colour or ethnic origin,”91 and those 
who commit acts of discrimination are to be fined and/or imprisoned for up to five years 
(A. Marshall 2015). For low-wage workers, this law had the potential to reduce the 
discriminatory treatment they faced in the hiring process and on the job. While it does 
seem to have had a small impact, overall, for low-wage workers, it has been fairly 
insignificant. In discussing current forms of discrimination experienced by my 
participants, I consider how the choice of discourse used to talk about migrant 
nationalities creates both confusion and apathy towards those who are most exploited. I 
also consider how nationality-based discrimination has been able to flourish and the 
problems that arise when issues of nationality and racism are conflated. Through my 
participant stories and informant information, I attempt to tease apart the various 
                                                
91. Nationality is not addressed here, but then neither is it addressed by the EU’s Race Equality 
Directive (Howard 2008; Wrench 2016) 
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prejudices that non-nationals encounter. As mentioned earlier, issues of gender-based 
discrimination and the particular ways in which women are made vulnerable are 
discussed in the following chapter. 
The Roots of Discriminatory Treatment 
It is useful to compare the discriminatory experiences of other social groups to my 
participants’ situation to better understand the sources of their discriminatory treatment 
and their own attitudes towards others. Situating Emirati nationals provided a basis for 
understanding the positioning of non-nationals in general. The experiences of affluent 
South Asians and Blacks are useful points of comparison for understanding the 
differential forms of discrimination my participants encountered. To do this, I discuss the 
experiences of two academics living in Dubai, a British-Indian and an African-
American.92  
Selma was a university academic of Indian origin, but who was raised in the UK. 
I only met Selma once before she left the university and moved to India. However, we 
continued our discussion on the issue of discrimination through email. Selma is a good 
example of how, in Dubai, some identities supersede others. In relation to local Emiratis, 
who were her students, she found that they were more accepting of and curious about her 
once they discovered she had other “non-Indian connections,” as Selma said. Her UK 
education was influential in such cases, but even more important was having grown up in 
the UK and having a British accent as a symbol of that. These experiences are not only in 
regard to the responses she would receive from nationals. Affluent migrants from the 
                                                
92. I do not include the name of the university where they worked so as to maintain their 
anonymity. Further, they were not my participants. They earned far too much.  
 119 
Global North and Global South, as well as lower-wage workers from the Global South, 
regarded Selma similarly.93 Selma would notice a change in attitude once she proved 
through speaking that she was “not one hundred percent Indian.” Further, the clothing she 
wore—“Western clothes” or “Asian” as she stated—determined how she would be 
treated while shopping, that is, until she spoke.   
It is challenging to suss out the prejudices that are at the root of such attitudes. On 
the one hand, the discrimination Selma experienced seemed to be based on nationality, 
and in others, on racism. Neha Vora (2013, 2008), in her research on middle-class Indians 
in Dubai, found similarly that her interviewees spoke at length about the “systematic 
discrimination and racial hierarchies” they faced by white Westerners in Dubai, which 
resulted in them working in jobs for which they were overqualified (2013, 118). In a 
footnote, Vora (2013) wrote, “While my [middle-class] informants did describe some 
experiences of racism from local Arabs and Arab immigrants, the majority of their focus 
when it came to racial consciousness was on their standing vis-à-vis whites” (404). 
Selma’s own assessment was that if she were dealing with white Westerners, she felt it 
was her color and Indian features that elicited discriminatory treatment, but that their 
racially driven prejudice would lessen when her British upbringing was identified. 
Unknown is whether the improved opinions were nationality-based—being British rather 
than Indian—or the result of presumptions about her culture and ethnicity. “Race, 
ethnicity, and nationality are overlapping symbolic categories” (Desmond and Emirbayer 
2009) that can make differentiation difficult and at times impossible. Again, where, when 
                                                
93. There are no lower-wage workers from the Global North working in the UAE. 
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and with whom one is interacting can result in very different experiences of 
discrimination. 
Selma provided an Indian-British perspective. Steve’s perspective drew on his 
experience as an African-American academic living in Dubai. I interviewed him one 
evening when he came to a going-away party for a mutual friend of ours. We took a 
break and spoke one-on-one in my office. His experience resembled Selma’s in many 
ways. The central one was the assumption that Steve was from the African continent until 
he proved otherwise. Once he spoke and others heard his American accent, he gained 
more respect. He said, “I would get some credibility because of a blue passport.”94 Steve 
said he experienced some discrimination at his work at the university, but that he 
experienced more outside of work, likely because of casual attire and hairstyle. He said,  
I have experienced racism at work… but that’s been my whole life, so, of 
course, for me, but outside of the university is where I experience it more 
overtly… Southeast Asians mostly… because my hair is locked…. “Bob 
Marley, come sing us a song.” at the petro station. … It happens so much 
now… Somebody rolled up at [traffic light] and he rolls down his 
window, and he’s like, ‘What’s up Bob Marley? You wanna go get some 
weed. And f--- some bitches? 
 
The discrimination he encountered was driven by racial prejudice, and reflected the 
assumptions made about someone who is black and from the African continent. However, 
in Steve’s case, prejudices about nationality countered, in part, the racial prejudice, 
earning him more respect and “credibility.” Discrimination for both Selma and Steve was 
initially driven by how they looked.95 
                                                
94. This was quite different in the US. Steve said, “At home, everybody has that blue passport. So 
there’s no status for me there. All I am is what people see, which is black.”  
95. Steve chose to view these experiences through a positive lens. At the end of our conversation, 
he said, “So they’re just drawing on these stereotypes because they want to make meaningful connections. I 
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Discrimination Encountered by Participants 
Discrimination did not impact my participants evenly. Different nationalities were 
subjected to different forms and levels of discrimination, and some groups seemed 
unaware of the discrimination they most certainly must have encountered. Apart from 
discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, and/or ethnicity, my participants also 
mentioned religion, occupation, and socio-economic status. 
Sub-Saharan African Participants and Racism 
At the beginning of my interviews, I would tell participants the general topics I 
would like them to talk about, and then ask them to start where they wanted. This was a 
useful way to begin an interview because those issues that emerged first revealed what 
was important from the speaker’s perspective rather than mine. My participant Kendra 
provided the opening to this chapter. At our interview, they were the first words out of 
her mouth. She said,  
First of all my name is Kendra. I’m 24 years old. I’m from Kenyan. I 
came to seek green pastures in Dubai, specifically in Abu Dhabi, as a 
housekeeper through a recruitment agency. Something happens in these 
recruitment agencies. It’s like a slave trade…. 
 
When asked to elaborate, she said, 
Slave trade … someone buys you from your country, and then when you 
come here, they sell you to a person who will employ you, take your 
visa, and all that… [… The recruitment office] is a hub establishment, 
service. So they are the ones that took me directly from Kenya. […] The 
madam [the Egyptian woman whose home she had worked in and who 
had developed financial difficulties] saw us like an investment so she 
decided to try to take us back to the office to see whether she could be 
                                                                                                                                            
think… I want to think of the positive in humanity. They want to make these connections to people, and 
they go about it [in not a great way].” 
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refunded the cash. […] That office was to look for another sponsor for 
us. … 96 
 
Kendra was not the only one to connect her experiences to slavery. Sophie, an 
African participant who worked in a hair salon in Deira, an older part of Dubai, stated, 
“You work there like a slave. I can put it like that.” These women reveal the temporal 
connection between the centuries-long, sub-Saharan slave-trade era of the past and the 
present use and treatment of sub-Saharan Africans. I never asked either of these women if 
they knew about the slave-trade route to the Arab Gulf, but based on what other 
informants say, they likely would not have. Yet, in terms of the dehumanization of 
certain populations and the prejudiced attitudes that motivated it then and now, there is a 
clear continuity.   
The Africans in my study perceived discrimination on the basis of their skin color, 
pan-sub-Saharan African identity (which they referred to as “African”) and their 
nationality. Most importantly, they equated their African identity with their black skin 
color and believed others did likewise. They indicated so in the stories they told and 
defined it as so when I followed up with them later.97 For example, my participant Brice, 
a twenty-nine-year-old Cameroonian man, discussed the racism he encountered in his 
                                                
96. Placement agencies can arrange visit visas or work visas for a group of women and bring them 
together at one time to the country. Employers may have already preselected their maid and will pick her 
up at the airport, or they may come to the agency’s office and select a maid from there. Maya’s employers 
had apparently preselected her. Kendra’s employer picked her up from the agent’s office though I do not 
know if her employer selected her there or had done so prior. 
97. My African participants had the unequal and unfair advantage of being able to maintain 
contact with me after their interviews. My South Asian participants could not most often because they did 
not speak English. My interpreter had been incredibly kind with the time he gave to our interviews. In 
addition, near the end of our time together he had gotten a new job, which required much more time. It 
would have been unreasonable and insensitive of me to expect him to continue acting as an intermediary. In 
addition, while I could WhatsApp the Africans, My interpreter would have had to have phone 
conversations as many of the South Asian participants had limited literacy.   
 123 
accommodation, which he shared with South Asians.98 Of the eight individuals in a room, 
one would be African and the others South Asian, mostly Pakistani and Indian. Talking 
about those with whom he shared a room, Brice said, “So, the other guys, they’re like 
treating us like… I don’t know how to put it … ‘Those black people, do this, do that.’” 
Sophie, also a Cameroonian, she said that the other Africans she would meet on the street 
shared similar stories of discrimination. She said, “each time you meet one or two 
Africans, they will tell you [that] at my job site they discriminate too much because I am 
black skin.” Brice and Sophie (and those whom Sophie met on the street) all agreed that 
the discrimination they encountered was racially motivated.   
In most of the transcripts from my interviews, the relationship between being 
African and being black was not made clear. However, because the Africans in my study 
spoke English fluently, I was able to remain in contact with those who wanted. This 
allowed me to ask follow-up questions when I needed. Gabra, an Ethiopian man whom I 
often saw on my dog walks and who became a participant in the study, looked at me 
puzzled when I asked him if he equated African with black. His response was, “Do 
whites live in Africa?” Based on other conversations with Gabra, I believe he knew that 
non-blacks lived in Africa. His focus was on those who are native to the region, and in 
this case, Africans are black. Thus, for Gabra, when he referenced “Africa,” he was 
referring to Africans who are black.  
Gabriel, the young Nigerian geologist, said that black Africans typically only 
refer to themselves as African, and that northern Africans, who often have lighter skin 
                                                
98. While some companies allow their employees to group themselves by nationality, Brice’s 
employer distributed the seven African employees among different rooms. 
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and are Muslim, tend to relate to their Arab identities over their African ones. In Dubai, 
Gabriel said that it was clear to him that when others spoke about black they meant 
Africans until proven otherwise. This ties well to Jeffery’s experiences as an African-
American in Dubai. When others learned that he was not a “real” African, respect 
increased. These examples show that assuming  “Africans” are black is a justifiable 
assumption, as is a pan-African identity. 
A pan-African identity can be self-identification as well as an identity applied by 
others. I found that when it was self-identified, a pan-African was interpreted as positive. 
It connected them to a community that had encountered similar challenges. Similar to 
how connecting oneself to a country can provide a cultural identity (Loveman 1999), 
connecting oneself to a region (or continent) can provide similarly strong (and positive) 
conceptions of identity (Waters 2009), even if that community is imagined (Benedict 
Anderson 1998). In contrast, individuals and groups can “find their national differences 
obliterated” by such designations when the reference is made for discriminatory purposes 
(Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003).  
In addition to the examples discussed above, other stories made it quite clear that 
reference to skin color was not a neutral description; they were driven by racial 
ideologies. Kendra had been a domestic worker before absconding. She said that her 
Egyptian boss would refer to her as sowda. This is an Arabic word that is equivalent to 
the derogatory n-word in English. Further, when I asked Brice why he thought he was 
discriminated against, he smacked his arm several times, indicating the color, and then 
said, “Before [earlier in our interview], I didn’t want to put it straight forward, like 
racism.  … When I talked about the people around me, I talked about segregation, right? 
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Basically, that’s what I am talking about. …” And, Yabani, a Nigerian man, said, “most 
people in this country, they don’t even recognize black very well. They treat us 
differently…” Yabani meant that Africans, in general, are overlooked and excluded. 
Nina, a Cameroonian like Brice, spoke of the racial discrimination she encountered riding 
on public transportation. Nina said, “Inside the bus. Inside the metro… if a Filipina is 
sitting [next to you]—any of those white colors. Some of them get up, or some hold their 
nose as if you are stinky.” Gabra recently mentioned that his black identity was why he 
was stopped by the police, and his Ethiopian identity was why he was taken to the police 
station.99 There were many more examples of the racism my African participants 
endured, and many of these come in the stories I share further along in this chapter. 
South Asian Participants and Racism 
In contrast to the Africans in my study, the nationality-based discrimination that 
three of my South Asian participants spoke about was likely tied to ethnicity. Two of 
these participants were men from Bangladesh, but they did not know each other. Fardin 
and Rohan had both been told by individuals from other South Asian countries that 
people from Bangladesh “are not good.” It is highly unlikely that this involved racial 
discrimination. Rather, in this circumstance, if South Asians are denigrated by a fellow 
                                                
99. From what Gabra said, if there is a problem of some type, perhaps a small crime, and the 
police have reason to believe that it involved a particular African nationality, such as Ethiopian, they would 
stop every black man they see and check his ID for his nationality. If the person is Ethiopian, he is taken to 
the police station. “KPIs” are Key Performance Indicators. They are big in the country at the moment. For 
the police, meeting their KPIs likely involved arresting enough people. Gabra said that at the police station 
they would be finger printed and photographed and then forced to spend the night at the station sitting in 
chairs. They could leave the next morning, without ever being asked a question. This appears to occur 
mainly in Deira, an older neighborhood in Dubai. Gabra added that the week after the police picked him up, 
he was picked up again. He said he now avoids going to Deira. This is unfortunate because it is a 
neighborhood where many Ethiopians hang out. Not going there deprives him of social interaction and 
increases his isolation, topics Gabra speaks about in chapter eight.  
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South Asian and if the focus is on the character of the person, then it is likely culturally 
or socially motivated. Also, although Bangladesh is composed of multiple ethnic groups, 
it appears that other South Asians tend to focus on the pan-ethnic Bangladeshi identity. In 
India this is different. 
An Indian man in my study also spoke of issues related to ethnic discrimination. 
Pachai was from the Tamil Nadu state of India and the fifteen co-workers with whom he 
also lived were Malayali from the state of Kerala. Pachai spoke Tamil, Hindi, and 
workable English, but his co-workers spoke Malayalam and limited Hindi, which they 
apparently preferred not to use. In addition, Pachai was Buddhist and the others were 
Muslim, and Pachai was vegetarian and the Malayali were meat eaters. Pachai felt that 
none of his roommates was friendly toward him and that they treated him differently. 
Two other Indian informants (who were not participants) concurred and said that 
discrimination on the basis of regional cultural differences in India is quite common.  
One of these informants was an Indian woman who came to our apartment once a 
week to clean for four hours.100 Helen had been quite fortunate in comparison to my 
participants; however, she was still quite “poor.” She was from Karnataka, the state just 
north of Kerala, in India. She said that from her experience Malayali (those from Kerala) 
tend to exclude non-Malayali from their groups. In Dubai, this is quite easy to do because 
                                                
100. Helen had been coming to our home for nearly ten years. We had a good relationship; 
however, following my return from Tempe where I completed the course work and comprehensive exams 
for my Ph.D., we became much closer. Since returning to Dubai, I worked at home and thus we saw each 
other each week. It is during this time she told me her story. Helen had left home at the age of ten to 
become a maid for a family who lived far from her family and who was abusive. At the age of twenty she 
married and came to Dubai with her husband who worked as a chauffer. In the thirty years Helen had been 
in Dubai, she developed a clientele composed, for the most part, of other Western academics. She was—
according to her—quite lucky in this regard. In addition to being able to learn English, she felt it was rare 
for her to experience overt discriminatory treatment or abuse, though often I believe she did not recognize 
discriminatory treatment even when it sounded quite like it was so to me.  
 127 
the vast majority of Indians are from Kerala. The other informant was an Indian man who 
owned a small company in Dubai. Surresh said that discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity, race, and class were all rampant in India.101 Based on the description I gave him 
of my participants, what they had said, and my own analysis of it, Surresh agreed, along 
with Helen and Selma, that for the two Bangladeshis and one Indian who had 
experienced discrimination, ethnic discrimination appeared to be the central issue, not 
racism.  
Discrimination in the Hiring Process 
Most of my participants were hired prior to the 2015 Anti-Discrimination Law 
being enacted. As a result, they discovered a great deal of discrimination in job 
advertisements. Almost at the beginning of my interview with Sophie, the Cameroonian 
woman who worked in a hair salon, said (without promoting),  
Back when I came it really is not easy for me looking for a job. First there 
is nationality discrimination. Like when you pick up a paper. They write 
there, We don’t want Africans. We don’t want this nationality. Finally, I 
got a salon job. … […] … Life is really, really difficult for us. And even if 
you try to move, looking for another job. Nationality is a very big barrier 
for us… […] Just for example, just buy a newspaper now. Like the Gulf 
News … looking for a job, it’s written, only for Filipinos, no African 
required. Why?! Is it that we cannot do the same job. Of course we can do 
the same job and everything. But. It’s very clear. Even when you see an 
advert and call, it’s not for Africans. Even if you see an advert online, 
preferred Russians. Preferred this nationality. I never saw a job that is only 
for Africans! Preferred Africans. I’ve never seen it. Only we have a 
chance, stand a chance, when they say all nationalities are welcome. They 
never ever… 
 
                                                
101. As evidence of racial discrimination he explained that Indians from the northeastern part of 
India were often looked down upon because of their more eastern Asian look. He also explained that class 
was more important than skin color, but that within each socio-economic class, individuals were then 
ranked on the basis of their skin color, similar to the Emirati system.  
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As I mentioned, most of my participants found their jobs prior to the anti-discrimination 
law going into effect. However, as of May 2017, the law was appearing to have little 
effect. Job advertisements were still specifying their preferred nationality in the local 
newspapers. For example, a school requests teachers who are “Pakistani” only; a 
company wants a receptionist who is “Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan” only; security 
guards who are “Pakistan/India/Nepal,” and a house cleaning company is seeking 
“Filipinos, Sri Lankans, Nepal.” On this day, there is surprisingly a cleaning company 
that specifically requests “Female African Nationality” (Khaleej Times 2017). Typically, 
as Sophie pointed out, Africans are rarely if ever requested, and thus, the advertisements 
say, “Blacks need not apply.” Maintaining the focus on nationality helps to reduce the 
implicit racism, which would result if reference to skin color were made.  
Discrimination was not only linked to job advertisements. Gabriel, the young 
Nigerian geology graduate, told me about being discriminated against during an 
interview. At the interview, Gabriel sat at a desk with a secretary. On the desk was a 
voice communication system that allowed for a “blind” interview, with the interviewer in 
one room and the interviewee in another. An unseen man interviewed Gabriel through the 
intercom system. At the end, the man said that Gabriel was a good person for the job and 
that the job was his. A moment later Gabriel met the man. Gabriel said,  
The man came in and said, huh? … the man stared at me! I was shocked. I 
was, huh? The man stared at me… the reaction … was so alarming. Like, 
huh?? I stood up. I was shocked. He called the secretary and spoke with 
her. ... Then he came back and asked where I was from. … He said, I had 
an interview with you? I said, yes sir. … just now. ... He said, ohhh. Then 
he left. … … That happened to me twice. 
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This incident is clearly driven by racial discrimination not discrimination on the basis of 
nationality. The interviewer entered the room presumably to meet his new hire. However, 
at the sight of Gabriel, he recanted. Once Gabriel’s skin color was observed, he was no 
longer deemed an acceptable person for the job. 
In October 2017, five months after I first perused the job advertisements online 
and in local newspapers, I explored them again. The number of ads stating preferences 
for nationality had dropped noticeably. Further, it had become much more common to 
find news articles about the anti-discrimination law and how it was being implemented, 
or about companies being fined for discrimination (Maceda 2017; Nasir 2017). This did 
not appear to be the case for low-wage workers.  
In May of 2017, Gabriel shared another very recent experience of being 
discriminated against in the hiring process. He had gone to the site of a company that was 
hiring. When the general manager walked into the room, he looked at the two dozen or so 
job applicants who had stood at his entry. He then turned to his secretary and in a loud, 
angry voice demanded to know why there were applicants from a short list of countries 
he rattled off. Gabriel and the other applicants, whose skin color was clearly of those 
countries, began to walk out. Soon, the other “acceptable” applicants followed, too. The 
GM stopped one whose features identified him as being “acceptable” and asked where he 
was from. When the applicant said he was from Egypt, the GM said he could stay. The 
Egyptian slowly shook his head and continued to walk out. Everyone left.  
The first story Gabriel shared occurred before the anti-discrimination law came 
into effect and the second occurred two years after. The racial discrimination that 
undergirds both of them is the same. Gabriel’s qualification and experiences were clearly 
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more than sufficient in the first example, but not enough to undo the racial prejudice of 
the employer. In the second, Gabriel was immediately dismissed on the basis of his color. 
Affluent migrants with financial means and social capital are better positioned to 
challenge such discriminatory systems and have their stories discussed in the local media; 
however, low-wage workers typically cannot. According to Gabriel, the Ministry of 
Labor only accepts complaints if one is employed. If one is unemployed and not working 
for an employer, one has no right to submit a complaint. More affluent migrants can open 
a court case, but low-wage workers lack the funds, time, and ability to access the needed 
resources.102  
Although there are news reports of discrimination being reduced, other news 
sources state that incidences of discriminatory hiring practices are still prevalent (Maceda 
2017; Nashed 2017; Nasir 2017).  It is difficult to know the actual state of affairs. The 
second source listed above by Nashed is from an online news source that is currently 
banned in the UAE. Simply because an issue is not discussed in the local media, does not 
mean there is no problem. Continually discussing discriminatory hiring practices in the 
media would be highlighting the government’s failure to uphold its laws. This form of 
overt critique by the media is often discouraged. The result is a law that is ineffectual due 
to a lack of awareness and/or acknowledgment of actual discriminatory acts. 
                                                
102. In a WhatsApp message to me on January 14, 2018, Gabriel wrote: “...my day was ruin by a 
single call i placed through to an employer and it weakened all my body system....i saw an advert online 
concerning some vacancies and i put a call through and she shouted at me saying i don't want africans and 
even further by saying why do i have to send  my cv because she doesn’t want africans ...the way and 
manner she reacted just feeling so bad .... i am so down each i receive those messages stating we don't want 
africans ...i received a lot of calls telling me that ....its kills a lot of things inside of me …” 
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Trust in the Locals 
Only three of my participants spoke specifically about Emiratis in terms of 
discriminatory behavior. Two were advocates for the locals, and one was not. I include 
their stories because I believe they help exemplify how the kafala system is structured to 
shield and benefit locals. As I mentioned in chapter three, the kafala creates a structural 
system that inserts one or more intermediaries between workers and the kafeel. The 
structural violence that the kafala system creates allows the role of the national to be 
hidden from the worker. Other foreign workers in the role of supervisors and managers 
are instead blamed for exploitative living and working conditions.  
Michael, the thirty-two-year-old Kenyan man discussed in the previous chapter, 
was working for a car-cleaning company when we met. A common system in the UAE is 
for middle-class migrants and locals to hire someone who works for a car-cleaning 
company to clean the outside of their car several times a week.103 Car-wash work 
commences late in the afternoon when patrons return home from work with their cars and 
continues through much of the night. Michael’s job often placed him near to the homes of 
locals. He began speaking about issues of discrimination on his own. He said, 
I prefer to deal with the locals more than anyone else. I don’t think they 
discriminate … that much. They really don’t. … People under [them], who 
have already made it, they’re the worst. […] Let me say this… the people 
who discriminate against you are not from this place. The locals will never 
discriminate against you  … [The locals will ask] ‘Where is this 
company?! The way they are working you! Where are they?! Let me call 
your boss!’ 
 
I asked Michael if he thought the locals would fight for his rights, and he said, 
                                                
103. The more wealthy would not do this as they would have their own domestic staff who would 
clean their vehicles. 
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Big time, big time. … Those are the people you can confide in. There are 
those that are easy to talk to. … You tell them something [and they will 
support you.] 
 
Michael was generally quite insightful and reflective. However, this comment reveals no 
understanding of the broader structures that operate. That he was hoodwinked spoke 
much about the system. It is the kafala system that led Negasi, a participant with a 
university degree, to say, “But still, they [the locals] have more humanity than these 
people [i.e., his supervisors].” The kafala system keeps locals above the fray, where they 
can maintain their anonymity.   
In contrast to Michael and Negasi, Brice’s personal experiences revealed locals to 
be as racially prejudiced as any other nationality. Brice was a security guard and he often 
provided security at a bar. Brice said, 
One day I was in a bar [on duty as a security guard]. [There was an] Arab, 
local, one Indian. Billiards. They were playing and a problem broke out. 
I’m security so I had to come in. This local guy asks, ‘Who are you?’ Stuff 
like that. I said, ‘I don’t know, but you should respect me, I haven’t 
disrespected you.’ … The Indian guy said, ‘You can’t tell me such things’ 
…. [The other guy said,] ‘This guy [referring to Brice] is nothing; this 
black guy is shit. Forget about black people. They’re shit.’ 
 
Brice, unlike many of my participants, was in a position where his job required him to 
confront others of more affluence. He did not necessarily view locals as any better or any 
worse.  
In the minutia of day-to-day life, and especially in the lives of most of my 
participants, Emiratis were not part of the picture. Aside from those who might work for 
them in the capacity of domestic work, interactions between low-wage workers and their 
employer/kafeel are rare. Again, this is intentional and a design of the kafala system. As a 
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result, in the eyes of my participants, other foreign migrants who are their supervisors or 
managers were responsible for the exploitative conditions they experience.  
Disparate Experiences 
The stories of discrimination shared here are only a small sampling of those told. I 
heard stories about being pushed out of jobs, taken into police custody, being called 
stupid and dumb, and being treated dismissively, but they were all among my African 
participants. Only five South Asians addressed acts of discrimination, which were on the 
basis of socio-economic status and religion, in addition to the national and/or ethnic 
discrimination discussed earlier. I found it quite noteworthy that so few of my South 
Asian participants had spoken about experiences in which they faced discrimination. As 
discussed earlier, when I told educated Indians that far more of my black African 
participants experienced discrimination than my South Asians, their immediate reaction 
was annoyance and disagreement. The answer to this discrepancy was grounded in the 
intersection of social networks, racist ideologies, and labor market competition, and in 
the similarities and differences between the Dubai context and my participants’ home 
countries, which impacted their perceptions of their experiences.  
 Social networks, as I discussed in chapter three, facilitate migration, and lack of 
effective ones result in certain groups being put at a disadvantage. In the case of my 
participants, Indians (in particular) benefited from the uninterrupted networks that formed 
during British rule, as well as from the end of the slave trade which put a stop on the 
movement of sub-Saharan Africans to the Arab Gulf. The end of slavery cut off the 
movement of people from the sub-Saharan region and reduced the information networks 
between there and the Arab Gulf. Also, in order to integrate as quickly as possible, those 
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Africans who remained in the UAE after manumission quickly cut off association with 
their home countries. In contrast, because the flow of Indians was continuous and 
unbroken, strong networks developed, which provided educated Indians with more 
connections, information, and easier access to better quality jobs. Because educated 
Indians could access better jobs, there were proportionally fewer in my study. In contrast, 
educated Africans could not access such jobs. They lacked strong networks and good 
connections. They also arrived to a climate wrought with racist ideology.104  
The data from my study on participant education levels supports this. In my 
sample, ten individuals had university degrees and ten had not gone beyond the fifth 
grade; the remainder was somewhat fairly well distributed between these poles. Thus, in 
my sample, the levels of education were somewhat evenly distributed. In contrast, the 
nationalities at each of these poles were quite unevenly distributed. Of the twenty 
individuals who had education beyond high school, fifteen were Africans. In contrast, of 
the ten who had not completed primary school, nine were South Asian. Among the 
Africans in my study, there were far more well educated participants than less educated 
ones; among the South Asians participants, there were far more less educated ones.  
This is where social networks, education, English proficiency, and discriminatory 
processes intersect. The result is the inability to compete for jobs for which one is 
qualified.105 Educated Indians who had obtained higher-level jobs and had strong English 
                                                
104. Educated Filipinos fall somewhere in between. Many are able to find jobs appropriate to their 
education, especially in nursing, but a good number also seem unable to do so. Jean, my Filipina domestic 
worker, had a university education; however, she came to Dubai already in this role. Analyn had only one 
year of university and worked as a security guard. Again, this is similar to the Africans in my study.  
105. When qualifications are not recognized and job applicants feel they have no other choice than 
to accept jobs for which they are over-qualified (Bridget Anderson and Ruhs 2012), it is referred to as de-
skilling (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Menjívar 2000). De-skilling can occur when there is a high 
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skills had strong social networks. Educated Africans had weak ones. Lacking effective 
networks and competing in a climate where racial ideology—especially targeting black 
Africans—is rampant resulted in well educated Africans competing for (and working 
with) the same Dh1500 ($408) or less jobs as less-educated South Asians.  
Further, those with whom one is in routine contact determine, in part, experiences 
of discrimination. Educated Indians with strong English skills also faced de-skilling, but 
this was because they often worked with and were in competition with white 
Westerners.106 This of course explains why the educated Indians I know spoke of the 
extensive discrimination they encountered. This discrimination was likely motivated by 
the perceived racial and national differences held by many white Westerners. Also, as 
Selma, the Indian-British woman, explained, discrimination did not stop with white 
Westerners; she faced it with other South Asians, too, that is, until she proved that she 
was “different” in terms of being educated, affluent, and raised with the cultural customs 
of the West.107 Less educated Indians never competed with white Westerns. They 
competed with Africans, whether educated or not. The low-wage Africans in my study 
had not had the opportunity to compete with or work for white Westerners. Hence, the 
                                                                                                                                            
number of candidates for job openings, as well as when foreign applicants are deemed racially and 
culturally different. In the UAE, this involves attaching lower value to educational credentials from certain 
countries. In general, the ranking of credentials parallels the ranking of nationalities.  
106. Again, as mentioned earlier, this supports the comment that Vora (2013)made concerning 
middle-class Indians comparing themselves “vis-à-vis whites” (404). 
107. Of the five South Asians in my study with university degrees, their more limited English 
skills and young age had likely put them at a disadvantage in terms of employment. They did not compete 
with white Westerners or black Africans. Rather, they likely competed against other South Asians and 
Filipinos.  
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discrimination Africans encountered was most often by other low-wage migrants from 
the Global South.  
The context in which my interviews with participants took place would also have 
played an important role in determining whether participants spoke of discrimination or 
not. Being able to interview one-on-one or in English was clearly an advantage. It was 
quite easy for me to know when my African participants were holding back because they 
did not want to say something they thought might be offensive. Noticing this, I could 
easily reduce the barriers and encourage them to speak freely. With the South Asian 
participants, I could not do this. Because I required an interpreter, it was more difficult 
for me to sense when information was being withheld. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the low-
wage South Asians in my study typically did not encounter Westerners in their daily life. 
Their co-workers and supervisors were other South Asians or (non-Gulf) Arabs whose 
social class standing would often not have been much different. As a result, there is a 
strong possibility that in their day-to-day lives racial or even class discrimination was less 
frequently encountered.  
Conclusion 
Experiences of discrimination are a direct result of the inequality and “violence” 
built into the structures that conditioned the experiences of my participants. There are 
several ways in which this chapter contributes to substantive debates on discrimination. 
Unlike previous research in the UAE (or elsewhere), this chapter has provided a critical 
analysis of the processes involved in conflating race, ethnicity, and nationality. It has 
shown how seemingly innocuous references to “nationality” can be driven by a desire to 
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hide racial prejudices, while at the same time, conflating all as “racism” can reflect a 
simplistic analysis of the contributing factors.  
Discrimination in the UAE today typically uses the discourse of “nationality” 
when differentiating between bodies. This hierarchical segmentation is the result of past 
historical processes. This chapter interrogated these strands of the past in order to reveal 
how, in the present, they have influenced attitudes toward nation, ethnicity, and race, 
resulting in segregated bodies and delimited options. Further, by having a sample 
composed of such diverse nationalities, knowledge regarding the unequal processes of 
discrimination among low-wage workers was furthered. The impact of discriminatory 
processes on my participants’ experiences was seen in its most arduous forms during 
their search for jobs, a process that pre-determined their treatment and conditions, which 
they would likely endure for the remainder of their sojourn. The next chapter looks 
specifically at the role of gender in relationship to “nationality” and within the context of 
other social identities, and how it conditioned experiences unique to women.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
VULNERABILITY: LIFE IN DUBAI 
 
GENDER 
 
Why should my maid be allowed to go where she wants when I am 
not?!108 
 
Emirati university student from a conservative family 
 
Our social identities are multi-faceted and mutually constituted in that they cannot 
be understood in isolation from one another, or apart from their spatial and temporal 
locations (Collins 1998). This is not just in terms of current events and the spaces within 
which we move, but includes and builds upon the past, as was discussed in the last 
chapter. The past impacts the present which impacts and is impacted by the various 
dimensions of social life. In this chapter, the same discriminatory factors discussed in the 
last chapter carry over; however, here, attention shifts to women and the precarity of their 
lives. Specific attention is given to the experiences of the women in my study because 
their day-to-day experiences reveal issues and events that were distinctly different from 
those encountered by men. The goal in this section is to maintain the use of an 
intersectional lens that helps the reader to see how their experiences are co-constitutive. 
If, as Glenn (2004) writes, “gender is racialized and race is gendered” (7) then 
experiences resulting from labor migration are certainly both gendered and racialized, as 
well as sexualized, classed, and inferiorized. Thus, while this section focuses on how the 
                                                
108. A student asked this question during a class I was teaching in approximately 2007. The 
wording was likely a bit different, but the sentiment the same. We had been discussing domestic workers. I 
very specifically note that she is from a conservative family. She and her family are not representative of 
all, or even of most, Emirati families.  
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women in my study were gendered, it is mindful, too, of the many other inescapable 
variables that shaped their experiences.  
In this chapter, we explore the roots of gendered migration and the concept of 
forced migration and its relevance to the seventeen women in my study.109 It then 
introduces the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) indicators of forced labor and 
applies them to the experiences of two women who were domestic workers. Using the 
ILO indicators provides a powerful external point of reference for gauging the level of 
structural vulnerability experienced by my participants. Finally, I show that while the 
indicators are revealing, they do not give the full picture. They do not always capture the 
precarity experienced by low-wage workers.  
Roots of Gendered Migration 
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a large increase in the number of women 
migrating, resulting in numbers comparable to men (Donato et al. 2006). This has led to 
migration being seen as a much more gendered occurrence than previously thought; thus, 
states Donato et al. (2006), simply comparing men and women is too limited in what it 
tells about “gender as a way of structuring power” (6). A gendered perspective of 
migration means that “the participants of globalization . . . are not generic human beings, 
but gendered individuals who are situated within social, political, and economic power 
relations and processes” (Freeman 2001 as cited in Trask 2014, 45). The researcher, 
working from a gendered perspective, aims to examine all aspects of migration through a 
                                                
109. Of the seventeen, nine were South Asian (three Nepalese, four Pakistani, and two Sri 
Lankan), six were African (two Cameroonian, one Ethiopian, two Kenyan, and one Nigerian), and two 
were Filipina.  
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gendered lens in order to understand how gender operates in daily life and how it is 
present structurally within institutions (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2000).  
Gendered hierarchies have global roots. Capitalism, globalization, and 
neoliberalism work through structural and everyday violence to reinforce the inequalities 
found in gender, poverty, development, and human rights. In poor countries, they push 
women to migrate while in rich countries they pull women from the poor countries 
(Parreñas 2008). These processes create gendered hierarchies, as well as racial and social 
hierarchies, which lead to unequal hierarchical relationships among the women (Parreñas 
2008). Women, too, are gendered as feminine in their relegation to maternal roles. The 
devalorized work they perform (Sassen 1996) assists in the accumulation of wealth for 
dominant social groups, and growing inequality for migrant women and their families 
(Beneria 2009; Parreñas 2010). Understanding the experiences of migrant women 
requires understanding how they have been culturally constructed and how these 
constructions are both contextually and relationally dependent (Mayeda 2007).110 
A gendered analysis is important because without it there is no recognition of the 
gendered distribution of labor and the discrimination that determines it. The distribution 
is seen in the narrow range of employment opportunities available to low-wage migrant 
women. The occupations available to the women in my study included domestic work 
(including work as a nanny),111 hairstylist (trained and untrained), massage therapist, bus 
                                                
110. Interestingly, Rosewarne (2012) writes that the systemic structural inequalities and the labor 
market disadvantages that frame the work that migrant women perform is invariably temporary due in part 
to the required and accepted condition of temporariness that institutionalizes the subordination of women. 
In the UAE—a context in which all low-wage work for both genders is temporary—it seems much more 
difficult to contend that temporary work is gendered.  
111. Working as a nanny is usually seen as more respectable than cleaning, so regardless of 
whether their job focuses more on cleaning, employees (and some employers) prefer to use the term nanny. 
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nanny (i.e., school bus attendant), and commercial building cleaner. There was one 
woman who was a security guard, but for the most part, this job typically falls within the 
male domain.112 It is deemed inappropriate for women. Fewer opportunities mean that 
women often have higher competition for those jobs that are available (Bonacich, 
Alimahomed, and Wilson 2008). As well, many of the occupations—such as in small hair 
salons, massage salons, and especially domestic work—are in more isolated 
environments, and this is central to why many of the women in my study were made 
vulnerable. The conditions they faced were a result of the structural violence that framed 
their experiences; these conditions illustrate many of the factors that are indicative of 
forced labor and trafficking. Thus, examining forced labor and its parameters can provide 
a point of reference for better understanding their experiences. 
Forced Labor 
In discussions about trafficking, it is often presumed that the individual has been 
forcibly transferred against her or his will from their home country to a destination 
country. This notion of a “trafficked” person usually conjures up images of women being 
taken against their will to a destination country for commercial sexual exploitation. In 
fact, it encompasses far more than that. Forced labor is an umbrella term that includes 
force, fraud, or coercion in relation to sex or labor. Forced labor is also referred to as 
“labor trafficking” and includes the use of psychological coercion, abuse of the legal 
process, or deception to compel someone to work (United States 2016). This broader 
                                                                                                                                            
Thus, I will refer to nannies and house cleaners as domestic workers. In addition, many employers use the 
term “maid,” and African women will refer to themselves as “house girl.” I will generally use the term 
domestic worker, but will employ “maid” or “house girl” when appropriate.  
112. Exceptions to this would be, for example, a university for women. Such settings do not 
exclude men, but do include women.  
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conceptualization of trafficking—which is in line with the ILO’s and US’s Trafficking in 
Persons (TIP) report113—is frequently discussed in migrant research in the Arab Gulf (A. 
Gardner 2012; Fernandez 2013; Mahdavi 2016; Parreñas 2015; Renkiewicz 2016).114  
ILO Indicators of Forced Labor 
The ILO states that the two key features of forced labor are that it is “performed 
involuntarily and under the menace of any penality.” Again, this does not mean that they 
are physically forced against their will to leave their home country; rather, it means that 
one is induced with false promises to accept the job, and that mechanisms have been used 
to coerce one to do the work (ILO 2016).115 The eleven indicators developed by the ILO 
can be useful to consider when reflecting on the experiences of my participants.116 The 
eleven ILO indicators are:  
1. Abuse of vulnerability117 
2. Intimidation and threats  
3. Withholding wages 
                                                
113. The TIP report gives five different types of trafficking, one of which is Forced Labor. The 
report and definition of force labor can be found here: 
https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2017/271112.htm  
114. I would also add that even in regards to trafficking for sex work, it is presumed that this 
occurs against the will of the women involved. Again, this is often not the cause. Women are forced to 
migrate for sex work not by some external trafficker; rather, it is poverty that forces them. 
115. The full definition of forced labor as defined by the ILO Forced labour Convention 1930 (No. 
29) is “All work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for 
which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily” (Art. 2 ILO C. 29). 
https://www.immigration.gov.tw/public/Data/6319464571.pdf  
116. The ILO indicators for forced labor can be found here: 
https://www.immigration.gov.tw/public/Data/6319464571.pdf  
117. This indicator refers to the dependency that results when a low-wage worker does not know, 
for example, the local language or the local laws. This lack of knowledge makes the individual vulnerable, 
and the employer uses this vulnerability to his or her advantage.  
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4. Excessive overtime 
5. Restriction of movement 
6. Physical and sexual violence 
7. Retention of identity documents 
8. Abusive working and living conditions 
9. Deception 
10. Debt bondage 
11. Isolation 
Note that the indicators focus on the abuse, not the source of the abuse. Those 
who operationalize these factors could be anyone, the recruiter, the employer and/or 
kafeel, supervisor, or the government. This is why many scholars argue that the kafala 
system is structurally violent and must be ended. It places too much power into the hands 
of the kafeel and those who work for him or her. An intersectional analysis can reveal 
how institutional structures—like the kafala system—work to advantage some groups at 
the expense of others, and reveal the impact of these structures on the lives of those 
occupying marginalized positions (Dill and Zambrana 2009; Yuval-Davis 2006). 
The ILO indicators act as a form of “clue” that forced labor may exist; the ILO 
states that “the presence of a single indicator in a given situation may in some cases 
imply the existence of forced labour” or in other cases it may require more indicators 
(SAP-FL 2012, 3; emphasis added). My aim in presenting the ILO definition of forced 
labor and indicators is not to formally establish whether or not my participants have been 
the “victims” of forced labor. Rather, it is to provide a broader perspective by situating 
their experiences within a framework that has been determined by recognizable and 
 144 
known entities. This provides a point of reference from which to examine their 
experiences, so as to better understand them in regards of their severity and extent. At the 
same time, I also show how the indicators have their limitations in revealing a complete 
picture of migration and the precarities one can encounter. 
Domestic Work 
The low-wage jobs into which women from the Global South are funneled are 
fundamentally different from those men are funneled into. The individualized abuses that 
a woman can face while isolated in a home are qualitatively different from those 
experienced by, for example, a construction worker who lives and works in a well-
populated collective environment. As discussed earlier, gender is socially constructed. It 
is because of how the lives of women have been constructed that there are far more 
women performing domestic labor. It is also the reason why far more women are 
confined to their workplace and sexually violated. Immigration policies reinforce these 
constructions and subsequently work to disadvantage low-wage migrant women from the 
Global South, putting them into jobs that de-valorize, isolate, and make them vulnerable 
(Altman and Pannell 2012; Sassen 1996). 
Embedded in the system of domestic work is a hierarchical relationship between 
the affluent expat employer and her maid from the Global South. The two are unified by 
the need for each other and divided by their roles (Parreñas 2008). Differing social 
dimensions articulate the gap in the divide and are represented by those who perform the 
menial labor within the private home. Parreñas (2008) contends that it was during 
colonial rule in the Philippines that race and class became fused as indicators of proper 
womanhood, virtue, and morality, reflected in white women. The racial hierarchical 
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organization of the labor system has global capitalism at the root of this hierarchical 
system that puts those who are deemed superior in roles of privilege and allows for the 
exploitation of those deemed inferior (Bonacich, Alimahomed, and Wilson 2008).  
It is through economic liberalization that the perpetuation of inequalities has led 
to the commoditization of the migrant for domestic work and the need to perceive her as 
“other” (Kilkey, Perrons, and Plomien 2013; Farris 2012). This is a process. It is quite 
similar to the general process of commodification, but relies on a slightly different 
discourse (Lee and Pratt 2013). Liberal economic policies bring an increase in 
consumerism and the lifestyles that are related to this consumption. In order to obtain that 
lifestyle, there need to be certain groups whose job it is to serve this lifestyle. This 
requires relegating those from certain groups into the role of minion. To be able to do 
that, one must find cause to differentiate from them, creating an “us” and a “them,” 
creating an outsider, creating an “other.” “Otherness” speaks of subordination and 
exclusion (Mayeda 2007). It requires maintaining the difference that is necessary to 
seeing the “other” as alien, temporary, a carrier of disease, as desperate (Aguilar 1999). 
This allows the dominant group to atomize, isolate, and exclude without harming their 
conscience (Aguilar 1999). Gender, race, national origin, ethnicity, and social economic 
position are all signifiers that justify to the dominant group the societal position of those 
who serve. Hence, the liberal economy and the rise in needed domestic work are 
intimately linked (Kilkey 2013). Their link explains why domestic workers are perceived 
as commodities that are of economic use and why the occupation is one of the most 
precarious (Altman and Pannell 2012; Mahler 1995; Parreñas 2015; I. M. Young 1990). 
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ILO Indicators & the Domestic Workers in my Study 
The ILO indicators can be applied to all of my participants, regardless of the 
occupations or gender; however, here I focus on women and domestic work.118 This line 
of work is the most readily available occupation for migrant women in Dubai, especially 
for those earning Dh1500 (US$408) or less a month. It is possible to find men working 
inside the home, but it is less common. Thus, laws may not be gendered, raced, classed, 
or based on nationality, nor written in gender-, race-, and nationality-neutral language. 
However, the occupation is “naturally” determined by gender, race, and nationality 
through social and cultural systems that segregate certain groups of women into certain 
lines of work. Viewed through an intersectional lens, we begin to see how the various 
dimensions of social life are mutually constituted.  
Among my participants, six of the women were domestic workers when I met 
them, but a total of ten had at some point been engaged in this work. One, Jasweer, had 
not been a domestic worker for a quite a long time. Two of the former ten, Kendra and 
Danjua, had absconded from their employers prior to when I met them. Two, Maya and 
Sunita, would be considered indentured labor because either all of their pay or the 
majority of it was being withheld to pay back the recruiter and associated fees. Two of 
the ten, Lisha and Jilan, seemed to have acceptable jobs. By this I mean that they 
appeared to have been treated reasonably well and their conditions were reasonably good. 
And Jean, a fifty-year-old Filipina woman, appeared to love her job. In table 1, I have 
                                                
118. A study by Anderson and Rogaly (2005) applies a simplified adaptation of the ILO 
indicators. The aim of their study was to gain a better understanding of forced labor in the UK and how 
immigration impacted vulnerability. Their sample of forty-six men and women included cleaners, nurses, 
construction workers, home care workers, agricultural workers, and hotel workers, as well as those with 
regular and irregular status.  
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listed the seven women who were either working as domestic workers during my 
fieldwork, or had recently. I have also included two other women who were not part of 
my sample of forty-four. I did not include them as part of the forty-four because they 
were locked inside of their employers’ apartments, and, because of this, I could not carry 
out full interviews. Yet, while I did not feel I should include them as part of the forty-four 
sample, what I did learn is relevant to this discussion.  
Among the nine women listed in table 1 (see next page), there are an average of 
six forced labor indicators per woman. That is more than half of the indicators. Jean, the 
Filipina woman, had experienced none, and Sunita, a twenty-eight-year-old Nepalese 
woman, had experienced all eleven.119 Noteworthy are the differences in salary shown in 
the bottom row of the table and their relationship to the number of indicators given. There 
is a correlation between the conditions of work and the amount one is paid. While 
remunerations are not always associated with work conditions, in this case they are. The 
better the pay, the better one is treated.  
Participant Stories of Domestic Work 
Many of the stories shared by the women who are listed in this table would aptly 
illustrate the challenges of being a woman working in low-wage jobs in Dubai. However, 
to illustrate and draw connections between the ILO indicators and the experiences of my 
participants, I focus on just two women who performed domestic work and who 
encountered intense hardship as a result of their employers and recruitment agents. I then 
contrast this to another woman whose hardships are not caught by any of the indicators. 
                                                
119. The women in the study did not speak specifically to these indicators. I determined them 
based on their descriptions of their experiences. 
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Table 1. Experiences of forced labor among domestic workers120 
ILO Indicators Saida1 Eunice1 Maya Lisha Sunita Jilan Kendra2 Danjua2 Jean3 
1. Abuse of 
vulnerability Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
2. Intimidation & 
threats Yes Yes ? Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
3. Withholding 
wages No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
4. Excessive 
overtime ? ? Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
5. Restriction of  
movement Yes ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
6. Physical & sexual 
violence No Yes N No Yes No Yes No No 
7. Retention of 
identity documents Yes Yes Yes No Yes ? Yes Yes No 
8. Abusive working 
& living conditions121 Yes Yes Yes No
122 Yes No Yes Yes No 
9. Deception Yes ? Yes No Yes No No No No 
10. Debt bondage ? ? Yes No Yes No Yes No No 
11. Isolation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y/N Yes Y No 
Total Indicators    7 6 9 4 11 2 9 6 0 
Mobility restricted Yes Yes Yes No Yes ? Yes Yes No 
Salary ? ? 600 1600 600 1500 1000 800 3500 
? = I am uncertain.  
1 Not part of my sample of forty-four. I was not able to meet the women in person. 
2 Escaped/absconded from their employers prior to meeting me. 
3 Those with higher salaries were included in the study as a point of contrast.  
                                                
120. Those of my participants who performed domestic work for only a week or two or who were 
employed as such years prior to the interview were not included in this table. 
121. According to UAE law, domestic works must be provided with adequate sleeping conditions.  
122. According to UAE law, domestic works must be provided with adequate sleeping conditions.  
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The aim is to show the usefulness of the indicators, as well as the need to look beyond 
them.  
Saida 
Saida was a Kenyan woman with a third grade education who was employed as a 
domestic worker. Saida was confined to the home of her employer. As a result, I never 
met Saida in person. I have included her story because it provides a good example of how 
an employer can isolate her employee, and how immigration policy, which is meant to 
protect foreign workers, can fail to do so. Tasha, another Kenyan domestic worker who 
was not in my study, introduced Saida to me. What I learned about Saida came from a 
telephone call involving Tasha, Saida, and me. Saida was able to receive calls; however, 
she was unable to make them because she had no credit on her phone.123  
Saida’s employer was Jordanian and lived on the second floor of an apartment 
building with her twenty-six-year-old daughter. She was paid 1000Dh ($267) a month. 
Saida slept on the employer’s bedroom floor next to her bed. She and her daughter 
constantly shouted at Saida, and when they went to work, Saida was locked within their 
second-story apartment. If an emergency occurred, Saida had no way to call for an 
ambulance or the police. She had been communicating with Tasha through WhatsApp.124 
Saida wanted to be freed, and to return to Kenya.  
Saida’s circumstances are not that unusual. What makes her story interesting—
and sheds light on the challenges domestic workers face and on the institutions that fail 
                                                
123. Having little to no phone credit available is typical among low-wage workers. They can often 
only afford to buy a small amount of credit at a time and it is quickly used up.  
124. There are very inexpensive data packages that allow for WhatsApp and Facebook access, but 
do not otherwise provide Internet service.  
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them—was my visit to Immigration125 and to the Kenyan Embassy on her behalf. At 
Immigration there is a specific room for issues related to “Domestic Workers.” When our 
number was called, we went in. There were two officials present. Judging from the 
traditional abaya (black cloak) and shayla (black headscarf) they wore, I presumed they 
were both Emirati women. There were others in the room having a heated discussion. We 
spoke with the official who was not engaged. I told her that we were there on Saida’s 
account. I explained to the Emirati official that Saida was being verbally abused, forced 
to sleep on the floor, and locked in the apartment.  
Retaining Passport: “We Have to Take It” 
When I mentioned the employer had taken Saida’s passport, the Immigration 
official said that retaining the passport “was not a problem, we have to [take it].” The 
“we” to whom she was referring were women, like herself, who had to employ domestic 
workers. Clearly, if this is what government officials believe, and there is no concern by 
officials for upholding the law, then implementation of those laws will be problematic.126 
In September 2017, the UAE passed the “Domestic Labour Law.”127 One of the 
entitlements stated in the laws is that employees are to be in possession of their passport 
and other identification papers. Our discussion with the official was revealing. It was 
already well-known that no one abided by the passport law, which had been put into 
                                                
125. Immigration is formally named The General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs; 
however, it is referred to by most as Immigration.  
126. Interestingly, Irianto and Truong (2014) note when domestic workers abscond (permanently 
leave their place of work), employers hand over the absconded employees’ passports to the Immigration 
Office. Employers are not questioned about why they are in possession of the passport, even though there is 
a law prohibiting employers from doing this. Our visit to immigration confirmed this. 
127. Information regarding this law can be found here: https://government.ae/en/information-and-
services/justice-safety-and-the-law/workers-safety-and-protection#passing-the-domestic-labour-law  
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effect as far back as 2003. However, I did not expect a government official to state quite 
so blatantly and without qualm that retaining passports was necessary.  
Retaining a domestic worker’s passport is not confined to the local population, 
but it is something that many affluent migrants also do, including white Western 
migrants. In the previous chapter, I referred to a small study I had carried out on Western 
white women in Dubai who work outside of the home and employ domestic workers 
from the Global South. It is quite common in the UAE for more affluent women who 
work full time to employ full-time, live-in domestic help to both clean and take care of 
their children. For many, nannies are needed simply as after-school daycare and hiring 
fulltime live-in help is often no more expensive than part-time help. For a Western 
woman who works full-time and who has children, not having a live-in domestic worker 
would be an exception.  
One of the participants in the small study I had previously carried out128 for my 
course was an American woman who taught at a local university. MK said she knew that 
retaining a passport was illegal, but that she chose to not “abide by that law.” She said,  
I’m scared about how much freedom she has with [my daughter] . . .   
Also, there’s lots of valuables laying around and god forbid she doesn’t 
steal something, but maybe a friend does. What if she gets scared and 
runs. . . .  I mean I don’t know, anything can happen, you know, I just, it’s 
just in my mind, you know?  But . . . but having said that, you know, when 
we’re out of the country or wherever, I give her the passport back, you 
know, I suppose she could easily steal everything in the house. But I give 
it back because god forbid her mother dies or something and she can’t 
leave the country. 
 
                                                
128. In the previous chapter, I refer to this small study to talk about the way in which employers 
can use nationality to hide racial prejudices.  
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MK is clearly conflicted in her thinking. Her response seems to be more emotional than 
rational as she herself acknowledges when her actions and motives contradict each other. 
Reasons for withholding passports are usually a bit different from hers. A much more 
common reason given is that employer had paid too much to simply have the maid 
abscond. This is in reference to the fees which must be paid to sponsor129 a domestic 
work. Employers are expected to cover these costs.130 In terms of the ILO indicators, 
MK’s infringement on her domestic workers rights was fairly mild. This, I presume, 
would not be considered “forced labor.” Of the eleven indicators, this was the only one 
that any of the employers in this earlier study abused.  
It is important to note that domestic workers are not the only ones to have their 
passports retained. Low-wage migrant men will often have their passport taken by their 
employer, too. For both, the purpose of retaining their passport is to help deter them from 
absconding in pursuit of a better paying job 
Forced Confinement: “She Can Jump out the Window” 
Once I realized that the Immigration officials would not ask for Tasha’s or my 
personal identification, I began to challenge the official’s responses. After a few minutes 
of debating back-and-forth about why telephoning or simply leaving the apartment were 
not possible, the official said with exasperation, “She can jump out the window!” My 
visit to Immigration with Tasha was enlightening; it showed there was no clear system in 
                                                
129. Foreigners are allowed to sponsor domestic workers (house staff) as long as their salary is 
6000Dh a month or more.  
130. According to a local newspaper, the visa costs about 5000Dh and a refundable deposit 
anywhere between 3000Dh and 10,000Dh is required by the sending country as a form of insurance should 
the individual be hurt or not paid. The sponsor much also cover health insurance, R/T airfare, basic living 
expenses, and a recruitment agency fee which often range between 5000Dh and 15,000Dh (Musa 2017). 
Some employers (illegally) force their employees to pay these fees. 
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place to deal with domestic workers who were isolated in their workplace, that 
Immigration officials were not always concerned with upholding the laws, and that there 
is little concern for the mental or physical well-being of the domestic worker (i.e., 
jumping from a window).  
In the UAE, the issue of mobility—the freedom to come and go from the 
employer’s home on one’s own—is widely discussed in the literature, most often in 
regards to migrant domestic workers (Fernandez 2013; Fleury 2016; A. M. Gardner 
2010b; Kodoth 2016; Mahdavi 2016; Irianto and Truong 2014). In addition to locked 
doors, confinement can be the result of threats that intimidate the employee. Such threats 
include telling the domestic worker that if she’s caught on the streets alone, the police 
will arrest her or that some type of harm might come to her. These threats work to 
intimidate if the worker has little knowledge of UAE laws and speaks little English or 
Arabic.131 The use of such threats is gendered. Employers do not try to scare men into 
thinking they will be arrested and sent to jail if found wandering on the streets. Men may 
feel confined because of the location of their accommodation, but they are never forcibly 
confined. Issues of physical isolation are discussed in depth in the next chapter.  
For most Westerners, forced confinement would be one of the more egregious 
abuses. However, in the UAE, it is not. Isolation and confinement of domestic workers 
are not mentioned in law. There is, I believe, an important reason for this. If there were a 
                                                
131. Lisha, another domestic worker in my study, had only been in the country a few months 
when I met her. Her employers had been negligent in taking care of the formalities of sponsorship, which 
must be done for Lisha to be working legally. She said that they had told her that she could get arrested 
since she did not have the proper papers. At the end of her interview, I told her that she would not be in 
trouble if stopped by the police; however, her employers would be. I suggested that she let her employers 
know that she knew this. Soon after she WhatsApp-ed to tell me it worked. She now had a proper visa and 
identity card. While this is deception, it is not the deception which the ILO indicators are referring to. The 
ILO focus is on the false promises that are given about a job while still in their home country.  
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law stating that “maids” must be free to leave the workplace, i.e., the employer’s home, 
then Emirati women would have to be granted the same entitlement. The UAE is quite 
progressive and women have many rights. There is absolutely no comparison between 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, an issue that I am still asked about by Americans in the US. 
Yet, even though the country is quite liberal, it is still a patriarchal society and the 
government does its best not to interfere in family matters. As a result, it is not 
uncommon in quite conservative families to limit the mobility of one’s daughters, 
meaning that a male family member must accompany them if they wish to go, for 
example, to a shopping mall. A student in one of my classes in Dubai stopped short our 
discussion about maids and the problem of confinement when she said, “Why should my 
maid be allowed to go where she wants when I’m not?” And that is the crux of the 
problem. An Emirati’s maid cannot be given entitlements which an Emirati citizen is 
denied.  
This is where the customs of the host country which are restrictive to citizens, too, 
present a bit of a conundrum (Aguilar Jr. 1999). Women—employer and employee—are 
equal in their oppression by neoliberalism, state policy, and male patriarchy, but unequal 
in their hierarchical relationship to each other, having the dual effect of uniting and 
dividing (Parreñas 2008). This duality impacts and aggravates the gulf between those 
who serve and those who are served (Sassen 1996), resulting in women who exploit other 
women.  
Prior to leaving Immigration, the official told us whom we could contact at the 
Kenyan Consulate. A couple of days later, Tasha and I went to the consulate and were 
able to submit a report on behalf of Saida. Several days later, Saida’s employer was 
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called and instructed to bring Saida to Immigration. The good news was that Saida was 
sent back to her home country as she had wanted. The bad news was that she was given a 
six-month employment ban.132 This is bad because it is likely that Saida would want or 
need to return to Dubai for the same reason she had come in the first place—to earn 
money—though hopefully she would return much wiser. The additional bad news (which 
I learned a couple of weeks after this) was that the Kenyan Consulate official with whom 
Tasha and I had spoken, had begun making unofficial, unsolicited calls to Tasha.  
Saida’s experiences encompassed numerous ILO Indicators. No one physically 
forced Saida to go to the UAE; she had gone of her own free will. However, the 
conditions to which she was subjected in her job were clearly indicative of forced labor. I 
share one other domestic worker story. While Saida had “scored” a seven based on the 
eleven ILO indicators for forced labor, Sunita scored one hundred percent.   
Sunita 
Sunita was a twenty-eight-year-old Nepali woman from Nepal. When I met her, 
she was employed as a live-in domestic worker for a middle-class Indian family133 who 
resided in an apartment complex. She had not wanted to come to Dubai, but following a 
                                                
132. As discussed in chapter four, employers can request that employees receive a temporary 
employment ban. It is often done so as to dissuade employees from quitting for the purpose of finding 
another job.  
133. To remind the reader, if the individual or family is not identified as a local, national, or 
Emirati, then it should be presumed that they are foreign migrants. As migrants, they may have arrived 
three months prior or thirty years prior, or they may have even been born in the UAE. Regardless, they are 
still “temporary” foreigners, or “permanently temporary” as other scholars have written. 
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major earthquake in Nepal in 2015134, she felt she had no choice. Her family needed the 
financial help. Translating for Sunita, my interpreter Tarun said,  
Because of lack of money she couldn’t continue her studies. … She didn’t 
want to come to Dubai to work … but the massive earthquake last year. 
She lost everything. That is why she came to Dubai to work. […] She is 
working from 4 am to like twelve o’clock at night. … The agent said in 
Nepal you will earn good money, and now she is earning less, 600 a 
month. […]They [the employer] divide the money: half to agent [too pay 
her debt] and half to her [Saida]. … She sends all the money home. … 
And every 3 months she is allowed to go outside [one day, every three 
months] from 1 pm to 9 pm. [… Otherwise,] she is not allowed to leave 
the apartment.   
 
Sunita came from an extremely poor family, and the agent she met in Nepal told 
her she would “earn good money” and work in a “very good place” (9: deception).135 To 
come, she had to borrow money from the recruiter to pay for his service and the fees 
associated with migration. Her employers in Dubai paid her Dh600 (US$163) a month, 
half of which was retained by the employer (3: withholding wages) to pay the recruiter 
(10: debt bondage). It is likely that part of the money that was being withheld from Sunita 
was also to cover her visa and flight, expenses her employers—by law—are supposed to 
cover. She worked from about four in the morning136 until eleven or twelve at night (4: 
excessive overtime), only received one day off every one to three months, and was unable 
to use the phone in the apartment which her employers kept locked (11: isolation). 
Limited freedom is intentional. It prevents employees from developing friendships and 
                                                
134. This earthquake had a magnitude of 7.8. Approximately 9,000 people were killed, and 22,000 
injured. 
135. The number in parenthesis refers to the eleven ILO indicators. 
136. Domestic workers often begin work at extremely early hours of the morning. This is often 
due to children needing to be dressed, fed, and ready for school buses that begin their rounds very early in 
the morning. Her employers’ children caught their bus at five am.  
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confidants with whom they might share information about their abusive conditions. These 
multiple restrictions forced Sunita to be dependent on her employers and, thus, to be 
more susceptible to vulnerability (1: abuse of vulnerability). When her employers went to 
work, they also locked her in the apartment (5: restriction of movement) and kept her 
passport (7: retention of identity documents).  
I asked Sunita how often she spoke to her family and if she was honest to her 
family about her experience here. Again, translating, Tarun said,  
Sometimes she talks on the phone. … [She can talk to them] once in 
fifteen days or maybe once in a month. … They turn off the network while 
they are gone. […] Sometimes they [the employers] treat very bad. That 
kind of treatment she hides from her father.  … She is not sharing the bad 
things to father or mother. 
 
Wanting to know more about her “very bad” treatment, I returned to it again later 
in the interview. I asked Sunita what was most stressful about her job, Tarun translated, 
“They are torturing her each and every works [day]. … They are not letting her to eat at 
time … not giving enough food … she has separate food from the family.” I asked if 
there were any other ways that they tortured her. Sunita became very quiet, and stared out 
the car window in front of her. After waiting briefly, I was about to move on when she 
spoke. Tarun translated, “sexual harassment.” I asked if the man touched her 
inappropriately. “Yes, he is doing everything. … He is coming home at daytime [once a 
week and the wife does not know. …] He threatens her, if she is not going to do such 
things.” 
Sunita was forced to have sex with her employer (6: sexual violence), and he used 
threats to keep her from telling anyone (2: intimidation and threats). These were the “very 
bad” things she withheld from her family. I asked if she had a religion. Tarun translated, 
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“No, she doesn’t believe in religion now.” One can hardly refute that Sunita was ill-
treated and abused. However, the ILO indicators are useful because they provide a widely 
recognized external measure for comparing and gauging the severity of her ill-treatment.   
Zero Indicators 
The ILO indicators present some of the factors that can create vulnerability in the 
lives of low-wage migrant workers. Saida and Sunita’s stories clearly exhibit this. The 
indicators are not, however, the complete story. They reveal the role that recruiters and 
employers play in creating vulnerability. However, many other aspects of the migration 
process are not captured. Other occupations can allow for much more independence and 
mobility, and thus there are many other avenues through which a woman can be 
exploited. The final story I present demonstrates some of these ways.  
Mercy 
Mercy was a thirty-two-year-old Nigerian woman trained in cosmetology. While 
in Dubai, she first worked while on a visit visa in a massage spa. It expired and she left 
the UAE and returned on a second visit visa, which was later converted to an 
employment visa after she found a job waitressing. Finally, when I met Mercy, she was 
on a second employment visa and working at a hair salon. In these various settings, she 
encountered minimal to no abuse by recruiters or employers. Yet, she had experienced 
extensive hardship and vulnerability due to UAE policies and due to her women co-
workers and male compatriots.  
In Dubai, Mercy never worked with other Africans. Rather, her co-workers were 
Filipina, Pakistani, and Indian. At the restaurant where she had found employment and 
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gotten her first employment visa, Mercy contends that her co-workers conspired against 
her to run her off. Mercy said, 
I think what happened was that… It is the Filipinos… because I am the 
only African. … Yeah, the Filipinos… You know... Where they are....they 
don’t want another person…. They have to keep on fighting you... until 
they get rid of you… They keep complaining, keep saying things at my 
back, and it’s not true. 
 
Soon after Mercy lost this job, she ran out of savings. She had difficulty finding another 
job, and no money to support herself. Someone she knew connected her with a 
compatriot who had an apartment with extra space. She had understood that the Nigerian 
man who rented the apartment was living there with his fiancé. Mercy’s plan was to stay 
there only briefly—until she was able to find another job. Upon arriving at the man’s 
apartment, she discovered no fiancé. She soon discovered that the man believed Mercy 
should repay his kindness with sex. She said, 
So, the first night and second night, he did not disturb me. The third night, 
he kept disturbing me. That, ah, you know, I keep you in my room, this, 
this, this, and you’re not paying because you don’t have money, okay, for 
that reason, I want to have sex with you. I said what?! I said, I’m sorry, but 
no. He said, yes! Are you a virgin? I said, no, I am not a virgin but I don’t 
want to do anything with you. He said, okay, if you don’t want, you have to 
look for another place to stay, because I don’t help people like you. He 
said, What is this?! Are you a baby?! You don’t know this?! You don’t 
know! I said, I’m sorry. I’m not that kind of person. He wanted to rape me, 
but thank God I’m strong. … I left that place. I kept on going from one 
place to another… Sometimes I slept outside of the metro… I can never 
allow… I will sleep outside… 
 
Mercy’s loss of her waitressing job due to what she perceived to be the racist 
attitudes of her co-workers resulted in her being without money, destitute, and forced to 
seek accommodation with a strange man, which put her in the precarious position of 
potentially being raped. Why did the Nigerian man believe that he was entitled to expect 
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sex as compensation for the free accommodation she was receiving? Was this simply 
sexist entitlement driven by gendered sexist attitudes? Was it the result of a neoliberal 
environment in which all labor and most interactions are commodified and some form of 
“payment” expected? Was it the result of the dehumanization that can come when the 
other is perceived as being socially inferior or desperate? Or, was it her compatriot’s 
engrained stereotypes of Nigerian women coming to Dubai to work in the sex industry—
and becoming commodities—that resulted in him feeling entitled? And, if it is this, was 
this stereotype the result of internalized racism and, as Bourdieu writes, the 
misrecognition of what is legitimate, resulting in acceptance of this violence by the 
dominated? And if so, did this also include an internalized prejudice against his own 
compatriots?137 Was this similar to the assumptions that the Kenyan Consulate official 
made in regards to Tasha? I do not have the answer. 
There are times when one of Mercy’s employers could have extended themselves 
and done more for Mercy by, for example, providing financial assistance in the form of a 
loan, more proactively dealing with co-worker infighting, and more critically responding 
to complaints employees made about Mercy. However, she suffered no ill-treatment from 
them in the forms described by the ILO indicators. Rather, other forces drove Mercy’s 
vulnerability. The Nigerian man deceived Mercy by leading her to think she could stay in 
his apartment with no strings attached. He also threatened her in his attempts to sexually 
violate her. Further, UAE policies required Mercy to exit the UAE in order to switch her 
                                                
137. Nationality-based discrimination against one’s own country was not unique to this situation. 
On other occasions, participants spoke about their distain for fellow nationals.   
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visit visa to a work visa. This resulted in her acquiring greater debt and hardship as she 
had to borrow money to do so.  
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the experiences of my women participants in relation to 
the ILO indicators of forced labor. These indicators provide an internationally determined 
point of reference for examining the conditions and treatment of these women, an 
approach not previously taken with migrant workers in the Arab Gulf. These indicators 
could also be applied to the men in my study. They, too, experienced all but two of the 
indicators: physical and sexual violence, and physical isolation.138 It is these two 
indicators that reveal the gendered impact of structural violence which exacerbated the 
women’s structural vulnerability. In examining the experiences of my participants, the 
role that gender played in intensifying their vulnerability resulted in experiences that 
were distinctly different from the men in my study. Mercy and Sunita’s experiences were 
not unique. Four other women—one-third of my women participants in all—encountered 
sexual violation or harassment.  
This chapter also offers, through example, a more in-depth understanding of why 
laws that were designed to protect migrant workers often fail. While this can be due to 
the employers, recruiters, or the government, this chapter provided evidence of the role 
played by government officials. The need to rectify this is discussed in the conclusion.  
This and the proceeding chapters have focused on societal divisions based on 
nationality, race, and ethnicity. The following chapter explores spatial divisions which 
                                                
138. Yet, it should be noted that although the men in my study did not experience enforced 
physical isolation, they did experience isolation in other forms. (This is discussed in chapter eight.) 
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are mostly driven by socio-economic status. These forms of segregation are found in the 
spaces that privilege and exclude, and are determined by socio-economic status.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
BORDERS, BOUNDARIES, & ZONES OF MARGINALIZATION 
 
As I parked my car, I noticed a police car stopped in front of the villa. 
The term “villa” is used loosely here. This building, like many in Deira, 
was an old, indistinguishable one-story villa that had been subdivided into 
multiple small rooms housing low-wage migrant workers who rented bed 
space. The room I was going to was the current accommodation for two 
Pakistani women whom I had met and interviewed early in my study. This 
about the seventh or eighth room they had lived in since I had met them. 
We had remained friends and would occasionally visit, and each time I 
needed to locate their new residence.  
   I walked past the police officers and through the gates into the villa. 
The room where Wafa and her mother Jasweer were currently renting bed 
space was small and windowless. It was the middle of the summer and the 
A/C was humming, going off occasionally due to the power cutting out. 
Soon after arriving, a CID officer—a police detective in street clothes—
hammered on the door and barged in. He barked out a question at us. 
Uncertain as to whether I had misheard what sounded to be an offensive 
question, I said, “Excuse me, what did you say?” He repeated himself a bit 
slower, “Didn’t you hear the f---ing?” (Apparently, a couple in a nearby 
room had been reported for their yelling and presumed abuse that had been 
going on.) To the CID officer, I replied, “Don’t use that word. You’re 
speaking to a group of women!”  To which he roughly stated that there 
was no other appropriate word. As my local identification card had been 
taken with the others to be checked, I decided it was best if I did not 
respond.     
 
Author’s field notes July 16, 2016 
 
While this was not the incident that sparked my interest in the spaces and 
boundaries low-wage migrant workers encounter, it was a personal experience that 
increased awareness and empathy for those who must daily occupy unwanted spaces and 
cross boundaries that society considers off limits. My indignant and somewhat imprudent 
response to the officer was a clear indication of the social position I held and the sense of 
entitlement that came with it.  However, by crossing the invisible boundary and entering 
the space of low-wage workers, I had apparently waived my right to respect and decency. 
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The officer’s vulgarity was a reflection of the inferiorizing and dehumanizing attitudes 
dealt to those who occupy the margins of society. My experience—brief as it was and 
shaded by my social status—was nevertheless a window into the discriminatory and often 
insulting processes faced daily by my participants. The incident helped me to consider 
more critically the spaces my participants inhabited and the challenges they experienced 
navigating through them and between them, and it prompted me to theorize about these 
spaces and boundaries. 
Chapters five and six addressed how the low-wage migrant workers in my study 
were differentially devalued in the labor market, and focused on divisions created by 
nationality, race, and/or ethnicity. Differential devaluation was also spatial, presenting 
itself in the zones or spaces that privileged and excluded, and the borders and boundaries 
that acted as thresholds of invitation or barriers of exclusion in the lives of my 
participants. While this, too, includes division on the basis of nationality, race, and/or 
ethnicity, this chapter focuses on how society is divided by socio-economic level. Who is 
and is not Emirati is less important to this chapter. What is important is one’s affluence 
and where that allows one to live, regardless of nationality.  
As a whole, this chapter focuses on the spatial manifestation of structural violence 
and how it marginalizes. In the first section of this chapter, I define the meaning of 
borders and boundaries, and introduce the concept of zones of marginalization, and 
explore the processes of spatial segregation and exclusion. The next section considers the 
national borders and political boundaries my participants crossed, and the temporariness 
and uncertainty that resulted in them occupying liminal spaces. Subsequently, I examine 
the various types of accommodation occupied by low-wage migrant workers, why these 
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spaces operate as zones of marginalization, and the extent to which my participants were 
able to transgress the boundaries of these zones. The quality of the accommodation and 
its location typically intensified the vulnerability that my participants experienced as a 
result of their work, The final section of the chapter considers who is and is not able to 
cross the boundaries that encompass the marginalized zones that low-wage workers 
occupy and how this makes them vulnerable to exploitation, and ends by addressing the 
need for more inclusive zones.  
Borders, Boundaries, and the Socio-Spatial Perspective 
Borders and boundaries are both socially constructed, but function differently. 
“Borders,” as used here, refers to the political boundaries of the nation state; these 
borders are imagined, yet have political and legal ramifications (Yuval-Davis and 
Stoetzler 2002). The term border is also used, as it is used colloquially, for discussing the 
periphery of any bound space or object. While borders tend to clearly demarcate, 
boundaries are often less clear. I use boundaries legally, socially, and spatially. 
Boundaries are legal when they refer to a migrant’s status in the host country. The 
boundaries of “legality” are typically quite clearly demarcated, but can also be fuzzy or 
ill-defined (Wimmer 2013) and flexible (Baker and Tsuda 2015). Social boundaries are 
present in individual and group relations. They are often situationally defined (Wimmer 
2013) and can, for example, separate space on the basis of socio-economic status or 
gendered relations. Legal boundaries—as a reflection of group relations and status—are 
also social boundaries. In this chapter, however, I use legal boundaries when referring to 
the threshold of “legality” and “illegality” which migrants may cross within the host 
country.  
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Spatial boundaries make territorial distinctions or divisions. They can have a 
distinct materiality about them, such as the “hard” built boundaries of walls and limited 
entry points, or they can be less visible, composed of the natural environment and 
extreme climate. For example, one might live in a location absent of walls, gated entries, 
or other physical barriers; however, if that location is far from the city center, with the 
expanse of desert and heat in between, then the boundary is “hard” and the city 
inaccessible. Thus, an invisible boundary—such as the desert and heat—can be one of the 
hardest boundaries to cross. 
In keeping with current conceptualizations in geography, space and the 
boundaries that delineate it are not simply territory with physical characteristics. Space is 
defined by relations, and because of this, space and social relations must be 
conceptualized together (Eade and Mele 2002; Harvey 1973; Lefebvre 1992; D. Massey 
1994). To understand space, we must gain an understanding of the social processes 
involved. When the natural and/or built environment is conceptualized in relation to 
society and social relations, a socio-spatial perspective is taken. Focusing on the socio-
spatial aspects of space—and the boundaries that are associated with it—means 
considering how social variables interact with “locational” or “spatial” factors and how 
these impact daily life; it considers the role of those who inhabit spaces and how they 
impact and are impacted by those spaces and give meaning to them (Gottdiener, 
Hutchison, and Ryan 2014). 
A socio-spatial perspective is necessary because the “desire to exclude is 
communicated spatially” (Sibley 1995, 976). Those in power use difference and spatial 
control to marginalize those deemed inferior, excluding them from certain spaces (Lipsitz 
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2007; Sibley 1995). Feelings and attitudes about those who have been constructed and 
defined as deviant are connected to how society and space are structured. This physical 
structuring of space (the material world) articulates the unspoken belief and rules about 
who is to be included and excluded. The power grants the ability to exclude others from 
certain spaces, and spaces and boundaries can provide an overt display of that power.  
Zones of Marginalization 
My participants’ narratives described or hinted at these legal, social, and spatial 
boundaries and spaces. Their stories revealed how space and the relations that govern 
them often resulted in what I came to term zones of marginalization. Marginality is the 
“process of becoming peripheral” (Trudeau and McMorran 2011, 458), and is, according 
to Iris Young (1990), the facet of justice that is the most dangerous form of oppression. 
Marginality can occur when the dominant use their power to operationalize social 
stratification in the built environment (D. S. Massey 2008; Mitchell 2005; D. L. Swartz 
2013; Wolf 1999). The socio-spatial conditions created by those in power result in spaces 
of exclusion and alienation that become naturalized and routinized in everyday life 
(Mitchell 2005; Sibley 1995). Deliberately placing low-wage migrants in specific zones 
marginalizes and alienates them from other social groups and allows for further 
exploitation.  
Processes of Spatial Segregation and Exclusion 
Various historical mechanisms have driven the desire for social and spatial 
stratification in Dubai. They are rooted in capitalist neoliberal discourses that have 
encouraged consumerism and a lifestyle based on consumption. This discourse places a 
high level of value on consumable goods and the lifestyles associated with it. These 
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desires inevitably infiltrate the psyche and impact the values one has and thus impact the 
public discourse and perceptions. Those privileged in society—whether they are citizens 
or affluent foreigners—gain their consumer goods and occupy their privileged positions 
at the expense of low-wage migrant workers. It is only through their labor that the 
privileged can indulge in activities and maintain the lifestyle of their choosing (Bosniak 
2008). Maintaining this privilege requires differential inclusion which, according to 
Espiritu (2003), is the desire to have low-wage migrants, but only for their subordinated 
status signified by the work they perform.  
The other-ing and differentiating needed to perceive domestic workers as less 
deserving are also required outside of the home and throughout society as a whole. They 
form the basis for socially and spatially marginalizing certain groups so that the more 
affluent can maintain their privileged lifestyles. Butler (2011) refers to this “other” as the 
“abject,” those denied recognition as subjects (See also Papastergiadis 2006; Sibley 
1995). She explains that abjection is used to describe those who are relegated to 
“unlivable and uninhabitable zones of social life” (xiii). “Otherness” and “abjection” 
speak of subordination and exclusion.  
Lipsitz (2007) in his analysis of racialized spaces in the US contends that the role 
of landscape architects should be to expose the discriminatory practices of race, place, 
and power that undergird the built environment. Again, space is relational: “The lived 
experience of race has a spatial dimension, and the lived experience of space has a racial 
dimension” (12). Therefore, spatial arrangements allow certain groups to have easier 
access to opportunities. The goal is to exclude those considered the deviant other from 
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opportunities to participate in the sociality of the city, but near enough to support it and 
serve it as needed (Lipsitz 2007; Sibley 1995). 
Political Borders & Boundaries of “Illegality” 
All collective boundaries, and their construction, involve the act of imagining. 
State territorial borders are one of these. It is up to each country to “imagine” their 
national borders and to determine who belongs and who does not belong within their 
borders and why (Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler 2002). The rules regulating whether or not 
one is allowed to enter a foreign country—and thus be seen as belonging within that 
country’s borders—are imagined in different ways. Because of this, some country 
borders are easier to cross than others and can thus be considered as softer and more 
porous.  
Unlike the US and many other countries in the Global North, in the UAE if 
someone of low socio-economic status from the Global South is able to acquire the 
necessary funds, it can be quite easy to enter the country. In this sense, the UAE border is 
quite porous. All of my participants who entered on visit visas were able to legally 
purchase their entry into the country.139 The reasons for their migration to the UAE were 
to a large degree, driven by economic and political conditions that marginalized them in 
their own countries.140 Thus, entering the UAE was their attempt to escape the zones of 
marginalization that they occupied in their home country.  
                                                
139. There are migrants who attempt to enter the UAE illegally; however, none of my participants 
did. Issues regarding illegal entry are outside the scope of this paper.  
140. See chapter three for a discussion of the economic and other factors that motivated their 
migration. 
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UAE immigration laws are in a sense somewhat more advantageous due to their 
being, might we say, “more democratic” in who they allow to enter. However, for my 
participants, the leniency of these laws and the apparent advantage of its permeable 
borders were often lost. While a very small number of my participants did escape the 
vulnerable conditions of their home country, the vast majority did not. The cost and debt 
acquired to come and search for work in the UAE, and the unscrupulous employers who 
took advantage of those on visit-visa status often hindered more than helped my 
participants.141 A porous border, in this sense, was a double-edged sword: Crossing the 
border into the country was relatively easy; however, the ease with which they entered 
could easily be outweighed by the ease with which he or she could be exploited, either in 
the process of the migration or within the UAE. Most of my participants—those who 
came on visit visas as well as work visas—moved from a zone of marginalization within 
their home country to another one within the host country.  
The political nature of the national border—where one’s status and right to belong 
is first determined—can also be found in the legal boundaries within a country’s interior. 
The remainder of this section explores the tenuous hold on “legality” which my 
participants had, and the ease with which their right to belong in the UAE could be taken 
away from them. It also describes the various ways my participants moved between the 
status of “illegality” to “legality” within the country.  
The “Legal Liminality” of Temporariness and Uncertainty 
For those of my participants with current visas, whether visit or employment, the 
loss of their “legal” status was a fear that loomed daily within their thoughts. It loomed 
                                                
141. See chapter four for a discussion of these challenges. 
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there as a result of their precarious position within the country, one that left them 
constantly vulnerable to termination and deportation. Their status within the country, 
though technically legal, left them in what would best be described as a state of 
liminality. 
The concept of liminality was developed by van Gennep ([1908] 1961) in his 
work on the rites of passage. The term became popularized in Turner’s (1969) continued 
work on the rites of passage with his classic description of liminality as being “neither 
here nor there . . . betwixt and between” (95). For transnational migrants, especially for 
those who are temporary, the concept of liminality can describe their experience in the 
host country, an experience that can become transformative (Aguilar 1999; Lehmann 
2014; Menjívar 2006; Tsuda 1999). The concept of liminality can also reflect a migrant’s 
vulnerability to having their “legality” taken away from them. Menjivar (2006) uses the 
concept of “legal liminality” to describe the tenuous hold which some immigrants in the 
US have on “legality.” She points out that although we typically think of only those 
migrants without authorization as being at risk of deportation, this is not always the case. 
She explains that there are migrants in the US who are not authorized to be there; 
however, they are granted a temporary stay on deportation. This stay allows them to 
“legally” remain in the US for a certain amount of time. These temporary stays, however, 
could go on indefinitely. While the chance to stay is desirable, the uncertainty that goes 
with this temporary, unstable state can lead to great anxiety. It is an “in-between” status 
that is not always clear and results in a “gray area” of ambiguity about one’s life and 
future, making even those who are properly documented deportable because one never 
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knows if their stay—their reprieve from deportation—will be granted again (Menjívar 
2006, 1002). 
This was the experience for many of my participants. They were made liminal by 
their tenuousness (Menjívar 2006), their state of temporariness (Vosko, Preston, and 
Latham 2014), and their isolation and exclusion from mainstream society (Trudeau and 
McMorran 2011). Many of my participants believed, and evidence showed, that if they 
demanded unpaid wages or complained about their accommodation, and especially if 
they took their complaints to the Ministry of Labor, they risked termination and 
deportation. This inability to advocate for their rights combined with their temporary 
status, and the condition of being isolated and/or socially excluded within society 
produced a state of “liminal legality.” These workers were “legally” present in the UAE, 
but were “liminally legal” because of their conditions. Their liminality left them 
straddling the legal boundary between “legality” and “illegality,” trapped within the 
space that is in itself a zone of marginalization.  
Moving In and Out of “Legality” 
In the US, irregular status is viewed as “an existential condition” (Menjívar and 
Kanstroom 2013, 2). The government creates a class, or according to the Supreme Court 
in 1982, “a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens” (Menjívar and Kanstroom 
2013, 3). In Europe there are similar attitudes. Wicker (2010) states that in Switzerland, 
the “noncitizen” was constructed as “a counterpart to the citizen” (226). As in the US, 
undocumented workers in Switzerland occupy a new class, or caste. In the UAE, the 
perception of irregular migrants is not so harsh. In addition, it is not a permanent 
situation. Foreigners, including low-wage migrant workers can move back and forth 
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across the boundaries of legality fairly easily. All of them entered with proper 
documentation.  
The greatest leniency is shown for individuals who remain in the country after 
their employment contract (and its related permit) end. When a worker’s employment 
visa ends or is cancelled (for any reason, including resignation and termination), he or she 
has a thirty-day grace period to stay in the country. After this, the worker has to pay a 
relatively small fine for overstaying. Immigration is not concerned with why the 
employment visa was cancelled or how long the person stayed in the country after the 
visa was cancelled; they simply want the individual to pay the fine. Once new 
employment is found—and assuming the previous employer did not request a ban—the 
worker pays the fine and moves back across the line of “illegality.” For some, this 
movement is not possible, because the individual does not have the funds to pay the fine. 
Often, however, it can be afforded because the worker will be granted a salary advance 
from the new employer.142 This is a relatively “soft” boundary in that one can fairly 
easily purchase the right to re-cross it. 
In addition, although working briefly while on a visit visa is “illegal,” it was not a 
problem for my participants. Twenty-three of my participants entered on a visit visa, and 
all but six of them worked “illegally” at some point. Doing so was fairly routine and none 
encountered any problems. Workers are often able to re-cross the boundary of 
                                                
142. The fees associated with overstaying visit visas and employment visas are handled somewhat 
differently. After one’s visit visa ends, a thirty-day grace period is granted. During this grace period, a fine 
is paid. It is Dh200 ($54) for the first day one overstays, and Dh100 ($27) for each subsequent day. The 
fine must be paid at Immigration or the airport before departing. When an employment visa ends, one is 
given a thirty-day grace period during which one can search for a new job and apply for a new work visa. 
During this time, one will not be fined, face a ban, or be blacklisted from future entry, unless one is found 
illegally working. After the 30-day grace period ends, one must begin to pay a fine, Dh125 ($34) for the 
first day, and Dh25 ($7) for each subsequent day.  
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“illegality,” moving themselves out of the zone of legal marginality and the uncertainty 
and precarity that accompany it. Where problems arose is when they overstayed their 
visit visas and continued working. Unlike those who overstay their employment visa, 
those in this situation have crossed a “hard” legal boundary. If caught, there is likely jail 
time, a fine, deportation, and an immigration ban. As a result, some will simply stay in 
the country and attempt working unofficially until they are caught or turn themselves in. 
For those who choose to enter this zone of legal marginality, the space they occupy 
becomes much smaller and fraught with danger. The boundaries between themselves and 
authorities are invisible and everywhere. As a result, they will confine themselves to 
spaces that are much smaller and less visible to avoid police or CID (undercover police) 
detection.  
The penalties are not necessarily enforced. Peter, the Nigerian with irregular 
status, said that other Nigerians had told him that one does not always have to pay the 
fines or go to jail. Peter said,  
A Nigerian I spoke with told me again that if you have overstayed—and 
you have not been caught overstaying or caught working illegal—you can 
go to Immigration and turn yourself in. They will scan your eyes making 
you banned for life, and you can depart. There will be no fine and jail 
time. You will, of course, have to purchase your own airfare.”  
 
Peter said that he knew many who had departed in this way. Danjua, a Sri Lankan 
woman, had absconded and was currently working “illegally.” Her Consulate had told her 
not to worry, that she could continue working if she wanted to. At the point that she 
wanted to go home, she should turn herself in. She would do a month in jail and then be 
sent home. While jail time is undesirable, the ability to stay and increase one’s earnings 
before choosing to leave or being caught is an acceptable risk (Fargues and Shah 2017). 
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On paper, for the most part, the rights of workers are being addressed. The 
problem is that sometimes the laws are not upheld. However, it also lies with migrants’ 
lack of knowledge about any of the laws, the complexity of the processes and time 
involved, and the fear of doing the wrong thing. If my participants knew about the laws 
and procedures—knowledge that most did not have—their ability to logistically carry out 
the procedures was an immense challenge. To issue a complaint about one’s employer, 
one had to go to the Ministry of Labor. Most of my participants worked twelve or more 
hours a day at least six days a week. If their day off was Friday—the Islamic holy day in 
the UAE—then the Ministry of Labor was closed. In addition, those who lived in labor 
camps were quite far from the Ministry of Labor and from their respective Consulates. 
Physical space and administrative challenges are hurdles many low wage migrants face. 
Accessing assistance was or seemed logistically impossible for many. Finally, as 
discussed in chapter four, the laws and procedures are extremely difficult to access and 
interpret. Even for professionals in the legal field, interpreting the exact meaning and 
processes required can be difficult. 
All foreigners in the UAE can face the challenges above. However, middle and 
upper income earners are not exploited in as many ways due to their economic and social 
capital. Their employers know that their employees have the means to access and 
purchase information and assistance, and, consequently, the employer is more likely to 
respect contractual agreements. Low-wage migrant workers on the other hand face far 
more extensive structural challenges, including spatial and temporal challenges. Even 
those workers who have strong English or Arabic language skills and who feel they have 
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a good enough understanding of UAE law and procedures face the challenges of 
physically accessing the necessary Ministries and of having the time needed to do so.  
Further, though it may be easier to regain one’s “legal” standing and it may seem 
that there are a great number of low-wage migrant workers willing to perpetuate their 
“illegal” situation, it does not mean that the potential of losing one’s authorization to 
belong in the country had less of an emotional and psychological impact. Low-wage 
migrants in the UAE, like temporary guest-workers in other parts of the world, dread 
being “illegal.” My participants seemed consumed—depending on their situation—with 
either avoiding or escaping such a status. The metaphorical border that separated and 
determined their status was invisible; however, it was an invisible presence whose weight 
was strongly felt. It was also a status that drastically altered their circumstances. As a 
result, like migrants in the US and Europe who knew they were outsiders in society and 
felt the need to protect themselves by being “as socially and culturally invisible as 
possible” (Wicker 2010, 240), my participants knew, too, that their position was always 
unstable. The ease with which the metaphorical boundary could follow them into the 
interior of the state and move over them, left many in an affective state of liminality.  
Social Boundaries, Interactions, and Zones of Marginalization 
The first time I came to Dubai … I didn’t see this part of Dubai, where 
I’m now living [Sonopur labor camps]… I didn’t see this the first time I 
came. I was used to the life on the other side, like in Deira and Bur Dubai. 
… I tell these people here, go to the big Dubai. See. People are living 
happily. People are living like, yeah… … It’s a social life. You need it!... 
in your system! You need to feel it. … Here… We are really in an 
enclosed space here. We’re not allowed to be seen by the outside world. 
We’re not to be seen… Outside there … you feel unsafe… … I need to go 
out there… 
 
Michael, a 30-year-old Kenyan man 
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My thoughts about sociospatial boundaries and how they impact low-wage 
temporary migrant workers arose following my interview with Michael. His comments 
led me to think about the boundaries that divide; the zones in which one feels 
comfortable, freer; being inside, outside; the desire to escape to that other side. I began to 
theorize about the multiple zones workers encounter and move through on a daily basis, 
how they are reproduced and reinforced by society, and how they result in social division 
and increased precarity. 
My participants either lived in shared accommodation in the older neighborhoods 
of the city, or lived in labor camps. There are two issues to consider when examining the 
accommodation in both these areas: the condition of the accommodation and its location. 
The actual accommodation, regardless of its location, had the potential to be of good or 
poor quality. For most of my participants, regardless of whether they lived in the older 
neighborhoods or in the labor camps, the condition of their accommodation was quite 
poor. What is quite different about the two areas—the older neighborhoods and the labor 
camps—is their actual location in relation to the city and the boundaries that enclose 
them. Some of the boundaries that divide these areas from surrounding ones are quite 
visible, others are fragmented, and still others are not apparent at all, but regardless they 
are generally understood by those who come in contact with them. The older 
neighborhoods are central (close to the city center) and in close proximity to each other. 
The labor camps, on the other hand, are spread out; some have boundaries that would be 
considered “soft” and easy to access, and others are “hard,” being difficult to access.  
This section of the chapter first examines the notion of shared accommodation 
and the challenges it presented. It then discusses the three spaces where my participants’ 
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accommodations were located: in the older neighborhoods, in the labor camps located in 
the city, and in the labor camps “in the desert.” Finally, it specifically addresses 
exclusionary processes, considering the aims of those who wish to displace low-wage 
migrant workers to peripheral spaces, and why most low-wage migrant workers are 
unable to cross the boundaries that contain them, and why some can. 
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of Dubai and surrounding areas.143 
 
 
Shared Accommodation 
When reference is made to “labor accommodation” in Dubai, it is typically 
referring to rooms within which four to twenty low-wage workers are allocated “bed 
space.” Companies are required by law to provide accommodation for their employees. It 
can be the actual accommodation or a stipend that (in theory) covers the cost. My 
participants who found their own bed space typically paid about 500-700Dh ($136-190) 
                                                
143. All maps in this chapter are ©2017 Data SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA, GEBCO, Landsat / 
Copernicus, Map data ©2017 Google, United Arab Emirates 
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per month. These rooms are typically located in the older neighborhoods of Dubai or in 
labor camps. Among my sample, twenty-three lived in in labor camps, and fourteen lived 
in shared rooms in the older parts of the city. On average, my participants were in rooms 
with approximately ten occupants. In these circumstances, the bed space would typically 
be two- or three-tier bunk beds.144 In some cases, there were not enough bunk beds for 
the number of room occupants, or bed frames were not provided. When this happened, 
mattresses would be used, filling the floor space at night.  
The accommodation is one of the first spaces low-wage migrant workers 
experience in Dubai, and for many it is the first zone of marginalization they 
encountered. For my participants, what made these spaces marginalized zones were the 
tight confinement of the rooms and the conditions and cleanliness of the facilities. An 
important commonality between accommodation in the city and in the labor camps is that 
the room and its facilities could be good quality or quite poor in either place. Being 
assigned to one location over another did not dictate the quality or comfort of the space.  
Adapting to a New Concept of Housing 
“Can you believe! . . Like one, two, three beds [high]. Like what kind of 
… I have never experienced this. Three beds! I’m like what kind of life is 
this?! … A minute later she again quietly asks, “What kind of life is this?”  
 
 Sophie, a 25-year-old Cameroonian woman 
Responses such as Sophie’s were far from unique. Many of my participants 
appeared shocked by this “kind of life.” Sophie’s emotive response is given to help the 
reader understand that the low socio-economic level of my participants did not mean that 
                                                
144. I had participants whose employers had allocated them rooms which they would share with 
as few as three other workers and rooms they would share with as many as fifteen other workers.  
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they were any more experienced or more equipped to deal with such living experiences 
than others of greater means. 
Regardless of whether their accommodation is in the city or in a labor camp, the 
rooms that low-wage migrant workers occupy hold many similarities. Entering a shared 
room for ten occupants, a common sight is two sets of bunk beds lining each of the two 
parallel walls, with another set at the end of the room. The leftover floor space in the 
middle of the room is the occupants’ shared space, a space which could be as wide as the 
length of a bunk bed or much narrower. This space is where they socialize and in some 
cases where they are forced to cook their meals using a portable gas tank with a burner on 
top. Rooms often lack cupboard space. Clothes are hung at the end of a bunk or on hooks 
on the wall near their bed. Sheets and blankets were sometimes hung to separate beds or 
to create private space.  
The impact of these spaces on my participants varied. Some expressed annoyance 
at the conditions, and others expressed shock at discovering what “accommodation” 
actually meant in the UAE.145 The different reactions—annoyance versus shock—
appeared to be drawn along lines of nationality, likely reflecting the value of networks 
between sending and host countries. My South Asian participants often expressed 
annoyance at the conditions. On the other hand, the reaction of my African participants 
was primarily shock at this new definition of accommodation and the expectation of how 
one should live. Half of my African participants had responses similar to Sophie’s; they 
had not expected it. Brice, another Cameroonian, said,  
                                                
145. The issues domestic workers faced are addressed in chapter six.  
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I grew up in a harsh environment so I was used to hardship. … But,.. I 
never. … I went inside. I saw bunk beds, bunk beds, in this small confined 
room. I said, oh my god, I’ve arrived … in Dubai … the other side of 
Dubai.146  
 
Gabriel, the twenty-six-year-old Nigerian man with a geology degree, shared a room with 
fifteen other men. He said, 
In my room, I have 14 people. … 14! Yeah, 14! And that 14 I am talking 
about, they are just the people who work in the morning. … I have people 
who come at night. There was a guy on my bed!!! On. My. Bed! I was so 
crazy! I thought I’d better go home! How can I be sharing a bed?! 
Somebody will go; I will sleep in the morning. I have to go to work. 
Somebody will come and sleep in the night?! …Yeah! The other room 24! 
In a room! They have to... they have just the bunk, one, two three [stacked 
high] somebody is sleeping under… two people, two people! Yeah! Like 
that. I was like, sir, how… 
 
Among my participants, issues apart from the physical arrangement of the 
accommodation and its conditions also arose. These revolved around social and cultural 
aspects of identity, including nationality/race, culture, education, religion, diet, and 
language. All of these elements could help those who must live together by creating 
opportunities for belonging (Sweet, Lee, and Escalante 2012), or make co-existence 
difficult. As discussed in chapter five, participants who were the “odd man out” in 
regards to their nationality, race, and/or ethnicity had a much more difficult time than 
those who were the majority. The intimacy of the room created and/or intensified the 
boundaries between occupants sharing a room and could result in further exclusions. 
For the majority of my participants, including those who had roommates of the 
same nationality, it was a challenge to live in such an extremely intimate and confining 
                                                
146. There are many potential reasons why my African participants were shocked but South 
Asians were not. The most prominent cause likely ties back to having access to strong social transnational 
networks. The one Filipina who lived in shared accommodation only spoke about the other Filipinas she 
roomed with, not the space. 
 182 
space with so many others; the many social and cultural differences, as well as the stress 
of their work and low pay, simply exacerbated differences and encouraged stereotyping 
of the “Other.” The stress of their lives in some cases seemed to pull room occupants 
together, but in others—especially those where an occupant was the minority in terms of 
nationality—the stress of their lives increased the distance between.  
The phenomenon of beds stacked one upon another in a tightly confining space, 
and terms such as “bed space” made previous conceptualizations lose meaning in this 
context. “Home” was never used by my participants to describe where they stayed. With 
the introduction of these new concepts, many found they were on the other side of a 
boundary that they had not known existed. This zone of marginalization can be 
considered marginalizing for several reasons. One was the unhealthy crowding and 
confinement of the space, where illness is easily spread. Another was the condition of the 
space. Many rooms and their facilities were quite dilapidated. They lacked sufficient 
cooling and/or had ceilings that leaked, and could be dirty and unhygienic if the 
occupants did not agree on issues of cleaning. Using portable propane tanks of gas was 
dangerous. Living in this environment impacted my participants emotionally and 
psychologically and is what likely heightened their sense of marginalization. The 
crowded confinement of the rooms resulted in occupants having very little personal 
space. This space, defined by the boundaries of their bed space, was the only territory 
they could feel was theirs to control.  
In contrast, some of my participants were happy with their circumstances and 
found sharing a room could prove to be beneficial. Typically those who were happy only 
had three roommates. In two of the cases, the roommates were close friends from the 
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same village in their country. In the third case, the woman was Sri Lankan and her three 
roommates were each from a different South Asian country. There could be benefits even 
in rooms that had too many occupants. If bonds could be created and high degrees of 
discord avoided, a communal style of life could allow for the sharing of information and 
the development of friendships and support networks. This helped them, emotionally, to 
reduce the marginalization created by the confined and dilapidated spaces they occupied.  
Location of Accommodation 
Low-wage migrant workers who are new to Dubai first must deal with the 
accommodations in which they must stay, and then with its location. Excluding my 
participants who worked in the homes of their employers, about half my remaining 
participants lived in older neighborhoods of the city and the other half lived in labor 
camps.147 Accommodations in the city were almost always preferred due to their more 
central location. Labor camp accommodation in general tended to be in less accessible 
locations and to lack a sense of sociality. However, even among the labor camps, some 
were more central and others were quite far and isolated.  
For my participants, the location of the accommodation played a crucial role in 
determining the level of their exclusion from mainstream life and their access to services. 
The more marginalized they were spatially, the more marginalized they were socially. 
Thus, zones of marginalization and the “soft” or “hard” boundaries that enclose it were 
both spatially and socially experienced.  
                                                
147. This chapter focuses only on those who lived in labor camps or in shared rooms. It does not 
address those who lived in the homes of their employers.  
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What is important to keep in mind regarding both the labor camps and the older 
parts of Dubai is that the populations that reside in these spaces are almost exclusively 
foreign and low-income. In these neighborhoods, any presence of locals is marginal at 
best and, in the labor camps, nationals are nonexistent.148 And finally, while I am 
focusing on the oldest most familiar neighborhoods of Dubai as well as the most familiar 
labor camps, these are far from the only ones. With ninety percent of the population 
foreign, of which fifty percent are low-wage, workers can be found in many sectors of the 
city, both centrally and in the periphery. 
Nationals only make up about ten percent of Dubai’s population, and in these two 
lower-income spaces that percentage is far less. It is not that there are no poor local 
families in the UAE; there are. However, they would be provided with subsidies from the 
government. Many locals like to live in Emirati majority neighborhoods, but not all. 
Some locals live in neighborhoods that are mostly populated with very affluent migrants, 
as well as neighborhoods where more middle or upper-middle class migrants live. In 
general, in discussions of space and neighborhoods it can be assumed that outside of the 
lower-income neighborhoods, the spaces that are referenced in this chapter are mixed 
neighborhoods, home to foreigners and locals, though predominantly foreigners. The 
concern in this chapter is less on the divisions between nationals and non-nationals, and 
more on the boundaries that divide the poor and the affluent.   
                                                
148. There is some economic diversity among low-income earners. In the camps, salaries likely 
range between 600Dh ($163) and 3000Dh ($817) a month. In the older neighborhoods of Dubai, the socio-
economic level of migrant workers is more diverse. One will find pockets of more middle-class earners 
living in newer apartment buildings and townhouses. However, the oldest and inner-most areas of the 
neighborhoods being discussed are dominated by structures that are noticeably shabbier and dilapidated, 
and occupied by those likely earning between 1000-5000Dh ($272-1361). 
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Focusing on the location of accommodation is important because it is through 
spatial relationships that hierarchies are often enacted. This is, in part, because groups 
that are spatially contained can be more easily controlled. Similar to those who inhabit 
the ghettos within wealthy capitalist cities, those clustered within specific locations of 
Dubai can also be more easily be marginalized. Wacquant (2008) contends that “advance 
marginality tends to concentrate in well-identified, bounded, and increasingly isolated 
territories viewed by both outsiders and insiders as social purgatories, urban hellholes 
where only the refuse of society would accept to dwell” (125). Wacquant’s focus is not 
on the quality and condition of these spaces. Rather, he is focusing on the socio-spatial 
aspects and the value placed on those who occupy them. The “social purgatory” for 
migrants in Dubai is to be excluded and marginalized from the “real” Dubai, the places 
where the affluent go. 
Older Neighborhoods 
Original historical settlements in Dubai developed around the Dubai Creek, a 
central feature of the city that divides the older areas of the city (see figure 2). 
  
 
Figure 2. Left map is Dubai in 1984; right map is Dubai in 2017. 
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The oldest and most familiar neighborhoods in the city are within Deira, the older 
Al Fahidi district of Bur Dubai, Al Jaffiliya, and the older parts of Al Satwa (see figure 
3).149  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Map of Dubai showing older neighborhoods. 
  
                                                
149. These are certainly not the only spaces “in the city” where low-wage migrant workers live. 
They are, however, in the oldest part of the city, and likely reflect the largest clusters of this population. 
Also, while the structures are generally old and occupants poor, there are newer structures interspersed.  
Al Satwa 
Al Jaffiliya 
Al Fahidi district in the 
older part of Bur Dubai Bur Dubai 
Deira 
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Condition of the Accommodation 
Accommodation in Deira and the Al Fahidi neighborhood in Bur Dubai are more 
often old three or four-story apartment buildings. In Al Jaffilya and Al Satwa, there are 
more old single-level villas. The structures are different, but the conditions are much the 
same. Nationals own but do not reside in these residential properties; rather, they 
subdivide the spaces and rent them out. The oldest and most dilapidated buildings are 
partitioned and filled with bunk beds. The bed space is rented to individuals, or in some 
cases a small company rents a room to accommodate its employees, as was the case for 
several of my participants. While some subdividing of residential properties is allowed, 
many of the spaces occupied by my participants had been illegally subdivided to 
accommodate more people than permissible. Rooms with ten to fifteen occupants may 
only have one rudimentary bathroom with a toilet, sink, and a small space with knee level 
tap and drain for bathing. Some rooms have a kitchens consisting of a small nook, with a 
portable gas tank below a counter and a single burner above. Other rooms have no 
additional space. These rooms might have gas tanks with attached burners in the middle 
of the room that are shared by all. Clean up is often in the bathroom. When looking at 
these villas from the street, one would never imagine the number of individuals residing 
inside. The occupants are in essence hidden away in plain view. While the government 
prohibits subdividing villas in this way, it is both easy to get away with by the owner and 
by the occupants, as well as easy for authorities to overlook these spaces. While helpful, 
especially for those who have irregular status, the substandard housing and crowding can 
make the occupants vulnerable. Those like Peter, the young Nigerian man with irregular 
status desperate to earn money, never leave the confines of their room except to work. 
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Those with regular status are free to move, but their options are limited. Moving for them 
typically involves relocating from one precarious space to another.  
These old villas and apartment buildings have been allowed to dilapidate because 
there is no market for them (Elsheshtawy 2010). Only nationals can buy and sell these 
properties, and they do not want to live in them. Yet, despite their dilapidation and their 
dirty and sometimes cockroach-infested spaces, the emotional distress of beds stacked 
one upon another and the lack of personal space, the vulnerability that is created by these 
marginalized spaces is in small part rectified by the accommodation being located in the 
older part of the city. 
Atmosphere in the Older Neighborhoods 
The older, lower-income neighborhoods of Dubai have a distinctly different 
atmosphere and vibe than the newer more affluent areas of the city, as well as vastly 
different boundaries. The streets in the older areas look a bit tired and worn; however, 
they are full of people and life. The sidewalks are bustling in a way not found in other 
parts of the city where cars are required. The streets are filled almost solely with lower-
income foreign migrant workers. One exception is in the Al Fahidi district in the older 
part of Bur Dubai. Here is where tourists go for a taste of local Emirati heritage. In this 
area a small historical neighborhood has been revived and turned into an art district, with 
cafes and small boutique hotels. Surrounding this small-refurbished area  a completely 
different cultural heritage is found. Leaving the square where the Dubai historical 
museum is located, one unexpectedly crosses a boundary and enters a new world. One 
informally referred to as Hindi Lane. In this hidden away space, there is a series of very 
narrow alley ways with colorful small shops and nooks where one can purchase small 
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religious idols, flowers and other items for worship in the Hindu temple that is up a set a 
stairs and also hidden away. It is a relatively small area packed with people that soon 
gives way to narrow streets and walkways where shops selling clothing, electronics, 
kitchen supplies, and other goods can be found. Even on these streets one can imagine 
they are in the streets of India.   
The boundary one crosses to enter Hindi Lane is quite stark. One feels as if they 
have just stepped into a new world. In other parts such as Al Jaffiliya and the older parts 
of Al Satwa, the neighborhoods tend more to blend together. Here, the concept of “hard” 
and “soft” boundaries plays a trick. Low-income earners do not perceive the “starkness” 
of this boundary. For them, they are transitioning into a space that welcomes them. It is 
the affluent Westerner—perhaps wealthy Emiratis, too—who feel they are the outsiders 
crossing a hard boundary.  
The internal network of roads, especially in Al Fahidi and Deira, are narrower and 
more organic, if not chaotic, and traffic jams are common on the small roads. There can 
be a sense of being in another world, and relatively little sense of being isolated from the 
rest of the city. The old neighborhoods of Dubai are spaces where workers are able to 
exchange information, engage with others from their own country and even region, form 
and strengthen friendships, and “evoke a sense of belonging” (Elsheshtawy 2010, 63). 
For women, too, these neighborhoods are comfortable and inviting. The spaces found in 
the old neighborhoods invite diverse nationalities and ethnicities to engage. They are 
more relaxed, the boundaries are more fluid, and the street life more vibrant. They are, 
contends Elsheshtawy, “a place worth living in for all and not a select few,” a space 
where true “urbanity” can be found (Elsheshtawy 2014, 758). Yet, even though these 
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spaces lack the uniqueness of Hindi Lane, a visitor could easily believe that he or she is 
walking through a small city in South Asia. Many Indians and Pakistanis wear the 
traditional shalwar kameez, restaurants serve “ethnic” South Asian cuisine. Living in 
one’s cultural neighborhood means that freshly baked roti is always available for 
Pakistanis in Al Jaffiliya, and injera is available in Deira for Ethiopians on their way 
home.  
Spatial Distribution & Boundaries in the City 
These older neighborhoods are the ones that for Michael represented “life on the 
other side.” The first time Michael came to Dubai to search for a job, he found bed space 
in Deira and made friends with others who were also in search of work. Here and in the 
other older neighborhoods is where a significant majority of the urban poor live, a 
population that is composed of lower-income foreigners working in Dubai. While 
nationals are rare in these neighborhoods, in other, newer, urban areas of the city, such as 
in Business Bay, The Palm Jumeirah, and Dubai Marina, some do reside in apartment 
buildings along with more affluent non-nationals. Mostly, however, nationals tend to 
cluster in Emirati-majority neighborhoods.  
Examining where various groups live in Dubai reveals the links between 
nationality and/or racial identity, socio-economic class, and occupation. For Emiratis, 
spatial distribution is driven primarily by nationality. For non-nationals, it is primarily 
determined by socio-economic level and secondarily by nationality. Among the more 
affluent foreigners, discriminatory attitudes about class and nationality and the lifestyle 
they would like drive their choice of location and establish their spatial boundaries. In 
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contrast, low-wage migrant workers have far fewer choices and more restrictions, as do 
the poor in most cities of the world.  
As discussed in the previous chapters, for both my male and female participants, 
nationality and racial identity were key determiners of employment options. As shown in 
chapter five, educated Africans and less formally educated South Asians compete for jobs 
that have the same skills and salary levels. As the job one obtains in the UAE determines 
the socio-economic group that will define them in the UAE, it too dictates their spatial 
boundaries. Thus, when employers dictated where my participants were to live, less 
educated South Asians and more educated Africans found themselves sharing the same 
room. 
When my participants were allowed to choose their accommodation, they self-
segregated, often choosing to live where their fellow nationals live. For example, Brice 
was a Cameroonian man who was working as a security guard when I met him. Soon 
after, he began studying for a certificate in tourism during his off hours. When he 
finished his security contract, he was able to find a job in Bur Dubai in tourism. Given 
the opportunity to decide where to live, he chose a forty-five minute commute so that he 
could rent bed space in Deira to be near other Africans. In general, African communities 
are most often found in Deira and to a lesser degree in Al Satwa; Filipinos lean towards 
Al Satwa; and South Asian communities are dominant in all of the neighborhoods. When 
possible, finding a culturally-similar community with similar socio-economic standing 
was beneficial for my participants. It provided social support and a sense of inclusion, 
factors that can lessen vulnerability. For Brice, it increased the quality of his life through 
the increased opportunities for socializing with those who were culturally similar. For 
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Michael, living with other Africans in Deira provided support and solidarity in his job 
search. It also made it easier for him to access networks that could provide leads about 
potential jobs and advice on how best to go about one’s search. According to him, they 
also provided him inspiration. Some of the individuals he met in the room where he 
stayed had gotten better jobs. He said that seeing what they had achieved helped motivate 
him.   
Low-wage migrants living in the older neighborhoods of Dubai rarely move out 
of these neighborhoods. While the physicality of the boundaries that enclose these 
neighborhoods are quite soft, the ability to cross over them into more affluent parts of the 
city also make them hard. This is because upward mobility—be it in terms of income, 
job, or accommodation—is difficult and uncommon. It is rare because, for most, the job 
they were hired for is the only job they will have. While the location of Brice’s job, 
accommodation, and responsibilities involving remittances allowed him the possibility to 
study, most migrants who live in the city have great difficulty in accessing such 
opportunities due to excessive work hours, distance from the institutions that provide the 
education, and economic limitations. Labor laws and the kafala system generally make 
upward mobility nearly impossible for most low-wage workers, and keep them confined 
to specific neighborhoods. Employers know that workers are trapped in these 
marginalizing zones, and most use this to further exploit their employees, requiring more 
work, more hours, less free time, and in some cases, less money.  
While few will move out of these low-income neighborhoods, movement within 
can be frequent. For example, over the course of eight or nine months, Jasweer and 
Wafa—a Pakistani mother and her adult-aged daughter—moved six or seven times. All 
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but one of the moves was within the same neighborhood of Al Jaffiliya. They moved for 
various reasons: to find lower bed-space rent, to escape others who were sharing the 
room, to follow others who decided to move, or to be in what they hoped would be a 
better room or location. The last move that I know they made was to a different 
neighborhood, but still within the older parts of Dubai. This move was an attempt to 
shorten Wafa’s commute to work. In general, attention to where South Asians live is less 
noteworthy because of their prevalence in all neighborhoods. Jasweer and Wafa’s move 
is significant because the specific location they chose in Deira had a large number of 
Africans. Choosing to move there disrupts the standard stereotypes.  
Perceptions of the older neighborhoods have changed over time. In the early part 
of the 2000s, the older, poorer neighborhoods of Dubai went unnoticed by tourists, and 
the more affluent who resided in Dubai easily avoided them (Elsheshtawy 2008, 2010, 
2013, 2014). More recently, these neighborhoods have become “more or less integrated 
into the city fabric” (63). Their spatial boundaries have become softer and those not 
considered “low-income” come in search of good shopping deals and authentic cheap 
food. A few even choose to live there so as to have a more “authentic” overseas 
experience, one that is often not felt in other parts of the city.  
The boundaries between the older neighborhoods blend into one another, and as a 
whole, they are well integrated into the city. These boundaries are soft and easy to cross. 
In contrast, the newer residential developments where more affluent migrants and locals 
live are much more segregated. These developments cater to various socio-economic 
classes, from the very affluent to the lower-middle classes. Large multi-lane highways 
delineate these wealthier developments from less wealthier ones and from industrial 
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zones where low-wage workers both work and live, making each differentiated zone 
almost impossible to access on foot. Even in a car the route can be quite circuitous. In 
addition, most communities are gated. Lower-income developments where middle-
income migrants live can usually be freely driven into, but upper ones require a pass or 
invitation. Regardless, the developments cater to those in cars and generally have few 
access points.   
Replacing the Old with the New 
Newer residential developments were built on “empty” land. However, in the 
older, poorer parts of Dubai, newer developments are displacing old. These 
neighborhoods are home to a mix of populations and include locals, too. What 
differentiates the neighborhoods is socio-economic class, not nationality. Projects which 
were conceived prior to the 2009 financial crisis were, according Elsheshtawy (2014), put 
on hold, and decisions to “raze” much of the older, poorer neighborhoods reconsidered. 
The hold continued because older neighborhoods were found to be a draw for tourists 
interested in enjoying the “ethnic eateries” and experiencing the “real” more “human 
side” of Dubai [Elsheshtawy2014, 59). Today, in 2017, the period of stagnation has 
ended, and early plans to “raze” the area have been revived. On the ground, it is difficult 
to fully grasp the degree to which entire neighborhoods are being leveled. The main 
arteries hide the extent to which it is taking place. Electronic maps, however, show this 
well (see figure 4). These spaces have easy access to government and commercial 
services and to spaces that exude a sense of urbanity. In addition, the old villas provide 
affordable bed space for low-wage workers. Removal of this neighborhood results in the 
removal of this population. 
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Figure 4. Map showing methodical transition from old to new. 
 
Elsheshtawy’s use of the term “raze” to describe what the plans had been in 2009 
is an apt term. While in other inner cities of the world, debates revolve around 
“revitalization” and “gentrification” of older neighborhoods, here the homes and other 
structures receive neither. Rather, they are leveled, leaving a fresh slate. What is similar 
to other cities, though, is the displacement of those who occupied the spaces. Whether or 
not the neighborhoods are razed, revitalized or gentrified, the result is typically the 
displacement of the poor and marginalized. For locals, razing the neighborhoods is 
beneficial. Locals had good reason to hold onto their dilapidating properties as the 
government compensates them for the land, and if by chance there are nationals still 
residing in any of the old villas, the government will assist their relocation to the suburbs 
near other Emirati homes. Foreign low-income workers are not so lucky.  
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As I discussed earlier, the condition of accommodations in the city and in the 
labor camps are equally good and bad. What differs is their location. While the crowded, 
dirty, and dilapidated villas can put their occupants at risk and their overcrowd condition 
with no personal space can exacerbate illness and cause emotional distress, being located 
in these neighborhoods encompassed by softer boundaries allows them to participate in 
what Elsheshtawy (2010) refers to as the “urbanity” of the city. The room that Gabriel 
shared with fifteen co-workers is in a villa two streets away from the frontline of 
demolition. Gabriel said that his boss has threatened to relocate him to accommodation 
outside of the city. This is one of Gabriel’s greatest fears. He said he had to live out in the 
labor camps once for two weeks, and he cannot go back. Having otherwise only lived in 
the city and working with men who speak little to no English, Gabriel’s social networks 
are all in the city. Having the condition of spatial—and thus social—marginalization on 
top of the marginalizing condition of being a university educated man working as a 
building cleaner with others who are the polar opposite is both emotionally and 
psychologically taxing for him.  
In Dubai, the desire to exclude is demonstrated spatially. Some exclusion is done 
with explicit marking of boundaries; others are determined much more subtly and without 
clear definition. This is the case in the older neighborhoods. The boundaries are porous 
and are easily crossed, but the old and weathered buildings and streets with throngs of 
people moving along them, clearly mark this area as different. 
Labor Camps 
The labor camps are also marked by an architecture that is noticeably different. 
What sets them apart is their location, which is remote and distant to services and other 
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amenities in the urban areas. Location is a key indicator for spatial and social 
marginalization, and, while the boundaries may seem invisible, the environment and 
extreme climate make them quite hard.  
For the labor camps, there is a lack of data on the specific nationalities of 
workers, their specific employment, and earning categories. There is also no reliable 
information on the number of workers who reside in various parts of the city. Based on 
my fifteen years in Dubai and carrying out my fieldwork, I would venture that there are 
many more low-wage workers in the labor camps.  
A labor camp could be thought of as a type of neighborhood. They are designed 
specifically for accommodating “single” low-wage migrant workers, not spouses or other 
family members. Typically, a company will rent a building or group of buildings to 
accommodate its employees. These buildings are referred to as worker accommodation 
and are set within their own compound. The “better” quality ones are guarded to keep 
non-residents out. There can be hundreds of compounds within a labor camp. The 
buildings are typically two or three stories high. These buildings are reminiscent of 
dormitories or army barracks. Each level has a common room with sinks, showers, and 
toilets. On the ground floor is a space for cooking, composed of long concrete counters 
with burners spaced out along them, and a space for eating.  
The general conditions of accommodation are not so different from those in the 
older neighborhoods. There are both good quality and poor quality. The better 
accommodation has toilets and showers that are of a sufficient number, well-functioning, 
and clean. Air-conditioning runs well in the rooms where the men sleep. There are a 
sufficient number of spaces for cooking, so long waits are not required, and a large, clean 
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dining room to gather and eat. Some compounds provide cafeteria-style food for their 
workers. The best compounds have recreational and fitness rooms. The compound is 
generally clean, as workers from other companies come daily to clean. 
As my participants were at the lower end of the wage pool, their accommodation 
tended to be far less desirable. Similar to those in the city, some used a portable gas tank 
and burner for cooking in their rooms. One explained that they usually cooked their 
dinner outside in the open lot behind their building because the kitchen was always 
crowed and smelly. Some camps were strict about prohibiting the use of gas in their 
rooms, but did not provide cooking facilities. Those who lacked the space and/or ability 
to cook outside were forced to purchase prepared food. In the evenings, entrepreneurial 
migrants would sell this in the streets.   
Location of Camps  
What sets labor camps apart from accommodation in the older neighborhoods is 
their location. In the past, labor accommodation was often at the location of the worksite. 
Today, this is not the case. Starting in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the government 
changed the law. Companies are now expected to provide accommodation separate from 
the worksite and within designated areas. This has resulted in labor camps being pushed 
to the periphery, farther and farther from the city. Distance, the natural environment, 
extreme climate, and the built environment come together to create harder boundaries and 
increased marginalization.  
The two most well-known labor camps in Dubai are Sonapur and Al Quoz. 
However, there are many other labor camps near to industrial areas mostly on the 
outskirts of the city. Companies who have men working in the industrial zones will often 
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house them in accommodation that is nearby. Construction companies have sites 
throughout the city. Thus, it is not possible to house their employees near the worksite, 
and the men may have lengthy commutes each way. The most recently built labor camps 
are found in what might best be referred to as “in the desert.” Participants in my study 
lived in Al Quoz and Sonapur labor camps, as well as labor camps in the desert. In this 
section, I discuss these three areas in this order, moving from that with the least socio-
spatial marginalization to the most. In addition, I address the gendered dimension of these 
spaces. 
Al Quoz 
The labor camp in Al Quoz is quite a larger zone (see Figure 5). Originally it 
would have been on the outskirts of the city; however, the city has now grown around it 
and in certain ways has incorporated it. It is an approximately seven-kilometer by three-
kilometer space with many roads crisscrossing in and out. Most of its edges are clearly 
defined by highways, but some parts protrude into surrounding neighborhoods that have 
grown up alongside the camp. Overall, its boundaries are not as soft as those 
encompassing the older neighborhoods, and not nearly as hard as other labor camps. As a 
result, workers can cross in and out of this labor camp with relative ease.  
 
 200 
                           
Figure 5. Al Quoz labor camp. 
 
 
The northern and southern ends of Al Quoz contrast in their integration with 
surrounding neighborhoods. At the northern end, the distinction is less clear because the 
apartment building structures of the neighboring residential area do not drastically differ 
from worker accommodations in the labor camp. One reason for the less obvious 
distinction may be the better quality of labor accommodation and the lower socio-
economic level of the adjacent residential apartment buildings. Another is the less rigid 
and more fluid roads that separate these spaces. In contrast, the southern edge of Al Quoz 
is quite distinct. Industrial buildings and worker accommodations are separated from the 
residential villas in the adjacent Al Barsha neighborhood by a broad multi-lane road. 
While the boundaries are porous and relatively easy to cross, the densely packed 
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industrial buildings create a harder boundary, and the distance, time, and cost of public 
transportation required to access places outside the area of Al Quoz can deter (but not 
completely deny) mobility.  
To the uncritical eye, the boundaries between may seem to go unnoticed. 
However, while affluent expats could likely not clearly articulate the borders, they are 
perceived and the general space is avoided. Few affluent expats, especially Western ones, 
enter the inner regions of Al Quoz unless they have a purpose. I first ventured into Al 
Quoz as part of my volunteer work with a local NGO. Those who are more affluent have 
an inexplicable fear of venturing into these areas. It is perhaps the tendency to conflate a 
labor camp with a ghetto and the presumed violence that takes place there, as well as the 
assumption that one’s presence is unwanted. The conflation is wrong. On a Friday 
morning, the day of rest for many workers, I would venture into the Al Quoz. There are 
small and large groceries, inexpensive cafeterias, medical clinics, and later in the day, a 
few vendors selling fruits, vegetables, and prepared food. The area is different from other 
neighborhoods, but that is due to the lack of women on the streets, the abundance of 
bleak three to four story buildings, and the dustiness and lack of sidewalks and greenery. 
My presence (in my car) was of little concern.  
While the labor camps certainly present male occupants with challenges, the 
difficulties women face far exceed them. The central reason gender plays such an 
important role in determining one’s experience is because women are such a significant 
minority in these spaces. Rashma, a Nepalese woman, was the only woman I interviewed 
who lived in a labor camp. I did not visit Rashma’s accommodation, but I did visit 
another women’s camp located in Sonapur. Based on what others told me, this women’s 
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accommodation was one of the better facilities. The rooms were quite clean and tidy, and 
there was ample cooking and refrigerator space for its occupants. Women were four to a 
room. The facility was run in a manner similar to how some women’s sororities are run in 
the sense of having a chaperone. There were also curfews that resulted in the occupants’ 
movements being closely monitored, managed, and restricted (See also Kathiravelu 
2016). While it would have been unheard of to have a curfew for men, women were 
deemed in need of such protection. Rashma did not say whether she had a curfew or not. 
She did say that she was scared to go outside because there were so many men and they 
were continually trying to talk to her. As a result, she only left her room for work or to 
purchase prepared meals. (Her accommodation did not provide meals or cooking 
facilities.)  
While crossing the boundaries between Al Quoz and surrounding neighborhoods 
was manageable by all, for Rashma the tiresomeness that results from continually 
warding off unwanted male attention creates an additional cause for exhaustion. Further, 
while all who resided in the labor camp were marginalized in terms of their isolation, 
being isolated within their compound marginalized women further. Within the boundaries 
of the masculine-gendered zone of the labor camps, men were relatively free to do as they 
wanted. This created an environment where the movement and freedom of women were 
either self-restricted as in Rashma’s case or restricted by the camp’s chaperone who 
enforced curfew hours. The mobility of individuals living in the labor camps was not 
restricted, unless one was a woman. For women, the boundaries, gates, and infantilizing 
curfews reflected patriarchal barriers reinforced with physical barriers, making boundary 
crossing a tedious—and at times impossible—endeavor.   
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Sonapur 
The boundaries of Al Quoz are harder than those of the older neighborhoods, but 
much softer than other labor camps. Sonapur is the labor camp that Michael referred to at 
the beginning of this section. He was living there when I interviewed him. It was the 
place he yearned to leave.  
“Sonapur”—an ironic “nickname” for the labor camp—is a Hindi word for “Place 
of Gold.” It is part of a larger neighborhood called Muhaisnah. Sonapur is relatively 
square with an area approximately two kilometers by two kilometers. It was once on the 
outskirts of the city; however, the city—while keeping its distance—has grown up around 
it. Walls, eight-lane highways, and wide-open expanses surround it, making it hard to 
physically cross (see figure 6.) In addition, it has only two roads leading in and out of the 
entire area. In the evening, it can take an hour more for the buses transporting the workers 
to make it in through the congestion and enter one of the two gates. Nothing is a close 
walk away. It is both isolated and isolating. Its boundaries are etched into the landscape 
in a way that creates spatial—and social—exclusion.  
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Figure 6. Sonapur labor camp. 
 
Like Al Quoz, Sonapur hosted both good and bad quality accommodation. 
However, it lacked the higher end facilities. For example, in Al Quoz, a few compounds 
make an effort to have trees and recreational facilities; one even hosts a full-sized, grass 
soccer field. The field was a focal point for various sporting events and brought people 
together in an appealing environment. Sonapur lacked this. Any empty spaces were sandy 
lots, and no trees adorned the spaces. Michael said that it seemed there was currently 
some effort to improve the roads and create sidewalks, all for the Expo 2020 to be held in 
Dubai.  
Camps “in the Desert” 
Within the emirate of Dubai, there are far more labor camp areas than just 
Sonapur and Al Quoz. Many in the industrial areas are located on the southwestern 
outskirts of the city, in the direction of Abu Dhabi. More are located in what many would 
Imagery ©2017 DigitalGlobe, Map data ©2017 Google 200 m 
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consider the middle of the desert, in the empty area between Dubai and Abu Dhabi (see 
figure 7). While the location of labor accommodations have a distinct role in 
marginalizing workers, the actual conditions of accommodations—like that in the older 
neighborhoods of the city or in the labor camps—could be good or poor. The quality of 
the facilities in the labor camps, for the most part, is not location dependent.  
Only one of my participants was put in a labor camp “in the desert.” His was in 
one of the more marginalizing spaces. Manish was a twenty-eight-year-old Nepali man 
whose contract was switched at the airport in Katmandu immediately before departure. 
As a result, he was only earning 450Dh ($123) a month. As we drove to the camp, he 
described the poor conditions of his accommodation. He said that it was unclean and had 
water dripping from the ceilings. There was no kitchen or other cooking facilities for 
preparing food. At night, other migrants set up small stalls to sell prepared food. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Labor camp “in the desert.” 
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In contrast to Manish’s accommodation are the (so called) “luxury” labor camps 
being built in other parts of the desert. Both Abu Dhabi and Dubai have started building 
such worker accommodations. Rather than calling these sites “labor camps,” there has 
been a concerted effort to change the terminology for these camps, presumably in hopes 
of changing how they are perceived. Abu Dhabi refers to the “luxury” camps as 
“workers’ residential cities.” These “cities” are not actually in residential neighborhoods, 
nor are they in the city. They are new developments for foreign workers to live in and are 
located far outside of the city “in the desert.” They are often adjacent to industrial areas 
presumably where the occupants of the accommodation work. Needless to say that 
despite the quality of these “luxury” camps, their location does much to marginalize its 
occupants.  
Exclusionary Processes 
For all of my participants, regardless of the location of their accommodation, the 
room they slept in and shared with multiple other bodies was for the most a marginalizing 
space. It could marginalize through the dirty, dilapidated, sub-standard conditions of the 
space, its overcrowding and potential for spreading illness, the dangers created by using 
propane gas in the small rooms, and the overall impact of enduring such experiences. The 
conditions of the accommodation in the labor camps were not worse because of their 
location. In fact, there was the potential for rooms in the labor camps to be an 
improvement over similar spaces in older neighborhoods of the city. What differentiated 
the accommodation and either increased or reduced the marginalization of its occupants 
was its location. This does not mean that the experiences of those living more centrally in 
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the city were necessarily easier or more manageable. Many of my participants who lived 
in the city had horrific experiences. However, focusing on location as a factor can help 
reveal why it holds such power to marginalize, allowing for greater exploitation and 
hence increased vulnerability.   
The final section of this chapter examines the role of location in spatially and 
socially marginalizing my participants. It builds on and consolidates some of the issues 
and themes brought up throughout the chapter. The overall goal is to examine who gets 
stuck in zones of marginalization and who has the agency to cross out of them, escaping 
either temporarily or permanently. This section begins by considering the motivation in 
relegating certain bodies to undesirable spaces. It then examines the experiences of my 
participants in crossing spatial boundaries. The focus leans more towards those who 
reside in labor camps and addresses those in the city to a lesser degree. It first addresses 
why some low-wage migrant workers do not cross spatial boundaries and thus get stuck 
in zones of marginalization, and then focuses on those who attempt to cross spatial 
boundaries and in so doing escape zones of marginalization and in the process reduce 
their vulnerability.  
Why Exclusion Is Desired 
The desire to spatially exclude laborers—the term often used for those who 
perform outside labor—and other low-wage migrants is driven by several factors. One is 
the belief that this population is a threat to the safety of families and harmful to tourism. 
In response to complaints by Emirati families in Abu Dhabi who see male low-wage 
migrant “bachelors” to be a threat, the government created a law requiring worker 
accommodation to be built at least five kilometers away from neighborhoods where 
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families reside (Kühl 2012). The law also stated that the “workers’ residential cities” (i.e., 
the “luxury” labor camps built for foreign workers) be built far from tourist areas. The 
effect was to limit workers’ “ability to access, occupy, and use other parts of the city” by 
housing them at a distance that would squelch any desires to journey into the city center 
(Kühl 2012, 18). Similarly in Dubai, the aim of removing worker accommodation from 
the main parts of the city and building new ones in “fringe locations” was done so as to 
reduce the access of workers to affluent tourist destinations, and “free it [the affluent] 
from their presence” (Elsheshtawy 2010, 64). In both cases, the low-wage migrant 
worker is seen as the deviant “other,” one who should be relegated to the social and 
spatial periphery (Shields 1991). This approach to expelling the poor to peripheral areas 
is not new. Engels addressed this in his 1872 essay The Housing Question. In it, he 
addresses the bourgeois approach to dealing with the poor, which was to displace them to 
areas apart from and peripheral to the areas occupied by the bourgeois (Fainstein 2014). 
Another reason to place laborers out of sight, behind boundaries that dissuade 
crossing, is to obscure what is within. In this case, those who are being dissuaded from 
crossing boundaries are affluent passersby. Their presence is discouraged to avoid their 
bringing attention to the conditions of those inside. It also lessens attention to the less 
desirable activities that can take place on the eve of workers’ day off. This may include 
excessive drinking, violence, and general lawlessness. The chaperone of the women’s 
camp I visited addressed these issues. She gave me a tour on a Thursday afternoon, the 
eve of most workers’ day off. She said soon the streets would be filled with “a bunch of 
drunken men.” The week before she said that a riot had broken out in a compound nearby 
before spreading into the streets. Men had damaged the bus parked opposite us on the 
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road, and then later two of the men who lived in the camp were thrown from a rooftop in 
their compound, killing them. This type of “lawlessness” is apparently quite common in 
the labor camps on a Thursday night evening. However, like this incident, such events 
typically do not make the local newspapers.  
Other activities that are hidden include worker protests. According to Buckley 
(2012) in her article on neoliberalism and class struggle in Dubai, in the mid-2000s 
during the height of Dubai’s construction boom, laborers began to collectively protest. 
The government initially responded with violence, imprisonment, and deportation; 
however, over time, the government became more lenient as long as protests were non-
violent and did not leave the confines of the labor camps (Buckley 2012). This left 
affluent city residents and the media ignorant of the ongoing conflicts. The government 
was free to manipulate the information received outside of the camps, and free to remain 
hands-off. They could define the conflicts as a private matter between the workers and 
their employers. The boundaries between the labor camps and surrounding 
neighborhoods and city create a divide between those lives deserving of protection and 
those that apparently do not.  
The boundaries surrounding labor camps serve not only to keep what is inside 
from exiting, but also serve to keep those on the outside from entering. Maintaining an 
image of those within as deviant and the space they inhabit as potentially threatening 
reduces engagement between the various socio-economic groups residing in the city, 
leaving the affluent ignorant and the low-wage worker within “a zone of Otherness” 
(Shields 1991).  
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Those Who Get Stuck 
The ability to cross over the spatial boundaries that delimited the zones of 
marginalization that my participants occupied was rare. Apart from what work 
necessitated, the majority of my participants appeared to be less likely or unable to cross 
socio-spatial boundaries. There are many potential reasons why they chose not to cross 
the spatial boundaries that encompassed the neighborhood or labor camp where they 
resided. For many, in the labor camps, it was due to the “buffer zone” that physically 
separated worker accommodation from affluent developments (Kühl 2012, 18). The 
buffer was the boundary created by the heat and expanse of the desert, the highways, the 
lack of adequate transportation and time, and general exhaustion from their long week of 
work. These obstacles create an immense boundary that is physically difficult to navigate 
and leaves workers “stuck” in their zone of marginalization.  
Avoiding more affluent areas was also the result of monetary limitations. This 
limitation was expressed by two of my participants. Maya was a Nepali domestic worker 
who lived near Emirates Mall (the mall with the ski slope). Maya had yet to receive any 
of her salary because her employer had been withholding to refund the agent that had 
brought her. I met Maya when she was sitting outside the Mall, in a grassy left-over space 
between it and the highway. When asked if she ever entered the mall, she asked why she 
should bother when she does not have any money. Negasi, the Ethiopian man whose 
father was a university professor, worked as a security guard in a sports complex located 
in the center of the city. His shared accommodation was also located there. He said that 
every dirham he earned was needed by him and his family. He stated,  
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I never go out. I live around here, I eat around here. I live in Dubai, [but] I 
never go anywhere. People talk about Dubai is this … Dubai is that … I 
don’t even know it. Now I’m three years here. You’ll be surprised. If you 
take me somewhere, it will be a new thing for me. 
 
Immobility can also be emotionally and psychologically driven. Low-wage 
international migrants exhibit a high degree of mobility in having emigrated from their 
home country; however, in the host country they are often immobilized. Their sense of 
obligation to their families and their need for remittances may immobilize them in 
relation to their accommodation and work situation, restraining any impulses they might 
have to alter their circumstances (Mahdavi 2016). This family obligation was also a likely 
cause for Negasi to stay within the space of his work and accommodation.  
Another reason why migrants may choose not to cross its boundaries is that the 
marginalized zones they occupy provide comfort and security. Earlier discussions make 
clear that a great deal of effort goes into maintaining the seclusion of these groups. This 
separation—the zones and boundaries that separate them—is not lost on low-wage 
workers. The divisions between the different segments of society and the exclusion that 
results are “tangibly and viscerally felt” (Kathiravelu 2016, 141). They sense that they are 
unwanted and unwelcome, and this can leave them feeling they have no entitlement to the 
“real” Dubai. This entitlement and power is felt by those who embody the crowded, dirty, 
left-over spaces in the margins. As a result, it seemed that some of my participants 
practiced a form of self-imposed exclusion because they felt they lacked the right to 
access certain spaces, and thus were wary of transgressing the socio-economic spaces to 
which they had been consigned. They also seemed to engage in self-exclusionary 
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practices because they wished to avoid discriminating practices that left them feeling 
alienated.  
For those in labor camps even going to the older neighborhoods where occupants 
were of similar socio-economic status could be difficult. Michael who yearned to escape 
the labor camp said, 
When I go to the big towns [the older parts of Dubai]… I’m always 
feeling I’m intruding. … I’m more comfortable [here] … It’s like I’m 
getting acquainted with this place [the Sonapur labor camp]. I don’t see 
any police. I can do anything. That’s why I feel isolated at times. […]Ah 
… it … this place … This place makes me … we are shut [in]; at the 
moment I realize even we have a wall around this place. Yeah? It’s like a 
gated community. [Laughter] Not in a good way. There is no social life 
here… I’m getting acquainted with this place [the labor camp]. Outside 
there … you feel unsafe…. I haven’t become acquainted with the rules 
[…] 
 
For Michael, the walls of Sonapur had become reassuring. He knew he needed to engage 
socially with those in the city, but he was also intimidated by thoughts of doing so. If 
Michael, who had previously lived there, felt some anxiety about appropriating the city 
streets, what about those who have never ventured out of the camps? Many low-wage 
migrant workers who come on an employment visa are given accommodation in a labor 
camp. They may be fearful of attempting to access the affluent areas of Dubai and 
unaware of the older neighborhoods where they might engage with other like-minded 
migrants and expand their knowledge and social networks. Michael who had lived in 
Deira prior to being put in Sonapur said,  
I tell these people here [in Sonapur], go to the big Dubai. See. People are 
living happily. People are living like, yeah… … It’s a social life. You 
need it!... in your system! You need to feel it. 
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The inability of workers to cross over the boundaries that trap them within zones 
of marginalization leaves them vulnerable to greater exploitation and abuse by their 
employers and reduces their ability for upward mobility and a fuller and more balanced 
life. As Michael said at the end of his interview, “People are supposed to be seen.” Socio-
spatial marginalization denies them this right.  
Those Who Cross Over 
While many low-wage migrant workers may not cross the spatial boundaries that 
define the zone to which they have been assigned, some do. The following are examples 
of low-wage workers who managed to cross boundaries either temporarily or 
permanently, and what motivated them to do so.  
Among low-wage migrant workers, a fairly assertive and rebellious reaction to 
being allocated accommodation in an isolated, peripheral location, is to refuse it and find 
one’s own. None of my participants were in the position to be able to do this. However, 
an article in a local UAE newspaper told of such a story. It told about men in Abu Dhabi 
who refused to stay in the accommodation their company was providing (Ahmad 2015a). 
It stated that the men who chose not to stay in their company’s accommodation due to its 
isolated location opted instead to pay rent out of their own pockets so that they could live 
more centrally in the city. The site of the company’s accommodation is on Saadiyat 
island. This labor camp is one of the newer “luxury” style workers’ accommodations, but 
although it meets all international standards regarding space—three-square meters of 
space per person—and meals are provided, the man being interviewed said he preferred 
not to live there due to its location. Instead, he moved off the island into the city proper 
and now pays 350Dh ($95) a month to share a three-bedroom apartment with forty-five 
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men.  His company does not subsidize this; however, the man contends that the expense 
is worth it. He and the others were willing to clean their own rooms, cook their own food, 
and live with forty-five men in an apartment. This is significant. The freedom these men 
were able to obtain by crossing the boundaries that secluded them and moving into the 
city granted them the ability to escape the zones of marginalization that excluded them 
and to access and use the city’s urban spaces. Living in the city reduced the spatial 
boundaries between them and their right to the city, and it increased the (healthy) 
boundaries—spatially, metaphorically, and emotionally—between them and their 
employer and the work environment. Most low-wage workers do not have the choice to 
relocate because of their low wages. Some, however, can if they are able to sacrifice part 
of their income. 
Whether one has the capacity to cross boundaries depends in part on where their 
accommodation is. For those whose labor camp is in the desert on the borders of Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi, as was Manish’s accommodation, accessing the city without 
transportation would have been impossible, even in cooler weather. Those whose labor 
camps were more central, as Sonapur and al Quoz are, could venture out if motivated to. 
Toben, a thirty-five-year-old Nigerian man with some university education, was 
motivated to venture out of his camp to go to church on Fridays. Toben said he went to 
church as do many he knows and that the first church he went to was attended mostly by 
Africans. He decided he wanted to engage with a more diverse group so he began 
attending a church located in Dubai Marina, a much more affluent section of the city. 
Toben said, “I needed a church where I can also mix with whites. … I need to mingle, 
new cultures. This church is all the nationalities of the world. The pastor is South 
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African, white.” Toben crossed several boundaries, a socio-spatial one separating the 
socio-economically poor from the affluent, as well as social boundary separating racially 
and nationally distinct groups. The willingness of a church member to pick him up each 
week aided his temporary boundary crossing.  
Like Toben, Michael was another person who was able to routinely cross out of 
the zones that marginalized him. He explained that although he felt more comfortable and 
safer staying within the confines of the labor camp, he also needed to journey into Deira 
to sustain himself. He said, “For me to [stay] sane, on my off days, which are normally 
Friday, I normally go to those places, just to feel … yeah … … the environment is there. 
That is the Dubai environment…” Meeting up in Deira with the friends he had initially 
made when he came to Dubai helped him to rejuvenate himself and to maintain his social 
networks. 
The search for noteworthy examples of crossing boundaries that marginalize can 
result in smaller movements going unrecognized. Maya said that there was no point in 
her going into the mall because she has no money. In lieu of entering the mall, she was 
sitting in the grassy left-over space between it and the highway. These left-over-spaces—
found also in the in-between spaces of boulevards and roundabout—become the areas 
where low-wage workers congregate. The well-groomed lawns are taken over and 
occupied by those denied entry into the mall. They force their presence upon the affluent 
passersby and refuse to go unnoticed. In a sense, they are challenging society’s 
boundaries.150 
                                                
150. There is, of course, a counter view for this. Though space may provide a respite and in one 
sense a challenge to authority, their proximity to such affluence would certainly deepen awareness of one’s 
social location and create a psychological barrier that prohibits entry. 
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While Michael escaped Sonapur for the older neighborhoods of Dubai, Gabriel 
and Mercy both escaped these older neighborhoods for the affluent neighborhoods of 
Dubai. Gabriel only did so occasionally when time permitted. Mercy escaped it for good. 
Mercy was a thirty-two-year-old Nigerian woman with a degree in cosmetology. Mercy 
had had an extremely challenging experience in Dubai, one that left her homeless and 
sexually violated. Even after her hardships, she was unwilling to accept the easily 
available hair salon jobs in Deira that paid Dh1000 ($267) per month and did not want to 
live there either. A few months after finally being hired by a hair salon in the affluent 
area of Dubai Marina, Mercy was able to move into a shared apartment a short distance 
away from her job, and a long distance away from the older neighborhoods of Dubai. The 
bedroom she shared was still filled with multiple bunk beds; however, the apartment had 
a proper kitchen and bathrooms. Of all of my participants, Mercy’s journey out of Deira 
seemed the most momentous. 
Of my forty-four participants, only five or six seemed to have been able to cross 
boundaries even in seemingly insignificant ways, and Mercy was the only one to do so in 
a significant way. The vast majority were immobilized, unable to escape their assigned 
zones.  
Zones of Inclusion 
Low-wage migrant workers need, as all humans do, a sense of social inclusion in 
order to live a full life (Cass, Shove, and Urry 2005). Urban citizenship, according to 
Lefebvre, addresses this by attending to the rights that are necessary to allow individuals 
to appropriate—to access and use—urban spaces (Kendall 2012). The freedom and 
ability to appropriate space and experience the sociality that comes from such 
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engagement should be a social right. Achieving this right requires mobility so as to 
maintain social networks and relationships (Cass, Shove, and Urry 2005). 
The ability to traverse boundaries—as well as to have and maintain the 
boundaries of one’s choosing—empowers the individual and increases independence, 
sociality, and well-being. Michael pointed out that labor camps—which are places of 
exclusion and marginalization—are also refuges where one feels safe. Walls, buildings, 
highways, and desert all act as barriers to the outside world, barriers that can protect. But 
the sense of safety they create is a false security that isolates and increases vulnerability, 
pushing its inhabitants even further to the margins.  
One participant, not yet mentioned, had a great deal of mobility. Rifat was a 
Bangladeshi man working as a private driver for a family in Dubai. He was one of my 
three outliers, earning far more than my 1500Dh ($408) limit. I kept him in my sample 
because I thought his story would provide a good contrast to the others. By choice, Rifat 
lived in the Al Quoz labor camp. As I mentioned, labor camps have accommodation that 
is of poor quality as well as good. In addition, the family whom Rifat worked for allowed 
him to keep their car at night and on Friday, so Rifat had mobility. Further, Rifat was able 
to share a room that he described as clean and comfortable with three of his close friends. 
Rifat’s access to mobility gave him the opportunity to live where he wanted and with 
whom he wanted, and to “appropriate” the city as he needed. 
Conclusion 
There are a limited number of scholars who examine the spatiality of life in Dubai 
in relation to the lives of low-wage workers (Elsheshtawy 2008, 2010, 2013, 2014; Kühl 
2012). Elsheshtawy’s (2008, 2010, 2013, 2014) work is quite extensive and focuses on 
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the physicality of space in order to study its social function for low- and middle-income 
migrants. Kühl’s (2012) work in the UAE is more limited; however, her research 
addresses the policies that are behind the spatial practices of low-wage migrant workers. 
Both of their works significantly informed this study; however, it also goes beyond their 
work. This chapter examined the various ways in which the physicality of space and the 
policies and societal attitudes that determine it impact the emotional well-being of low-
wage workers.  
The quality and location of my participants’ accommodation was the medium 
through which inequality was demarcated and structural violence manifested. The 
peripheral location of the labor camps make them an easy focal point for examining the 
role of marginality in creating spatial exclusion. However, the isolation felt by those in 
the older, poorer neighborhoods of Dubai should not be forgotten. Their boundaries and 
the rooms they occupy are more invisible, but have the power to isolate and marginalize 
from mainstream society, making the occupants vulnerable to exploitation. An inclusive 
zone is one that provides a livable space that is clean and not unreasonably crowded, and 
that is spatially located to allow for a sense of sociality and the appropriation of urban 
spaces.   
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CHAPTER 8 
 
EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING: 
 
SURVIVING THE ENDURANCE RACE 
 
Mental health is a state of well-being in which every individual realizes 
his or her own potential, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can 
work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to her 
or his community (WHO 2001, 1).  
 
Emotional well-being in the context of this study is broadly envisioned. It is a 
reflection of how people subjectively feel and think about their experiences (Diener 
2013), including the ordinary person’s capacity to achieve her or his aims and deal with 
the challenges of life (WHO 2001). Mental health and well-being are often thought to be 
under the purview of psychology. This assumption, according to Sheldon Stryker (2007) 
a sociologist by training and a scholar in both family sociology and social psychology, is 
narrow and misdirected.  
Sociological studies on mental health focus on the normal responses of healthy 
persons to highly stressful life events (Aneshensel 1992; Horwitz 2003). The focus is on 
the social—social structures, social institutions, social relationships, social groups, social 
processes—and how they lead to well-being and distress (Aneshensel, Rutter, and 
Lachenbruch 1991; Horwitz 2003; Lazarus 2006; Stryker 2007). They are social because 
they are external and collective, and are independent from any one individual. The aim of 
a sociological approach is to “uncover patterns and regularities” among people whose 
circumstances are similar (Pearlin 1989, 242, quoted in Horwitz 2002, 160). This chapter 
is an analysis of the factors and processes that impacted my participants’ well-being. I 
qualify my use of well-being as “emotional” to reflect the importance emotions play in all 
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aspects of well-being—physical, mental, and social (Lazarus 1999)— and their ability to 
control cognition, which in turn impacts an individual’s appraisal of self and 
environment.  
To situate my participants’ emotional well-being, I consider them in regard to a 
broad continuum ranging from thriving to languishing. The aim is not to quantitatively 
“measure” their well-being, but to allow us to gain a general understanding of my 
participants’ state of well-being by focusing on the processes and factors that determined 
it. The high end of the well-being spectrum is easy to articulate. One is content, happy, 
and thriving. It is what social psychologist Corey Keyes (2002) referred to as 
“flourishing.” However, what is the absence of thriving? Death by suicide or engaging in 
suicidal thought or behavior would clearly be the extreme opposite, but many people, 
regardless of their situation, would never engage in such activities. Keyes (2002) refers to 
the absence of thriving as “languishing,” the inability to function well. It is “life with low 
well-being;” it is “emptiness and stagnation, constituting a life of quiet despair” (Keyes 
2002, 210). Such conditions often manifest themselves in mental disorders (illness), such 
as anxiety disorders and depression. In contrast, those who fall in the middle of this 
spectrum would, according to Keyes, be described as moderately mentally healthy.151, 152  
                                                
151. Some contend that many definitions of wellbeing are broad, vague, and hard to measure, as is 
the definition and the continuum I am using (Dodge et al. 2012; Forgeard et al. 2011). However, while 
individual capacity and psychological well-being cannot help but enter into the discussion, this chapter’s 
focus is on the social factors and processes that led my participants to appear to have what would be a 
broadly conceived sense of high or low well-being. Further, a “diagnosis” of their well-being is beyond the 
area of my expertise. 
152. I have been tempted to refer to those in the mid-range as simply “enduring;” however, people 
can endure extremely difficult conditions. Synonyms for enduring include bearing, surviving, withstanding. 
Thus, if one is enduring, they likely occupy the space ranging between languishing and moderately 
mentally healthy, where one is holding ground, hoping not to slide further downwards. 
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The vast majority of my participants existed in the lower range of this 
spectrum.153 They were people who could be considered as moderately mentally healthy 
or languishing in despair. Often, their experiences had them vacillating between these 
two conditions. Eight of my participants—18%, or more than one in six—who had no 
past history of suicidal ideation (engaging in suicidal thought) did so for the first time 
after arriving in Dubai. Engaging in suicidal thought (or behavior) does not mean that 
these individuals were necessarily more depressed or less mentally healthy than others. 
The factors that play into suicidal behavior are much more complex, and some 
individuals would never countenance such actions no matter their desperation or despair. 
What was clear was that whether or not my participants thrived, languished, or occupied 
the space in between depended on the degree and type of stress they experienced as a 
result of the structural violence they encountered, their perceptions of this stress, and the 
amount of resilience they possessed to counter it.  
The stratification of society and one’s position in it determines one’s access to the 
resources that build resilience. The fewer resources one has access to, then the more 
difficult it is to resist the demands of those with greater power and to avoid harmful 
living and working conditions and, as a result, the more vulnerable one becomes 
(Fenwick and Tausig 2007). Chapters two through five provided analyses of the 
migration structures that affect the stratification of society in the UAE, the social factors 
that determined my participants’ position in that stratification, and the conditions and 
                                                
153. Two participants, Jean, a Filipina domestic worker, and Rifat, a Bangladeshi personal driver, 
were clearly in the upper range of the spectrum. They are the two outliers discussed in chapters two, six, 
and seven, and again later in this chapter.  
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circumstances—structural inequalities—they dealt with daily in their working and living 
environments.  
This chapter considers the state of my participants’ emotional well-being and 
theorizes about the factors that influenced it. It describes how potentially stressful events 
or situations can potentially be made better or worse depending on one’s resilience and 
perceptions. The first part of this chapter discusses two significant attributes of the 
stressors my participants encountered and focuses on one type of stressor that influenced 
their well-being. It then focuses on the role of resilience and perceptions and how these 
influenced the ability to manage the stressful events encountered. In effect, this was quite 
little. My participants’ resilience was no competition for the structural violence that 
underlay the exploitative conditions they faced. This does not mean that they did not 
persevere. Being able to persevere in one’s situation until it changes is certainly a sign of 
resilience; however, persevering is quite different from overcoming or mitigating it. Most 
did not have the resilience required by the later. The second part of the chapter discusses 
the impact of these stressful circumstances and the depression they produced. Finally it 
addresses the substantial number of participants who engaged in suicidal ideation as a 
result of the quiet despair they endured and discusses the mechanisms that move one 
from suicidal ideation to engaging in suicidal behavior.   
Factors That Impact Well-Being 
[In Cameroon] I was stressed, like, when can I ever get a better life, when 
will we be able to have something like … but [here in Dubai] this much 
stress?! It’s better to stay back home. It’s really, really better to stay home. 
[There] you know you don’t have anything. But nobody will stress you … 
but here, every time I’m like you have this [indicating her neck and 
shoulders where stress accumulates] this stress, and everything. At times, 
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you’re moving; it’s like you’d fall and die. What kind of life is this? You 
just… it’s not easy. It’s really, really painful.  
 
Sophie, a 25-year-old Cameroonian woman 
 
The mental anguish that Sophie—and many other participants—felt was palpable. 
They were confused and distressed by how such conditions could exist and how people 
could treat others with such disregard and menace. They felt hopeless about their ability 
to rectify or escape their circumstances. These stressful circumstances or events are 
referred to as stressors. 
Stressors 
Stressors can potentially disrupt one’s sense of equilibrium if they are perceived 
as exceeding one’s capacity to deal with them and as harming one’s well-being (Dodge et 
al. 2012; Headey and Wearing 1992; Lazarus and Folkman 1984). Stressors are part of 
everyday life, and healthy individuals in typical daily experiences can usually cope with 
and manage the stressors they encounter (Resick 2001). However, where one is located in 
the social system can increase the likelihood of encountering certain types of external 
stressors. Inequality, resource deprivation, poverty, discrimination, and overcrowding are 
just some of the stresses determined by social segmentation and experienced most 
frequently.  
It is argued that circumstances are not inherently stressful; rather, they become 
stressful if we do not have or believe we do not have the ability to cope with the demands 
created by these stressors or the ability to change them (Aneshensel 1992). However, 
while one’s capacity for resilience and resourcefulness can often help to overcome 
stressful situations, when the cause of that stress is extreme, such as homelessness or 
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extreme exploitation, then this capacity is often not enough (Aneshensel 1992). These 
forms of stressors go beyond normal experience and expectations and can be traumatic 
(Resick 2001). Traumatic stressors are often unexpected and so intense that one is unable 
to cope with them or manage (Boss 2006). This describes well the stressors that many of 
my participants encountered. 
Sophie, the woman quoted at the beginning of this section, worked in a small hair 
salon. She spoke at length about the stress she endured and its impact on her. She talked 
about the stress of attempting to find a job while on a tourist visa, and then about simply 
trying to survive her job.   
I came with the tourist visa and I had to look for a job and within that 
process, my God, you cannot believe. It was like, I could feel like when 
you are so much stresses and everything, your nerves, everything, it’s like, 
I’m like what is this? [… And now, working here] is really, really, 
stressful. At times, even when I sit, I feel like the nerves [indicating in her 
neck]... It’s too much. It’s paining because of stress. 
 
Once Sophie found a job, her employer and the work environment caused her extreme 
stress. The lengthy days of twelve or more hours, two or fewer days off a month, 
constantly being on her feet, and harsh verbal threats made to prevent her and her three 
co-workers from complaining to authorities were mentally and physically stressful, as 
well as disempowering. Sophie said,  
Like if I want to leave the job, she will tell you, I have your passport, I 
will go to Labor and tell Labor that you run away and I will black list 
you…. She is stronger than me. How can I fight? I don’t have anything. 
She is the one giving the money, and all of that. How can I go there to tell 
them she is lying? Who would believe you? Because there was one lady 
before, she cancelled. And she [the employer] really, really dealt with that 
lady.154 
 
                                                
154. The woman was put in jail and later deported. 
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I asked Sophie if life back home was stressful. She said that her family would “struggle 
to get something to eat and all of that,” and that they found “odd jobs just to earn a living; 
to survive.” However, the stress that she experienced in her home country was 
incomparable to what she experienced here. She explained that in her home country you 
may be quite poor, but “nobody will stress you [out].” She was distinguishing between 
the stress of living and being poor, and the stress of being intentionally mistreated—
intentionally “stressed out”—by one’s employer. Many of my participants experienced 
this type of purposeful mistreatment.  
The circumstances that caused my participants’ stress were far ranging. In 
relation to their work, they experienced, for example, stress from worrying about 
whether their employers would pay them on time, if at all, whether they would get 
sick and not be paid, and whether they might be terminated. They stressed about 
their children, elderly parents, or ill family members back in their home countries, 
whether they were earning enough money to pay for their families’ rent, food, and 
schooling, whether their family had a decent place to live, and whether they could 
cover the health expenses of family members.   
My participants were ready and willing to bear the stressful circumstances 
they encountered if, in the process, they were able to help their families, even if 
marginally. Gabra, one of my Ethiopian participants, said, "You’re here 
sacrificing. Separated from your wife, your kids, your mother, everything … 
Sacrificing. If I am sacrificing myself like this, I have to get something back. You 
have to get something. If I lose something, I have to gain something." Gabra felt 
that he was no better off than he had been before coming to Dubai. Rather, being 
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separated from his family and having such difficult living and working conditions 
made him feel worse off.  
There are many classifications that can be used to describe stressful events, such 
as whether the stressor is predictable, unique, or intense (Price, Price, and McKenry 
2016). While these and other dimensions of stress could explain the circumstances that 
my participants encountered, there are three other dimensions that stood out. Their 
stressors tended to be cumulative in their density, chronic in their duration, and in their 
type they were an ambiguous loss. I first briefly address their cumulative and chronic 
nature, and then focus in greater depth on ambiguous loss, a particular type of stressor 
that was frequently experienced by my participants. 
Cumulative and Chronic Stressors 
Stressors are cumulative when there are multiple stressors layered upon one 
another. This is referred to as stress pileup (Price, Price, and McKenry 2016). The vast 
majority of the stressors my participants encountered were cumulative. For example, the 
construction workers in my sample endured the stress of living in accommodations with 
eight or more individuals in a confined space with poor conditions, the stress of working 
twelve plus hours a day with little personal time or remuneration for their work, the stress 
of working outside in an extremely harsh climate, as well as the stress of earning 
extremely low pay, being financially penalized and harassed if they were ever sick, and 
being continually discriminated against on account of their nationality, race, and/or 
ethnicity, or on account of some other dimension of their identity.  
In addition to experiencing a multiplicity of stressors that piled up, the stressful 
events my participants encountered were also chronic in that they were persistent and on-
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going conditions (Boss 2000). Although, the end of my participants’ two-year contract 
marked the end of the contract, it did not mark the end of their need to stay overseas and 
work. This ongoing need made many of their cumulative stressors also chronic, persisting 
over many years. Most workers would have to stay in the same job or attempt to find 
another job. Some of my participants had been in the UAE for years, with little change to 
their social or economic status. As a result, the chronic (socio-economic) stress they 
experienced in their home countries followed them into the host country and would 
likely—as shown by their long-term stagnated status thus far—follow them back to their 
home country. The duration of this stress is, of course, extremely chronic. 
One of my oldest participant’s experiences demonstrated how low-wage migrant 
workers’ stressors could be chronic and cumulative. Mohamed was an Indian man who 
said he was about fifty years old, but looked like he was closer to eighty. He was small, 
thin, and slightly bent over, with hands and face weathered by the sun. He had had only 
six months of schooling as a child before he had begun working. When he was in his 
mid-to-late twenties, Mohamed came to Dubai. Since arriving, he had worked for the 
same construction company. In the mid-nineties when he arrived, he earned Dh650 
(US$177), and when I met him in 2016, he was earning Dh750 (US$204). He also earned 
about Dh100-150 (US$27-41) in overtime each month.155 He was able to take a holiday 
every two years. Having been in the UAE for numerous years, Mohamed’s migration was 
                                                
155. In 2012, there was an article in the Gulf News, a local newspaper, which stated that the cost 
of living had risen eighty-eight percent between 2002 and 2012. This news article or any other article 
addressing the rise in cost of living can no longer be found on any local newspaper website. I arrived in the 
UAE in 2002; as a result, the dates and statistics were notable, and the rise was quite noticeable. The cost of 
groceries had risen significantly and, whereas we had eaten out quite frequently in the earlier years, we 
rarely did so in 2012. Rents had also increased significantly; however, the university we worked for 
covered our rent.  
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chronic in its duration. Yet, it was also cumulative in its density. The stress of family 
separation, of economic insecurity, of his on-going health problems, as well as the 
multiple work and life-related stressors mentioned throughout this dissertation were all 
part of this cumulative stress. 
Another facet of chronic stress that low-wage workers can face is the ongoing 
conflict between the social or cultural position experienced in the home country and the 
newly subordinated position occupied in the host country. Such shifts in how one is 
perceived by others can be stressful because the new “cultural definitions” can run 
counter to those experienced in the home country (Horwitz 2003, 161). Many of my 
participants encountered this; however, it seemed to be more stressful and frustrating for 
some groups more than others. As I discussed in chapter five, South Asian participants 
had been socialized in a society with high levels of stratification. As a result, apart from a 
very small number of South Asians, issues of discrimination on the basis of socio-
economic class were often internalized. Africans, however, were not use to such 
discrimination and explicit stratification, and thus were quite aware of it when this new 
identity was forced upon them.  
Ambiguous Loss 
Pauline Boss (2006), a professor of family and marriage therapy, developed a 
theory that helps to explain the role of ambiguity and loss in creating situations which can 
become highly stressful when one lacks resilience and holds negative perceptions. 
According to her theory, “ambiguity coupled with loss creates a powerful barrier to 
coping and grieving and leads to symptoms such as depression” (1, emphasis in original). 
In other words, ambiguous loss is the ambiguity of a new situation coupled with the loss 
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of what was familiar. It is not the presence of ambiguity and loss as two isolated factors 
that is problematic. Rather, it is how these two factors connect, the uncertainty they 
create, and the inability to resolve the situation that can result in confusion, shock, 
anxiety, and depression. Boss’s theory of ambiguous loss can provide a point of access 
for understanding the type of stress my participants encountered and its impact on their 
emotional well-being. 
There are two situations in which ambiguous loss can occur. One is when a loved 
one is physically present, but psychologically absent, as are individuals with dementia or 
Alzheimer. In such cases, there is uncertainty about what the future holds and a loss of a 
familiar and important relationship. The second situation in which ambiguous loss can 
occur is when a loved one is psychologically present, but physically absent, as are, for 
example, family members who die and migrants who leave home. In both cases, the 
physical absence of this valued person in relationship to others in the family creates a 
new, unfamiliar situation and is felt as loss. Ambiguous loss has the potential to be the 
most stressful situation because it defies resolution (Boss 2006). 
Ambiguous loss simply describes a situation. Just because someone experiences 
ambiguity and loss does not mean that they suffer. Rather, a situation becomes 
problematic when a high degree of ambiguity is connected to it and the individual does 
not have the resilience156 to deal with it (Boss 2006). Ambiguity can occur in the case of 
family membership and dealing with changes in roles or dealing with who is in and who 
is out of the family. This ambiguity is referred to as boundary ambiguity. When boundary 
                                                
156. Resilience is addressed in depth later in the chapter. In short, it is the personal assets and 
external resources that help individuals deal with the stressors they encounter.  
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ambiguity is high, a wide range of feelings can emerge, including ambivalence, 
confusion, hopelessness, fear, guilt, anger, and inadequacy. The impact of these feelings 
can lead to anxiety, depression, passivity, and immobilization. Heightened boundary 
ambiguity is considered a risk factor to well-being and mental health (Boss 2006). 
In the scope of transnational migration, ambiguous loss can be examined from the 
perspective of the family left behind (Boccagni 2013; E. Castañeda and Buck 2011; 
Solheim and Ballard 2016), or from the migrant perspective (Falicov 2002; Horton 2009; 
Suårez-Orozco, Todorova, and Louie 2002). The absent person has not died, so the loss is 
not concrete like death. For both those who migrate or stay behind, the relationship shifts 
and changes, and parts diminish, feeling like a loss (Solheim and Ballard 2016). The 
ambiguity of a migrant’s life in the new host country and the temporariness of their 
migration together with a sense of loss and a lack of clarity regarding their role in the 
family they left behind can make it difficult if not impossible to find closure in the loss, 
resulting in heightened boundary ambiguity (Falicov 2002).  
Loss of Family 
Most low-wage workers who emigrate feel the loss of family members acutely. 
This can include children, the group that receives the most attention in the literature, as 
well as a spouse, parents, or siblings. The literature on transnational mothering is 
extensive (Chang 2000; Das Gupta 2015; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002; Michele R. 
Gamburd 2008; Parreñas 2001, 2005).157 Mothers who migrate are forced to leave their 
children in the care of others. They worry about whether the money they send back to the 
                                                
157. There are both pros and cons to transnational parenting, which is outside the focus of this 
chapter. 
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caretaker is being used properly and what their children are doing throughout each day. 
They also worry about their ability to maintain close relationships with the young 
children whom they were forced to leave behind. Among my participants, eight of the 
women had children whom they had to leave behind in the care of others. They were 
generally cared for by grandmothers, sisters, or other family members. It was common 
for my participants to feel “stressed” about their children and to “think of them all the 
time.”  
Several women with whom I spoke (and who were not part of my sample of forty-
four) confirmed the challenges of transnational mothering. A camp boss for a women’s 
accommodation in Sonapur said that such constant uncertainty was problematic for many 
of the women in her accommodation. Tasha, a Kenyan domestic worker who was also not 
a participant, but someone with whom I became friends, provided an example of this. She 
had been separated from her five-year-old son for about two years when I met her. After 
she left Kenya to come to Dubai, her sister had cared for her son. Tasha worried about his 
daily care, his schooling, and when she would next be able to see him, but most 
importantly she worried that she was losing her role as mother and her mother-son 
relationship. The last time Tasha had returned home for a visit, her son had referred to her 
sister—and not her—as “mom.”  
Transnational mothering can also be looked at through the lens of ambiguous loss 
(Horton 2009; Suårez-Orozco, Todorova, and Louie 2002). Falicov (2002), a clinical 
psychiatrist and researcher, uses the concept of ambiguous loss in her research on migrant 
mothers. Some of these women said that their children referred to both themselves and 
the temporary caregivers as “mother.” Falicov asks if this is a child’s attempt to deal with 
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ambiguous loss by accepting two mothers, reflecting a more fluid definition of multiple 
attachments, or if it reflected heightened boundary ambiguity and the division of 
loyalties. In Tasha’s case, it appeared that her son’s loyalties were shifting. Whether his 
reference to Tasha’s sister as “mom” was instinctual or intentional, Tasha did not know. 
Regardless, the emotional and psychological distress that she experienced was due to the 
loss she felt by separation coupled with ambiguity about her future, how long she would 
have to remain in Dubai and away from her son, and whether she would ever be able to 
regain her son’s loyalty and love.  
Another woman I encountered while carrying out my fieldwork shared a similar 
experience but from the “child’s” perspective. Jenny was a young Filipina woman in her 
twenties who was currently living with her parents in Dubai when I met her. She was not 
one of my participants, but her story provides insight on the anger and abandonment that 
can be felt by children who are left behind when their mothers emigrate (Das Gupta 
2015; Parreñas 2017). Jenny said that she and her brother had spent their entire childhood 
in the Philippines away from their parents. They were forced to stay with their 
grandparents because schooling in Dubai was (and is even more so today) too expensive 
for many foreign migrants. Jenny said that when she was young she felt like her mother 
had abandoned her and that this feeling did not begin to recede until after she had 
finished high school. The physical loss of a mother and the uncertainty of the future are 
ambiguous losses, and that they are on going and confusing for the child heightens 
boundary ambiguity. The fear that children experience can be symptomatic of trauma 
(Das Gupta 2015). For the mother who migrates, the loss that is experienced in relation to 
the child coupled with the ambivalence one feels about, for example, the circumstances 
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and whether one made the correct decisions can create guilt, fear, anxiety, and stress 
(Boss 2006). 
Among my participants, the absence of their children was not the only loss they 
spoke of. Often it was parents or spouses. Rohan was a twenty-seven-year-old 
Bangladeshi with a fourth grade education who had been in Dubai for four years and was 
working in construction. He had migrated to Dubai in order to help his mother and ailing 
father. However, to do so, Rohan had convinced his father to sell his home to pay for 
Rohan’s migration. This resulted in his parents living in a rented room. Once in Dubai, 
Rohan’s extremely low salary of Dh600 (US$163) provided little help for his parents and 
resulted in the loss of his family’s home. Much of Rohan’s story spoke to issues of 
ambiguous loss.  
Tarun, my interpreter, and I met Rohan in the evening in Sonapur labor camp. He 
seemed very fragile, emotionally and psychologically. He went back and forth on what he 
said, one moment saying that he wanted to stay in Dubai and the next stating that he 
wanted to return home to Bangladesh. He was concerned about his parents and deeply 
conflicted about his decision to come to Dubai and to leave his parents. As the interview 
went on and it grew later, it was hard to determine if Rohan was just exhausted and tired 
from a long day, or that the process of talking about his experience and challenges had 
mentally worn him out. His responses got slower and waivered more and more. Yet, he 
also did not seem eager to leave us. (As mentioned earlier, I believe my participants 
found the opportunity to unburden themselves of the pain they carried to be very 
cathartic.) 
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Examined through the lens of ambiguous loss, Rohan felt a sense of loss at being 
physically absent from his parents. He worried about his father who continued to work 
and about how his illness was progressing. He was unable to assist his father by being 
physically present, and he was unable to assist his father with sufficient remittances, 
failing to be the family provider which he felt was his duty. This situation stoked feelings 
of guilt, shame, and helplessness. In his own words, Rohan said he felt “hopeless,” had 
“regret” because he “didn’t do good for his family and parents.” The loss that Rohan felt 
in connection to his parents was increased by the high level of ambiguity he endured 
regarding his future in Dubai, and whether he would ever earn a sufficient salary. The 
ambiguity of Rohan’s circumstances lead to feelings of fear, inadequacy, and 
ambivalence. As pointed out, the inability to find resolution can make this one of the 
most stressful situations experienced and can likely have the most negative consequences 
on well-being (Boss 2006). 
Loss of a Place 
Boundary ambiguity deals with family membership, and who is in and who is out 
of the family, but loss is not only experienced in relation to valued others. Loss can also 
be experienced in many other ways (Boss 2006; Falicov 2002; Keller and Keller 2011; 
Solheim and Ballard 2016). The ambiguity of one’s new situation can also be coupled 
with the loss of familiar environments, such as one’s home, meals with loved ones, or a 
sense of community. There is also loss in the physical presence one had in the context of 
or in relationship to these places.  
Many of my participants clearly felt loss in relation to the living arrangement in 
Dubai. The places they came from did not require them to share a room with eight, ten, or 
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fifteen strangers. It did not require them to sleep in two or three-high bunk beds. Sophie 
said,  “Can you believe! . . Like one, two, three beds [high]. Like what kind of . . . I’m 
broke . . . I don’t have a bed . . . I have never experienced this. Three beds! Some of my 
participants—whose contracts included meals—also spoke about the food they were 
expected to eat. Brice, a Cameroonian man said,  
That [the food] is the worst part of it. … Because I don’t… they provide 
food, but I don’t eat, because when I eat I .... There’s nothing there. … 
Indian and Arabic food. … I can go for breakfast food because it is 
normal, bread, jam, butter. … sometimes omelet. For the food, no. Arabic, 
Indian, Filipino also. … … Sometimes I try to eat it, but sometimes I just 
go to the grocery. I get something I’m used to. 
 
What was lost was the familiar. In this case, the loss was tied to nationality, culture, way 
of life, and foods.  
Loss of place can also be connected to the loss of a familiar community. Gabra 
was a thirty-five-year-old Ethiopian man. He had left his wife and three children behind. 
Gabra felt a strong sense of loss in relation to his family, but he also spoke of loss in 
relation to place. When Gabra spoke about isolation and lack of community, he was 
bridging together the loss of valued people with the loss of place. Gabra said, “[There] is 
no social life here. We are coming… me, as an Ethiopian, I am coming from a big social 
life … and a social life family. Social life has a meaning in our country.” Communities 
are both the people and their context. People belong to and have roles within 
communities. When they emigrate, they can lose the comfort and identity created by 
those places.  
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Loss of Meaning 
Boss (2006) writes that loss is experienced in relationship to different elements of 
our lives. In addition to the physical and/or psychological loss of a valued person and the 
loss of place, one can also experience loss through the inability to find meaning in one’s 
circumstances or life events. Boss writes that one of the factors that prevents making 
meaning is disillusionment, which can manifest itself as “a mind-numbing apathy and 
emotional death” (Boss 2006, 87). Disillusionment was widely experienced by my 
participants. They had come to Dubai with certain expectations, and what they found was 
far different. Disillusionment was found in the conditions under which they were forced 
to live and work, the salaries they would earn, and the treatment they received from their 
employers. These conditions created stress through their ambiguous nature as well as 
through their tendency to be cumulative and chronic. 
In previous chapters, Sophie spoke about the illusions she held of Dubai and the 
“slave”-like treatment she received from her employer. The stress that Sophie 
experienced in regard to all facets of her life in Dubai left her uncertain of why she had 
come as well as confused and at a loss to understand how someone could be expected to 
live under such circumstances. During her interview, Sophie said, “I’m like what is this? 
It was better to stay back home. I’m frustrated. I’m lost. I’m in a strange world. What am 
I doing here? It was better to stay back with my parents, at least I know I am 
somewhere.” Sophie experienced loss of valued others and loss of the familiarity of 
place. Five times throughout our interview, she asked the hypothetical question “What 
kind of life is this?” This question was about her current life in Dubai, a life that does not 
make sense to her and a life that left her ambivalent about her decision to come. 
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Ambiguity coupled with loss has the potential to confuse and lead to feelings of fear, 
hopelessness, and despair. 
Other participants—all women—echoed this exact sentiment. Rashma, one of the 
women from Nepal, asked, “What is this life?” and Mercy, the hairstylist from Nigeria 
whose saga had included living on the streets of Dubai, also asked, “God, what is this?” 
and Sunita, also from Nepal and who was being raped by her employer, said, “Why did I 
come here?” I am uncertain why these types of responses seemed to be gendered.  
Suarez-Orozco and her colleagues (2002) carried out research on parents who migrate 
and the children they leave behind. They found that there is a qualitative difference in 
how women experience and express separation from their children. Perhaps this applies 
to a broader range of losses.  
Ambiguity and loss can be traumatic because of one’s inability to resolve the 
situation. In addition, what has been lost is often not recognized. This lack of recognition 
makes it difficult to understand the basis for one’s grief. Boss (2006) contends that 
ambiguous loss, whether psychological or physical, can be the most stressful because we 
often do not recognize that it is the psychological or physical loss of these individuals 
combined with an uncertain future that is causing distress.  
In addition to experiencing chronic and cumulative stress, Muhamed likely 
experienced ambiguous loss, too. When I asked him when he would be able to return 
home, Muhamed said he did not know. The ambiguity in this situation was in not 
knowing when he could leave Dubai for good. The loss he felt could have been the 
relationship he might have had with his wife and children had he lived with them for the 
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past twenty-three years or it might have been related to his role as economic provider, a 
role that he believed he had inadequately performed. 
In sum, chronic stress deals with the duration of the stress, cumulative stress deals 
with the density or pile up of stressors, and ambiguous loss deals with a type of stress, 
one in which ambiguity is experienced together with loss creating a situation that is or 
seems irresolvable (Boss 2006). All of these attributes are important; however, the root 
cause of my participants’ stress in the UAE was their exploitative working and living 
conditions. The following sections examine the effectiveness of resilience and 
perceptions in overcoming such conditions.  
Resilience 
In order to be moderately mentally healthy, one needs to have a sufficient amount 
of resilience to deal with the stressful circumstances encountered throughout life. This 
resilience is typically composed of external resources and personal assets. Although these 
forms of resilience are needed to offset the stressors one encounters, my participants 
often lacked them. This section addresses these two forms of resilience, but focuses on 
personal assets. The two forms of personal assets discussed are the resilience provided by 
past adversities and the degree to which my participants relied on families and friends for 
emotional support.   
Resilience is the opposite of vulnerability. If one is resilient, then one can cope 
with challenging and stressful life events encountered (Masten et al. 1995). Resilience 
can come in the form of external resources and personal assets. External resources 
includes those provided by governmental or non-governmental institutions (Fineman 
2010). These include ethical employers and recruiters, embassies that act on behalf of 
 239 
their citizens, laws that are designed to protect migrant workers from exploitation, the 
mechanisms that provide safety nets when employers do not abide by those laws, and the 
non-governmental organizations and the support systems they provide. These resources 
have been discussed throughout this dissertation. I return to them later in this chapter. 
Personal assets are not innate attributes; rather, they are the attitudes and 
behaviors learned from those in one’s family and community, and as one grows and deals 
with life’s adversities (McDermott 2017). They often include factors such as family, 
upbringing, education, and work, and can potentially become important forms of 
resilience in the future. This is, however, a broad generalization and the specific context 
will determine if certain attributes are positive or negative. Family, friends, and 
communities can also be assets in the form of socioeconomic, political, and cultural 
resources (Baker and Tsuda 2015), as well as in the form of psychological and emotional 
fortitude.  
A Lifetime of Adversity 
Research has also shown that individuals who have a history of dealing with 
“lifetime adversity report better mental health and well-being outcomes” (Fletcher and 
Sarkar 2013, 20). These adversities can be a resource that provides resilience. Many of 
my participants spoke about the difficulties they had faced in their home countries, 
including the inability to go to school because of a lack of money and the shortage of 
food. Going through these difficult circumstances while growing up provided important 
resilience while in Dubai. Two of my participants provided good examples of this. Brice, 
the Cameroonian man working as a security guard, said that he learned to cope with harsh 
circumstances early in life,  
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I started from a small age. When I was age three … after school at 2 pm, I 
wasn’t sure if there’d be food … so see, my mind is prepared already. And 
it was 50 km to get to the [my grandparents’] farm, that’s good, because 
you are sure there is food there. … We go there. We carry things. So I am 
used to it. I can always cope with these things, from a small age. 
 
Brice believed his difficult past had strengthened his capacity to endure. He said, “You 
know, I grew up in a harsh environment so I was used to hardship [before I came to 
Dubai].” Mercy, the hairstylist from Nigeria, felt similarly. She said that her two older 
brothers were of no help to her family, and, as a result, “I’m the girl at the middle and at 
the same time I’m the man.” Mercy felt that the role she had been forced to play had 
given her the capacity to perform the roles that men typically perform for their families, 
and, thus, the capacity to endure her present situation.  
Family and Friends 
Boss (2006) contends that how one reacts to a stressful event is often a 
combination of life experiences and interactions with significant others. The resilience 
Brice and Mercy gained from a lifetime of adversities was further enhanced with 
emotional support provided by family members. Their family resources were 
economically weak, but while growing up, they were emotionally strong. Brice said he 
was close to his mother and siblings, and Mercy was very close to her mother (though not 
her brothers). They both felt strongly supported and loved by these family members 
throughout their life. The emotional and psychological support of family provides 
migrant workers with resilience, helping them to deal with the adversities they encounter 
and reducing the ambiguous loss felt by separation. 
An extensive amount of research supports the importance and need for social 
support in building resilience and a sense of well-being among migrants (Branaman 
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2007; Chadwick and Collins 2015; Schweitzer, Greenslade, and Kagee 2007). This has 
been shown in quantitative research (Diener 2009; Sohn, Choi, and Jung 2016), and 
qualitative research (Brough et al. 2003; Kermode et al. 2007; Weishaar 2010). Some of 
my participants relied on the emotional and psychological support of their families whom 
they had left in the home country, but others did not. This was made evident by whether 
or not they chose to be truthful to their families or chose to withhold important details 
about their circumstances. This deception had the potential to both reduce and increase 
resilience.  
Overall, very few of my participants were fully honest with family members. 
They withheld the worst details about their work and living conditions. Michael, a 
Kenyan man whose job was washing cars, was one of the exceptions. He was very honest 
with his mother and wife. Asked if he tells them even the worst details, he said, “Big 
time,” and then explained, 
I can tell you, every day at 4 o’clock [before he goes to work], either my 
mom will call me or my wife will call me. At least they know I need that 
to start working. They normally call me. I told them it usually works. And 
trust me, it normally works. I just go to the cars, and I start. … 
 
Michael was over six foot tall, and he found washing cars was not only mentally taxing 
but physically stressful, too. He was able to endure his situation because of the emotional 
resilience his mother and wife provided him. A few other participants were also honest 
with a spouse or one of their siblings. Often this was the case if that spouse or sibling had 
for some reason—often in search of work—come to Dubai. These individuals were 
unique cases. More often, my participants withheld important details from their families 
back in the home country.  
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Being Deceptive to Family  
Migrant workers often seem to sabotage opportunities for emotional and 
psychological support from their families out of a desire to prevent one’s family from 
worrying about them and/or a desire to protect one’s pride. They sabotage such 
opportunities by withholding the worst details about their working and living conditions. 
Some deceive through omission and others more purposefully (Mahler 1995; Solheim 
and Ballard 2016). This is also common in the UAE (A. M. Gardner 2012; Kakande 
2013). Based on my participants’ stories, I found that this deception has the potential to 
provide resilience while also depleting it. 
Many of my participants participated in acts of deception with their family and/or 
friends, reducing their ability to draw on them as resources. Mohamed, the fifty-year-old 
man from India, had been in Dubai for twenty-three years. His wife and his family did 
not know how little he earned or of his living conditions. He also did not tell them that he 
was ill.  Mohamed said that he withheld the truth for the sake of his wife, who was his 
only close friend either in Dubai or in his home country. Mohamed said that if she knew 
of his circumstances, she would tell him to come home. However, he knew that if he 
returned home, there would be no one to provide her with food. Mohamed chose not to 
distress his family. He suffered in silence, as he had for the past twenty-three years. 
Mohamed was not unique in this. Many of my participants said that they withheld the 
worst information from their loved ones so as to keep them from worrying. Some 
participants believed that by withholding the worst details of their conditions, they were 
protecting the emotional well-being of their families.   
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Solheim and Ballard (2016) in their discussion of ambiguous loss among Mexican 
migrants and their families back home said that in some cases both parties knowingly 
participate in deception. The family (in the home country) knows that the parent or 
spouse who emigrated is withholding information, and the migrant worker knows that the 
family withholds certain information, too. This deception is knowingly engaged in to 
prevent the other party from worrying. It also allowed the family member who migrated 
to maintain dignity despite the circumstances.  
One participant gave a very clear example of what Solheim and Ballard (2016) 
found in their research. When asked if he told his parents about his poor salary and 
conditions, Rohan, the Bangladeshi man, said through Tarun my interpreter, "No. If [I] 
tell them they will cry. … [I] just tell them I’m working good and everything is good 
here, but [they don't know that I am] working in the sun and only earning six hundred 
[dirhams]." I told him I thought it would be difficult for his family to be compassionate 
and emotionally supportive if they did not know his circumstances. Rohan replied, "but 
they realize. They understand. [My] parents understand [my] situation ... bad ... but [I] 
never tell them." Rohan did not tell his family about his circumstances because he did not 
want them to worry, and his parents (most likely) did not question him because they 
wanted him to maintain his dignity. There were likely things that his parents withheld 
from Rohan, too. 
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Being Deceptive to Friends   
Although a small group of my participants confided in a parent or a sibling, as far 
as I knew, none of my participants confided in their friends (at home or in UAE).158 The 
central reason why my participants hid their living and working conditions was due to 
pride. They were embarrassed by the work they performed, the salary they earned, and 
the conditions under which they lived. Gabriel is an example of this.  
Gabriel, the young man who had a degree in geology, had been in Dubai for over 
four years when I met him. His first contract had been as a clerk for a catering company. 
He was quite sociable and while there he had made many friends among his co-workers 
of diverse nationalities. After their employer terminated him and all of his co-workers, 
Gabriel had only been able to find work as a security guard. He returned home to Nigeria 
to await the new visa. When it arrived it was a cleaning visa. When asked about whether 
he would tell his former co-workers and other friends in Dubai about his current job, 
Gabriel said,  
How? What will I…. How will I… tell friends? How will I…. If I tell 
someone I’m working as a cleaner. Ohhhh.  Nooooo. They just, 
hmmmm… They will tell you, Ohhh, sorry. At the end of the day, the 
person will bring up my story, tell my story.… and they laugh.…159 
 
There are potentially two ways that Gabriel’s friends could be a source for 
resilience. One involved Gabriel sharing his circumstances with his friends and telling 
them about the emotional and psychological pain these circumstances created. The 
                                                
158. The exception to this were friends who were co-workers. In these cases, their friends already 
knew about their working and living conditions. 
159. Being a cleaner is not only embarrassing, it has far reaching consequences. The job type is 
put on the visa, and this can impact future opportunities.  
 245 
second was ensuring that his friends continued to like and respect him. This required 
withholding information about his current degrading circumstances. For Gabriel, both 
were not possible, and maintaining his dignity was a far more important—and reliable—
form of resilience.  
The majority of my participants made the same choice as Gabriel. They chose not 
use either their families or friends as emotional resources. It is difficult—if not 
impossible—to know if deception was the correct choice. By not sharing his or her 
circumstances, there might be no one—apart from me—who knew the truth. On the other 
hand, honesty did have the ability to shatter resilience. Rohan’s sister who knew of his 
circumstances tormented him because she saw him as responsible for them. (This is 
addressed later in the chapter when I examine suicidal thoughts.)160  
Dishonesty—or withholding of the full truth—also had the potential to create 
greater stress and anxiety. Participants, who were not honest about their circumstances, 
would berate their family members for not being more understanding. Michael believed 
that he would not lose the respect of his mother and wife by sharing his difficulties. He 
knew he needed the compassion—and encouragement—that these valued others could 
provide. At the same time, he withheld the worst details from other family members back 
home. He said, “I tell them … you people don’t have any idea what we go through, so 
whatever little I send, take care of it.” Another participant said that even if you tell them 
the truth, they usually think you are lying. The Dubai image is so powerful and pervasive 
that truth can have a hard time reckoning with it.  
                                                
160. It was not just those with extremely low-level jobs or pay that would choose to deceive, so 
would those with better jobs and pay. For these individuals, such details were not discussed—or were lied 
about—so as to avoid continual requests for loans, connections, and/or referrals.  
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Together external resources and personal assets have the potential to help one deal 
with and overcome the stressors they encounter. When one has effectively dealt with such 
challenges, then equilibrium has been re-established (Dodge et al. 2012; Headey and 
Wearing 1992). Equilibrium is a useful conceptual tool for thinking about stability and 
how it is achieved. In the field of migration, Baker and Tsuda (2015) contend that out-
migration is triggered when individuals or communities have an insufficient proportion of 
resilience to counter social and/or natural disruptions. When resilience is high, then there 
is a stronger likelihood that emigration is not required because the individual and/or 
community has access to the resources that are needed to mitigate the challenges created 
by the disruption. The concept of equilibrium resonates with my participants’ 
circumstances. However, an additional essential factor was the role of perceptions.  
Perceptions 
In many, but not all cases, personal assets, external resources, and the stressors 
themselves can be impacted by one’s perceptions. These perceptions of one’s self, one’s 
self-efficacy, one’s capacity, and one’s agency as well as of outside forces have the 
power to influence our emotional response to circumstances and our capacity to 
overcome, manage, or simply endure those circumstances (Beck and Beck 2011). When 
perceptions are positive, they are a form of resilience in themselves (Boss 2006). When 
they are not, the result can be self-defeating thoughts and immobilization. In some 
situations (but certainly not all), perceiving one has an asset, even if she or he does not, 
can influence one’s resilience (Aneshensel 1992). 
Perceptions are driven by emotions. In the mid-1960s, Richard Lazarus argued 
that stress and emotions are interdependent; they depend on how one evaluates (or 
 247 
perceives) a situation, and that this constant “appraisal” of our environment impacts our 
well-being (Lazarus 2006). Emotions are the filter through which all other factors pass, 
including stressful events, our understanding of those events, and the ability to deal with 
those events. The effects of emotions have been discussed throughout this dissertation. 
Chapter three focused on the fear that led to greater vulnerability, and chapter five 
addressed the feelings of isolation and exclusion brought by their physical segregation. 
There was also shame and guilt that arose from the sense that they had failed their 
families, disillusionment and hopelessness over their circumstances, and frustration and 
anger over their sense of powerlessness. These reactions were in response to the stressful 
circumstances they experienced and their condition of being structurally vulnerable. 
Emotions control perceptions which can in part (and in certain situations) determine 
one’s resilience.  
Attention to perceptions is a constructivist stance (Rubin and Rubin 2011). 
Individuals in particular contexts see and interpret the world in different ways depending 
on their experiences (Berger and Luckmann 1967). For a researcher, a constructivist 
stance means listening to another to learn what it is like, for example, to be a low-wage 
migrant worker in Dubai. The researcher listens to understand how the other perceives 
and interprets her or his circumstances. This stance has been foundational to this 
research, which was guided by Charmaz’s (2014) constructivist grounded theory 
approach.   
My participants’ perceptions of themselves and their circumstance had—in some 
cases—a strong influence on their ability to deal with their situations. This section 
examines the role of perceptions in dealing with stress, and is mindful that even though 
 248 
one may hold strong, positive perceptions, external forces—or “physical facts” as Berger 
and Luckman write (1967)—can easily mitigate these assets. Further, as with the topic of 
resilience, my participants’ stories were often contradictory, reflecting the complexity 
that a constructivist stance acknowledges (Creswell 2013). 
 The role of positive perceptions is present in Boss’s model of ambiguous loss, 
which has its foundations in the work of Reuben Hill, a family sociologist and the man 
considered the father of family stress theory. In the late 1950s, he developed a model for 
explaining why family stressors may result in higher degrees of stress and crisis for some 
families, and not for others (Boss 2006; Price, Price, and McKenry 2016; Weber 2011).  
Hill’s ABC-X Model has been extended and adapted into multiple configurations, 
but its core premise has remained the same, and it is still the basis from which current 
theories on stress, resilience, and crisis build. Hill’s formula has three variables that 
determine whether a family has successfully coped with an event or situation. The first is 
the event or situation. The other two variables are factors that determine the outcome of 
the event and whether it becomes stressful. (Hill refers to the events as stressors, but they 
are in effect “potential” stressors.) The first of the two factors that impacts the outcome of 
the event is perceptions, or according to Hill’s original definition, how one defines the 
event. The second factor is the family’s existing resources, including personal and 
external forms of resilience. Positive perceptions and adequate resources provide a 
buffer, helping a family to adapt to new circumstances successfully. A failure to adapt 
can result in crisis.  
Hill’s model introduced the concept of perceptions and their impact on resilience 
and access to resources. Events and circumstances are rarely experienced or reflected 
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upon without them being altered by each individual’s own perceptions. These 
perceptions, or “appraisals” as Lazarus (2006) labeled them, are influenced by the beliefs 
we develop throughout our lifetime and, whether recognized or not, that guide our 
thinking and behavior (Beck and Beck 2011). The environment does not alone determine 
one’s well-being; it is how we evaluate the environment in relation to ourselves that 
influences it (Lazarus 2006). In these instances, cognitive behavioral psychology and 
family stress theory have a strong constructivist stance. 
My participants’ perceptions of themselves and their sense of agency were 
revealed in part when they spoke about control, and whether they felt they had control 
over their lives and circumstances. Sunita, the Nepalese woman who (as a domestic 
worker) had been repeatedly raped by the man of the house,161 said that her experiences 
in Dubai had made her “weaker.” The sexual abuse she endured led her to feel unsafe and 
to fear everyone. She said that she no longer “believe[d] anyone.” These responses show 
what little control she felt she had over her situation. More often, however, if participants 
were asked directly if they felt in control of their lives, the answer was yes. When asked, 
Brice said, “Of course. I am the only person who has the ability to change my life. If I 
decide to go home now, I can go.” Such answers appeared to reflect the desire and belief 
(and perhaps the neoliberal ideology) that one should be independent and in control. 
There was also strong recognition that one was not. Earlier in my interview with Brice, 
he had said, “I was left with one week only before I had to go back to my country. The 
money I used to come here, the expenses I had just … part was loan … so I couldn’t go 
back. My debt was [about Dh3000 (US$816)]. … … That time you know, I was like, I 
                                                
161. Sunita’s story is told in great detail in chapter six.  
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can’t go home…” Brice’s responses reflect a sense of power and powerlessness.  He 
believed he had no other choice but to accept the very low paying security job. Yet, he 
still held positive perceptions of himself and of his personal assets. Brice’s story is an 
interesting contrast to Negasi’s.  
Negasi was also a security guard when we met. He had grown up in faculty 
housing because his father was dean. His upbringing in Ethiopia had been comfortable, 
and he was university educated. As a result, he found being a security guard to be 
demoralizing. He thought he deserved better in life, but he also blamed himself for his 
inability to achieve more. He said,  
I don’t feel like I deserve to work like [a security guard]… I have an 
education. I have everything. I’m not … it just kills me sometimes. To 
stand in the door [while working as a guard]…why can’t you do 
something with yourself?! And all of my education; the time that I wasted 
in school, work, sometimes it just drives me crazy. I can’t even stand 
myself sometimes. […] I’m grateful that I can work, but every time I wake 
up and wear that uniform, I say I don’t deserve it. … And things are not 
going my way to change it. I tried a lot of things and things are not going 
my way. Not feeling like… just waking up… after all I’ve been through in 
life, and in school … I never imagined for a second I would be like this. 
 
Both Brice and Negasi spoke English fluently. Brice’s background had prepared him for 
life’s adversities, but Negais’s had not. Brice had not been able to complete his university 
training, but Negasi had. During Brice’s two-year contract doing security, he took 
courses to get certified as a tour agent. Negasi had chosen not to.  
It is easy to understand why Negasi’s childhood living in university housing and 
being a university graduate were central to his identity. Brice’s encounters with life’s 
adversities and his ability to overcome them had also clearly influenced his identity and 
sense of self-efficacy. In Dubai, Negasi and Brice both lived and worked in bad 
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circumstances. They both were shocked by the living arrangements. However, they both 
dealt with their circumstances quite differently. Brice was acquiring certification as a tour 
agent while he was working as a security guard. Negasi, who had been in Dubai longer, 
had either chosen not to or been unable to. It is easy to imagine how Negasi’s identity as 
a university graduate and comfortable upbringing might prevent him from taking the 
steps to be trained in an occupation he deemed below his stature. Negasi had accepted the 
security position as a stopgap measure, a temporary necessity. Choosing to be trained in 
an occupation that he deemed to also have a low stature—such as tour agent—was 
accepting that he was now of that status.  
In considering why Brice was able to move forward and Negasi was immobilized, 
perceptions of control and self-efficacy probably play a role; however, there is likely 
more. Brice thought he had the answer. He said,  
Most people who come here … can’t carry on … because where they 
come from, maybe they haven’t been through hard time, through hardship. 
They always had what they want and so when things turn around … they 
have to start trying for themselves when they are already old.  
 
I knew that Brice and Negasi knew each other from work and it was fairly evident that 
Brice was thinking of Negasi while speaking about the inability of some to cope with 
their circumstances or low status.162 It does appear that Brice had more of a fighting spirit 
and stronger sense of self-efficacy, and likely the hardships he endured while growing up 
                                                
162. The vast majority of my participants did not know each other, and almost none worked for 
the same company as others. If a participant did know another, it was usually only as an acquaintance.  
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prepared him for greater hardship later in life. These experiences helped him to perceive 
the difficulties he was facing as manageable, or at least as ones that he could endure.163  
While these factors likely all played a role in Negasi’s difficulties, another lens 
that could be used to examine Negasi’s situation is Boss’s model of ambiguous loss. 
Central to her concept is the role of perceptions. It is how one perceives a loss and the 
ambiguity of a new situation that determines whether that situation will be traumatic and 
debilitating, or not. This is where resilience comes into play; it is through positive 
perceptions.  
Negasi felt as though he had wasted his education, his previous work experience, 
and the time and effort he had put into them. He was fearful that he was loosing his 
achievements. Getting a certificate in tourism (or in some other “less-skilled” industry) 
would be an indication that he had chosen to forsake his achievements. In addition, there 
was a great deal of ambiguity as to what Negasi’s future would be. High levels of 
ambiguity combined with what one perceives as extreme loss can, states Boss (2006), 
lead to feelings of grief, hopelessness, shame, and inadequacy, which can lead to 
passivity and immobilization. Negasi demonstrated this immobilization. 
Perceptions are extremely important. How we perceive ourselves and how we 
perceive events impacts our ability to overcome, manage, or endure them. It is, however, 
extremely important to consider, in this context, other outside forces that influence the 
ability to achieve goals. Having the time available for re-training presumes that one has 
an employer who is willing and able to schedule your hours around the training course 
                                                
163. Interestingly, in contrast to this research, a US study showed that people with higher levels of 
education reported fewer negative feelings and less anxiety than those with lower levels of education 
[Simon2007inAvison].  
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desired. It also presumes that one has much less financial responsibility to family back 
home and that one can afford to cover the cost of that training. Negasi said, “I manage to 
send her [his mother] every month 1000, 1200 [dirhams] because I have my mom, my 
sister, and some other people who are living with my mom. I have to send everything.” 
Most of my participants had little free time to use as they chose, and most had extensive 
financial responsibilities to family back home. Brice was my only participant who 
engaged in such training while working.  
God, Hope, and Self-Talk 
Finally, religious faith, hope, and positive self-talk (the practice of talking to 
oneself) had the potential to impact my participants’ perceptions of their circumstances, 
and in so doing, were also an important source or resilience. Falicov (2002) writes that 
the ability to tolerate loss and ambiguity relates to culturally based understandings of 
faith and religious beliefs. The beliefs, as well as self-talk, help individuals construct 
narratives about themselves and the adversities they face. When they are positive, they 
improve perceptions and aid resilience.  
A good number of my participants would say they had hope and an equal number 
would say they did not. Many spoke of hopelessness but when asked directly would say 
they had hope. At times, this seemed due to the need to affirm the role of God. Muhamed, 
the fifty-year-old Indian man, said he was hopeless when asked, but then quickly shifted 
the focus to God, in a sense, reminding himself that God, not he, knew all. Interpreting 
for him, Tarun said, "Before he was hopeful. Now he’s …  … He says God knows 
everything now. He doesn’t know what’s going to happen. … He’s been here 23 years, 
and since [arriving in Dubai] he is earning, struggling, nothing happens."  
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It was quite common for participants to say, “God will help me,” “It’s in the 
hands of God,” “He will decide,” “He knows everything,” or that they talked to God, “I 
pray. God will solve everything.”  Less common was questioning God’s motives or 
stating that one had lost their belief. Two exceptions were Maya and Sunita, both 
domestic workers from Nepal. Maya asked why God had given her “such a bad life.” 
Sunita, who had been repeatedly raped by her employer, said that she “no longer believed 
in religion.” I would say that only one participant was robustly hopeful.164 Pachai, a 
young Indian man with a university degree, was working as a neighborhood delivery 
“boy” for a small shop earning a very low salary. He gave a resounding “no” when asked 
if he felt hopeless. He said, “No way! No chance! … I am very hard man. Everyday my 
attention is very big, but… … I’m slim, but I’m very strong. … Emotionally very 
strong.” Many others would say that they felt hopeless “often” or “so many times.”  
In some instances, self-talk, hope, and faith were often one and the same. Gabriel 
compares his difficulties to those of others, and then demonstrates self-talk when he 
cajoles himself into thinking differently about his experiences. He said, 
I met somebody that works in construction. ... Look at this person. He 
works in construction: It’s worse [job than mine]. … … When he 
explained his own problem to me. [The man said,] I work for almost 18 
hours, in the sunnn!!! During the whole day and there is no break time. 
Then I knew. … Ahhhh. That is hectic. I know. For the ones I met… That 
is when I thought, oh, come on, you will survive. I try to talk to myself. 
I’m consoling myself. Trying to … oh God help me.  
 
                                                
164. This does not include Jean and Rifat who were my two extreme outliers. They were discussed 
in chapters six and five respectively as well as in the next section.  
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Gabriel compares and cajoles, and integrates his hope with a belief in God. These 
practices helped maintain positive perceptions. They, too, were essential coping skills 
that provided resilience.  
Positive perceptions have the potential to increase resilience. However, even 
though one may have strong personal assets and hold strong, positive perceptions, 
external resources—Berger and Luckman’s “physical facts” —can easily mitigate them. 
These physical facts in the form of immigration laws and policies and the extent to which 
they are upheld have the potential to negate all other forms of resilience. It is why 
individuals languish. It is why those who languish have “incomplete mental health” and 
“low well-being”(Keyes 2002, 210). 
The Continuum of Emotional Well-Being 
Low-wage migrant workers filter the stressors they encounter, their perceptions of 
those stressors, and their resilience and resources through their emotions. It is an iterative 
process that can build strength or deplete it. When resilience is strong and stressors can 
be managed, then a state of equilibrium is achieved, one is moderately mentally healthy, 
and perhaps even able to thrive and flourish. Rifat, a thirty-seven-year-old Bangladeshi 
man who worked as a personal driver, and Jean, a forty-five-year-old Filipina woman 
who worked as a nanny, were the only two individuals in my study who appeared to be 
thriving. Their living and working conditions were fair and reasonable; they earned 
relatively good salaries, were treated well by their employers, and appeared to be happy 
with their lives. I asked Jean if she wished she were back in the Philippines. She was 
ambivalent and in no hurry to return. The rest of my participants fluctuated between the 
lower poles of languishing and moderately mentally healthy. When perceptions are too 
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negative, resources too small, and/or stressors too immense (or chronic, or cumulative, or 
ambiguous) to overcome or deal with, resilience is reduced and equilibrium is not 
achieved. When this occurs, stress takes over and, for many, culminates as depression.   
Depression 
My participants endured an immense amount of stress. Personal assets and 
positive perceptions helped, but the type, scope, and degree of the stressors they 
encountered would have been emotionally and psychologically taxing for the best of us. 
The stress that accumulated manifested itself as anxiety and depression. It is this 
depression that likely had the greatest impact on their emotional well-being.  
Major depression is a mental illness and it impacts the ability to function. The 
cause may be due to a genetic predisposition (Gerhardt 2014); however, assuming this is 
always the case and without considering the role of social and situational factors provides 
a very partial understanding (Hjelmeland 2013; Pearlin, Avison, and Fazio 2007). There 
is extensive research linking well-being to key social determinants, such as income 
inequality and social status (Aneshensel 1992; Fenwick and Tausig 2007; Simon 2007) 
and social stratification (D. S. Massey 2008; Muntaner, Borrell, and Chung 2007). These 
chronic stressors increase the chances of becoming emotionally distressed and developing 
depression and anxiety (Catherall 2004; Resick 2001). Research has shown that 
precarious work and marginalization makes migrants vulnerable to mental health issues 
such as depression (Standing 2011; Syed 2015). The depression my participants spoke of 
may have been major depression, or it may have been an everyday emotional reaction to 
extreme adversity resulting from feelings of fear, loss, anxiety, anger, despair, and 
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sadness. Which it is I am not in the position to say. Regardless, their discourse—which 
focused on feelings and experiences of depression—were numerous.   
Early in my fieldwork, a participant brought up the issue of depression without 
prompting. Gabra, the man with a wife and three children back in Ethiopia, worked as an 
outdoor security guard. He, said, “One thing I have to tell you here: Depression. You can 
talk to me about depression. Oh my God. Depression is the main thing that happens to 
you in Dubai.” He spoke at length about the problem of depression and believed that the 
central cause was isolation. He said, 
You know why? Because there is no social life here. We are coming. Me, 
as an Ethiopian, I am coming from a big social life. … And a social life 
family. Social life has a meaning in our country. …. I have to share my 
feelings. My happiness, my sorrow. … [Here,] I don't have a home. I just 
have a place to sleep. I don’t have anybody to talk to. I need to discuss 
about many things. I need to discuss about life, my future, my dreams. 
Everything. But there is nobody around. This is the difficult thing I am 
going through.… But it is not just me. Most the people are going through 
this difficult time. This lonely life. Loneliness. You feel like you are living 
alone. … … Too hard this stuff.   
 
I told Gabra that it sounded like he was very isolated. He quickly latched onto that 
word. 
Isolation. That’s a big thing. Me, it’s not about the hardness of the job. 
Sometime you work hard, outside in the sun. … But more than that you 
feel isolated. Sometimes people coming from the same places get together. 
Asia for example. Pakistani people have Pakistanis." [...] Sometimes, … 
these things I told you about, depression. It changes your mind. 
Sometimes I react with these guys. I react. … I react like if someone 
wakes me up, … Oh my God… I’m over the house. … I don’t know… 
Why?.... This depression causes me these things. If I were peaceful with 
myself, I wouldn’t react that way. Maybe I would pass it. … Especially, if 
it is repeated. …. So this thing … it is not only me. Depression. It’s 
everywhere. … 
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Irritability and anger are also signs of depression. In the lives of my participants, there 
were many factors driving depression: the work, the housing, the marginalization and 
isolation, social deprivation, de-skilling, being ill-treated or ill-spoken about as a result of 
one’s race or nationality, feeling hopeless. When asked about depression, more than one 
participant said, “But of course. Who wouldn’t be?” 
Suicidal Ideation 
In this study, eight of my forty-four participants spoke of having suicidal ideation 
for the first time in their lives after arriving in Dubai.165 This is 18% of my sample. The 
global average for suicidal thoughts is shown to be 9.2%166. That my participants had 
never contemplated suicide until arriving in Dubai is significant. Depression was 
prevalent among my participants and there is a strong association between depression and 
suicidality (Ferreira et al. 2015; Klonsky, May, and Saffer 2016; O’Connor et al. 2016). 
Thus, this section discusses the prevalence of suicidal thoughts among my sample.  
Although there is very little research that looks at suicidal ideation among 
temporary migrant populations, there are several studies that can help inform this study. 
One study actually is about this population. Final year medical students at a UAE 
university administered a survey in 2011 to 318 male migrant workers in labor camps. 
The aim was to determine the level of depression and suicidal ideation. The majority of 
the participants were Indian and Pakistani, and more than half of the study participants 
earned less than Dh1000 (US$367) per month, which according to the authors was 
                                                
165. See Appendix B for nationality, age, gender, and the presence (or absence) of suicidal 
ideation for each participant.  
166. This is based on Nock et al. (2008; 2009). It is addressed again later in this chapter.  
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“barely sufficient to survive” and would impact the ability to send remittances. A 
relationship between income and likelihood of depression was found. A quarter of the 
respondents indicated difficulties with depression, and, among those earning less than 
Dh500 (US$184) per month, it was fifty percent. Those in construction had the highest 
risk of depression. Overall, they found a high prevalence of suicide ideation. Among my 
participants, only one earned less than Dh500 (US$184); however, fourteen of my forty-
four earned Dh950 (US$271) or less.  
Another study was carried out in Kuwait (Zahid et al. 2003). This study focused 
on women who had come to perform domestic work and who were hospitalized for 
psychiatric “breakdown.” (The authors provided no description of a psychiatric 
breakdown.) Notable is that half of the women in study who were hospitalized over the 
course of the two-year-study were placed there within their first three months of arriving 
in Kuwait. This would likely be a strong indicator that conditions for domestic workers in 
Kuwait were less than optimal. The UAE has many of the same immigration policies. 
A more recent study on suicidal ideation—not in the Arab Gulf region—was 
carried out on mostly first generation immigrants in the US and Spain (Fortuna et al. 
2016). The respondents were of various socio-economic levels. Fortuna et al. (2016) 
found that among the 537 immigrants surveyed, suicidal ideation increased for those who 
had resided in the host country on temporary status for more than ten years, and that it 
went down for those who acquired citizenship. The authors found that the process of 
migration, disruption to social ties and support, experiences of family loss or instability, 
and experiences of discrimination were linked to depression and suicidality and that the 
cumulative effect of these factors was also associated with suicidal ideation. My 
 260 
participants experienced these same cumulative and chronic stressors. Also, the Fortuna 
et al. (2016) study found that the symptoms associated with suicidal ideation were 
depression, anxiety, and experiences of trauma, and that the origin country and host 
country made little difference. Other research has shown that suicidality is linked to the 
country, culture, and/and society within which one was raised and socialized (Colucci 
2013; Colucci and Lester 2012; Hjelmeland 2013; Leach 2006), However, like the 
Fortuna et al. (2016) study, my study also did not show such a link. Those who engaged 
in suicidal thoughts after arriving in the UAE represented a wide range of nationalities. 
The one exception was that none of my African participants had engaged in suicidal 
thought or action in their home country; those who had were from South Asia and the 
Philippines.  
Finally, the Nock et al. (2008; 2009) study mentioned at the beginning of this 
section was a cross-national survey of 108,663 respondents from the general population 
in twenty-one countries. Because the focus was not on immigrants or temporary migrants, 
the study offers a useful contrast. The Nock et al. average of suicidal ideation among the 
general population was 9.2%. They further found that high-income countries have higher 
rates of suicidal ideation than low- and middle-income countries and that the US has one 
of the highest rates at 15.6%. These statistics are a good point of reference. The rate of 
suicidality was much higher among my participants than the global average.167 Sixteen of 
my forty-four participants (36%) had engaged in suicidal behavior or thought at some 
point in their lives, thirteen of those engaged in suicidal thought in the UAE, and eight of 
                                                
167. My participants were all from low-income countries, but had a higher rate of suicidal ideation 
than high-income countries. Could this be due to moving to and working in a high-income country?  
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the those had done so for the first time after arriving in Dubai. These numbers are 
significant (see table 2). 
Table 2. Participants who engaged in suicidal thought 
Only in home 
country 
In both home 
country 
& UAE 
Only in UAE Never 
3 / 44 (6.8%) 5 / 44 (11.4%) 8 / 44 (18.2%) 28 / 44 (63.6%) 
 13 / 44 (20.5%) 
In UAE (and maybe in home country) 
 
16 / 44 (36%) 
At some point in life (in the home country, UAE, or 
both) 
 
 
Note: The total number of participants in the study was forty-four. 
 
 
That 18.2% of my participants only thought of suicide after arriving in the UAE is 
a clear indication that (among those in my sample) suicidal thoughts were a bi-product of 
post-migration stressors, that experiences while living in the country of origin did not 
influence them, and that, because they occurred post-arrival, they were likely not 
influenced by pre-existing psychiatric or biomedical causes.  
Andreas Heinz (2014), a researcher in the field of psychiatry, argues that suicide 
attempts are not always driven by mental illness, and they should be seen as a distress 
signal indicating that current circumstances have become unbearable. Thus, to understand 
the circumstances, it is important to contextualize findings both temporally and spatially 
(Hjelmeland and Knizek 2010). Considering the context and circumstances which 
motivate suicidal thoughts will, according to Heinz (2014), help to avoid inappropriately 
labeling individuals who suffer from discrimination, political situations, and unequal 
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social structures as mentally ill. It focuses attention on the “everyday emotional reactions 
to adversity” (Heinz 2014, 137). 
Focusing on suicidality as a post-migration phenomenon focuses attention on 
circumstances that occurred in the host country and on circumstances that might be due to 
having left home. While some circumstances are personal, others are due to the social 
patterning of suicide (Wray, Colen, and Pescosolido 2011). This can include the 
discriminatory, unequal social structures that result in exploitative working and living 
conditions as well as isolation and marginalization. Research has shown that factors such 
as isolation and insufficient social support may lead to high levels of anxiety, depression, 
and hopelessness decreasing the ability to cope and hence making them susceptible to 
suicide (Hovey and Magaña 2003; Kposowa 2000), as do poor economic conditions and 
disadvantage (Baudelot and Establet 2008; Spallek et al. 2014). Suicidality is also 
associated with a sense of alienation, isolation, and the inability to integrate into highly 
segregated societies, resulting in deep incongruity between immigrants’ own lives and the 
more affluent lives of those who surround them (Wadsworth and Kubrin 2006). A factory 
owner I interviewed said that the men who work in his family’s small company lived in 
Umm Al Quwain, an emirate (state) that is much smaller and less affluent than Dubai. 
There, he said, “workers are not surrounded by the opulence that one encounters around 
every corner of Dubai.” He felt this made it easier on his workers.  
The various personal and social factors that impact well-being are not isolated; 
they work iteratively, continually informing each other. They can also impact individuals 
differently, some factors playing more significant roles than others. Yet, while there was 
some differentiation, two conditions laid the foundation and exasperated all other 
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variables. The first condition was that the stressors my participants encountered were 
chronic, cumulative, and extremely exploitative. The second condition overlaps with the 
first. External resources—a central form of resilience—were lacking. These external 
resources are the laws, policies, and governmental institutions that are designed to 
prevent exploitative living and working conditions and the mechanisms that provide 
safety nets when such conditions do arise. The lack of such preventative and protective 
measures increased stress and uncertainty, heightened boundary ambiguity, increased 
negative perceptions and hopelessness, and weakened emotions. 
At the beginning of my interviews, I would explain that my study was motivated 
by the numerous accounts of suicide in the UAE. I would then not mention it again until 
near the end of the interview, and then only if it seemed appropriate. I wanted to give my 
participants the chance to speak to the issue on their own. Their words illustrate the 
hopelessness and utter despair that drove many to have suicidal thoughts. Negasi, the 
Ethiopian man with a university degree, had such thoughts. He said, “I can get why 
people kill themselves…. When you talk about high suicide rates, I can feel … I feel like 
that sometimes. … It’s not the life I would wish for anybody.”  
I asked Sophie, the woman who spoke at length about stress, if she was ever so 
hopeless that she wanted to end her life, Sophie said, 
It’s like for a minute you say it is better I am dead and I never 
(incomprehensible) … It’s not easy (tears silently falling). … Many times 
I just say I wish I didn’t even exist and wouldn’t have to go through all of 
this. If this is really what I have to go through to… to get rich, or to earn a 
living, then I shouldn’t even exist, because this is more than dead. It is 
really painful. Especially deep in the heart. When you feel your heart... the 
pain... it’s better to be dead because when you’re dead you don’t feel 
anything. You just have to sleep. (hopeless or cynical laughter) And all of 
that… 
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Mercy seemed to come the closest to acting upon her suicidal thoughts. She said,  
"Yes… Um… when I was in this… when I was passing through this 
challenges, I was walking on the road one day. I just, like, .. this large 
RTA bus … like.. I want to die… so… I keep a… There was a time again.. 
that was the first one.. but,  …  Before, then, …  in Deira it is very easy for 
you to come out and get… I (incomprehensible) alcohol, like this. So… 
there was a day I said I will kill myself then. Let me just die and go. I 
called one of my … somebody who used to (incomprehensible). They 
brought one drink for me, spirits. I said, when I finish this I want my 
intestine to cut. That was my intention for drinking those things. ... 
Because I want to die. … I don’t want my family to know about me. Let 
them… just, oh I’m in Dubai, but they don’t know I’m already dead. ... So 
that was all things coming in my head... So another one again... this the 
second one... The one again, this my last Kish. The first 4 days I did not 
eat anything I did not take any water. I said I will die... here… anything. If 
it’s food... for food, I will not eat. God take my life, I don’t want to live 
anymore (small laugh) … oh gosh… okay…" 
 
Rohan, the Bangladeshi man discussed earlier, had lost his family’s home because he had 
failed to repay his debt in time. He seemed to carry an immense amount of grief and guilt 
inside of him. He was the only participant who spoke about family motivating his 
suicidal thoughts. Through Tarun, my interpreter, Rohan said, 
[My] sister said, “other people are earning very good and sending good 
money to the home, but you are not sending, what are you doing there?” 
… At that time, [I] was thinking about suicide. … [I did not act on it 
because I was] thinking, after I die, how will my parents survive? 
 
While Rohan perceived his parents as being compassionate—“They realize. They 
understand.”—his sister either did not understand his circumstances, or chose to 
blame their family’s misfortunates on him. 
While these stories help to illustrate my participants’ despair, considering the 
contrast between how they assessed their mental well-being before migrating and after 
arriving in Dubai, reveals the immense change that occurred. Prior to carrying out my 
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fieldwork, it seemed reasonable to presume that individuals who engaged in suicidal 
thought had a history of such in their home countries. Thus, if someone spoke of suicidal 
thoughts, I always asked if they’d experienced them in their home country, too. Five of 
my participants had. The eight others, who included Rohan, Mercy, Sophie, and Negasi 
whose stories were shared above, had not. They had only engaged in suicidal thought 
since arriving in the UAE. When Rohan was asked if he had ever considered suicide 
before coming to Dubai, he adamantly said “Never!” This was a common response. 
Sophie said, “No, back home I didn’t have [suicidal thoughts] … It’s in Dubai. This 
stress and everything and even thinking of dying… It’s in Dubai. It’s here.” Negasi said, 
“No…. Suicide starts here… sometimes because I don’t speak to anybody about my 
problems. Like I can’t even tell my mom what is going on. …. I can’t even talk to my 
friends… old friends. … […..] I have nothing to go back to.” Brice, who had not engaged 
in suicidal thoughts himself, understood what drove others to do so. He said, “If you 
don’t have somebody you can talk to here … that’s why people commit suicide. If you 
don’t have somebody you can express your feelings to, you go crazy. …”  
It is impossible to know why Sophie, Mercy, and Rohan and the other five 
participants engaged in suicidal thought. Several participants who said they would never 
consider suicide referenced their religion, yet others who appeared religious did consider 
suicide. Some who considered suicide appeared to be quite emotionally and 
psychologically strong and carried positive perceptions, and some who seemed weaker in 
this regard said they would never consider it. Those who engaged in suicidal ideation 
represented a diversity of nationalities and genders. Their time in the UAE ranged 
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between one and four years. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, some people 
simply would not engage in suicidal thought.168  
Heinz (2014) writes that suicidality can show that a person is “mentally 
distressed,” that he or she “does not know how to continue her or his life in the given 
circumstances,” or it can be an “emergency signal” indicating the need for help (137). 
Even though depression has been shown to be strongly associated with suicidality, 
Verrochio et al. (2016) found in their review of the literature that mental pain is an even 
stronger indicator of suicidal ideation. On the continuum of emotional well-being, many 
if not most of my participants hovered in the lower regions. Regardless of whether they 
engaged in suicidal ideation, the stress, anxiety, and mental pain they felt over their 
conditions was significant.169 
How Ideation Progresses to Attempt 
My aim in addressing suicidal ideation was to present a more tangible and 
accessible way to appreciate the level of distress my participants were experiencing. 
However, discussions of ideation also raise questions about the potential for suicidal 
thought to progress to suicide attempt or suicide. Four of my participants had attempted 
suicide in their home country; however, neither they nor anyone else in my sample had 
attempted it in the UAE. This does not, however, mean that they will not. 
                                                
168. It is possible that there are factors that distinguish between those who would and would not 
engage in suicidal ideation. However, such further analysis would require expertise beyond the author’s.   
169. During our interviews, the idea that participants may be “languishing” was often difficult to 
ascertain. Apart from individuals, such as Rohan and Negasi, whose anguish and distress were quite 
palpable, the interview process was restorative and helped revive them and give them a sense of hope. 
Many appeared happy by the end of the interview. Loneliness, isolation, and a lack of emotional support 
were briefly interrupted as I listened intently to what they had to say and showed compassion for what they 
were enduring.  
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It is only relatively recently that researchers have begun to explore the processes 
through which suicidal thoughts progress to suicidal attempts. That is the goal of this 
section, to examine the potentiality for such movement. It begins with a general 
introduction to theories of suicide that is of relevance to my participants and then 
addresses how ideation can develop into action. 
Numerous theories attempt to explain the factors that motivate suicidal thought 
and behavior, and several of them are relevant to my participants’ experiences. One of 
these is the role of psychological pain, or psychache, as Shneidman (1998) labeled it. 
Suicide, according to Shneidman (1998) is neither psychiatrically nor environmentally 
based. Rather, it is due to the inability to deal with adversity. “[F]rustrated psychological 
needs” result when an individual’s “threshold” for psychological pain has been exceeded; 
when this occurs, psychache ensues and the likelihood for suicidal behavior increases 
(Shneidman 1998, 18). The mental pain individuals experience can depend on the 
meanings which individuals, groups, cultures, or societies give to suicide. These 
meanings—which are the motivators of suicide—can include rebellion and acts of protest 
or defiance, revenge and punishment of others, self-punishment due to a sense of failure, 
and suffering or pain due to distress, fear, alienation, or hopelessness (Lester 2011). 
Abramson et al. (2000) in his theory of suicide suggest that issues of hopelessness in 
relationship to depression may be a significant factor in understanding how psychosocial 
factors impact suicide. The work of Shneidman (1998) and Abramson et al. (2000) has 
been substantiated in other studies. In fact, psychache, hopelessness, and escape are the 
three most agreed upon motivators of suicide attempts (Verrocchio et al. 2016).  
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Social isolation is another form of psychological pain. Addressed over a century 
ago, Durkheim’s sociological study of suicide and the role of belonging is still relevant 
today. Central to his theory is that suicide is a social phenomenon, rather than an 
individual one. There are shared societal experiences that play a role in suicidal behavior. 
One of these factors is integration. Durkheim explains that integration involves having a 
sense of belonging that comes from familial or community bonds. These bonds reduce 
feelings of isolation and generally foster well-being. Building on Durkheim, as well as 
Shneidman, more recent work by Joiner (2007) has addressed the role of burdensomeness 
and belongingness as central motivators.  
These studies are all relevant to this research. However, (apart from Joiner’s 
work) they do not differentiate between suicidal ideation, attempts, or completed suicide. 
The work of Klonsky and May (2014), whose aim has been to understand which suicide 
ideators are at most risk of attempting suicide, does differentiate. Klonsky and May 
(2014) credit Joiner (2007) who was the first to analyze how suicidal thoughts advance to 
attempt and for inspiring their ideation-to-action framework. Joiner’s (2007) theory of 
suicide is based on the premise that suicidal behavior increases when one—who already 
perceives him or herself as a burden and not belonging—acquires the capacity to enact 
lethal self-injury.  
Klonsky and May’s (2014) contend that psychological pain typically does not 
develop into suicidal ideation. If individuals have hope that their situation can be 
overcome, then they focus on bringing about that change and do not develop thoughts 
about ending their lives. It is when individuals with psychological pain also feel hopeless 
about their circumstances that suicidal thoughts develop. Becoming hopeless is the first 
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step of advancing from ideation to attempt. The second step is lacking a sense of 
connectedness, either to people or to some other aspect of life. This is similar to Joiner’s 
burdensomeness and belonging and Durkheim’s social isolation and lack of integration. 
Finally, as Joiner stated, individuals need the capacity to attempt suicide; however, unlike 
Joiner who limits capacity to the acquired experiences of self-injury, Klonsky and May 
see capacity more broadly. To them, capacity can also be dispositional (having low 
sensitivity to pain) and practical (having access to lethal means to kill oneself). 
Psychological pain and hopelessness combined with a perception of being unconnected 
coupled with an increased capacity for suicide increase the potential for suicidal ideation 
to progress into suicidal attempt.  
My participants spoke of the hopelessness that led them to despair. Sophie talked 
about the mental distress she felt by her ill-treatment. Rohan spoke about the shame and 
guilt that arose from believing he had failed his parents. Many told me about the 
disillusionment and hopelessness they felt about their circumstances. Gabra spoke at 
length about the depression and isolation that he and so many others experience. Gabriel 
told about the soul crushing discrimination he encountered. Brice described the cognitive 
disconnect between his current situation and the life he should have been living. Boss 
(2006) contends that the ambiguity of one’s circumstances combined with a sense of loss 
can result in feelings of hopelessness, fear, and shame. Feelings of ambiguous loss were 
the result of Tasha leaving her son behind and Mohamed not knowing when he would be 
able to return home. 
Taliaferro and Muehlenkamp (2014) in their research on adolescents found that 
hopelessness and depression were predictors for both ideators and attempters. Verrochio 
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et al. (2016) found in their review of forty-two studies that mental pain was central to 
suicide. Pompili et al. (2011) in their study of fifty individuals with suicidal ideation and 
fifty who had attempted suicide found that stressful life events and major depression were 
frequently reported by both. They also found that suicide attempters are more likely to 
speak of low social support than ideators.  
What do these findings tell us about the future of my participants? Will their pain, 
hopelessness, isolation, and depression lead from suicidal ideation to suicidal attempts? I 
do not attempt to answer these questions, but leave them for the reader to consider. 
Conclusion 
Resilience comes from the personal assets and external resources to which one 
has access. Some of my participants had quite strong personal assets. They had a 
supportive family, a solid education, and an upbringing that prepared them to deal with 
and cope with harsh circumstances. Further, if we assume that those in better mental 
states tend to be the ones who migrate (i.e., the healthy migrant effect), then we can 
assume that the individuals in my study were self-selected, robust, resilient, and healthier 
than those who did not emigrate. However, while personal assets were relatively strong, 
external resources were more questionable. 
External resources can include the environment where one lives and works and 
the institutional resources available. The environment relates to issues discussed in the 
previous chapter, most importantly, the location of one’s accommodation and its 
condition. Both have the potential to harm resilience. Institutional resources are the 
structures—found in the laws and policies—that are designed for the protection of 
migrant workers. This was discussed at length in chapters three and four. In the UAE, 
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although there are extensive laws designed to protect, the sponsorship system which 
grants undue power to the employer, the vagueness with which some of the laws are 
written, and the inability to enforce the laws and policies that are on the books result in 
little protection for workers.  
The stressors my participants encountered would, I believe, be considered 
extreme. They were chronic, cumulative, and ambiguous, as well as traumatic. Resick 
(2001) defines traumatic stress as stress that goes “beyond normal developmental life 
challenges” and are events that are “accompanied by intense fear, helplessness, or horror” 
(2). Being made to sleep on their employers’ dining room floor, limited to one day off a 
month, being raped or otherwise harassed by one’s male employer—I believe these 
would be considered traumatic. (The ILO indicators for forced labor discussed in chapter 
four provide a quick reference for the stressors encountered, many of which would be 
considered excessive and traumatic.) 
Under most circumstances, one’s perceptions and resilience provide the tools 
needed to deal with external stressors. My participants faced difficult odds. The stressors 
they encountered were extreme and the external resources that people tend to count on 
were denied to them. These resources were important because they provided the tools for 
overcoming, managing, or enduring the stressors they encountered, and for being 
moderately mentally healthy.  
Only a limited amount of research on temporary low-wage migrant workers has 
been examined through a lens that examines the role of stressors in relationship to 
perceptions and resilience, and none has done so in the Arab Gulf. Further, research that 
addresses the particular stress of ambiguous loss among migrant workers is also quite 
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limited and absent in this region. Finally, the literature that explores the processes 
through which suicidal ideators become suicidal attempters is relatively limited, and none 
has explored it in relationship to migrant workers.  
The emotional well-being of my participants is found in the lower regions of the 
continuum for emotional well-being, that region where “emptiness and stagnation 
constitut[e] a life of quiet despair” (Keyes 2002, 210). Yet, despite this—despite the lack 
of laws and policies that are designed to protect, despite the chronic, cumulative, and 
ambiguous stress, and despite the depression, suicidal thoughts, and languishing at the 
lower regions of emotional well-being—my participants endured. For resilience, their 
only resources were personal. For some it was their life experiences that had taught them 
to keep moving forward. For many, it was their family and hope for a better future. For 
most, it was their belief in a higher power that controlled their life. All endured, but for 
many it was and continues to be an unending endurance race. Time will tell if Klonsky’s 
(2014) theory of progression from ideator to attempter holds true. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation research has explored and described the experiences of 
temporary low-wage migrant workers in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. It examines 
how structural violence in this particular context often led to experiences that increased 
vulnerability and that subsequently impacted emotional well-being. Unlike previous 
research which has focused only on migrant workers from a particular country or region, 
this study’s sample represented a broad diversity of nationalities, occupations, and 
employers. Further, it targeted those earning in the lowest wage bracket of less than 
Dh1500 (US$408) per month. No other study of which I am aware has focused solely on 
this wage bracket in the Arab Gulf, had this diversity, or focused on the impact of 
structural violence on emotional well-being. These attributes and the exploratory nature 
of the study generated data that both reinforced previous findings on low-wage workers 
in the UAE and led to new findings.  
Findings 
Structural violence created many of the conditions and stressors that caused the 
vulnerability of my participants. These stressors included exploitative living and working 
conditions; verbal, physical, and sexual abuse; temporariness, low pay, and debt; chronic, 
cumulative, and traumatic attributes of their stress; extreme de-skilling and 
discriminatory treatment; isolation and exclusion; and the ambiguous loss created by the 
uncertainty of their circumstances coupled with the loss they experienced in relation to 
their families and homelands. Their vulnerability led to fear, stress, anxiety, and 
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depression, which were the determinants of their emotional well-being. For some, it 
resulted in suicidal ideation. 
Gainful employment and its associated economic benefits were central to why 
almost all of my participants came to the UAE, but they do not tell the complete story. 
These reasons do not explain the structural factors that prevented them from acquiring 
adequate work in their own countries, nor the other unassociated reasons that motivated 
their departure, such as misconceptions and/or deceptions concerning potential 
opportunities in the UAE, as well as socio-political and socio-cultural factors. Many of 
these factors are brought up in migration research focused on the Arab Gulf. However, I 
found that regardless of their motivation to emigrate and regardless of what they knew 
about the UAE context, there was a clear tendency to dismiss and/or rationalize 
information that did not align with their desperate need for gainful employment. This 
cognitive dissonance filtered out undesirable information and reduced their capacity to 
think critically about the information they were given. They did not migrate for rational 
reasons; rather, they rationalized their reasons for migrating.  
The research design for this project is significant because it resulted in a diverse 
sample that gave me the opportunity to theorize about the role of national, racial, and 
ethnic labels. I found that the complex ways in which nationality, ethnicity, and race 
intersect with socio-economic status, education, gender, and social capital determine the 
very diverse and unequal outcomes among those from the Global South. These factors 
determined my participants’ extent of marginalization, residential segregation, quality of 
housing, access to urban centers, and mental health. They determined the degree to which 
my participants were made structurally vulnerable, as well as the extent to which they 
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lacked the resources—namely those that provide protection by the law—to overcome 
such structural obstacles. While much of this is consistent with literature on the Arab 
Gulf, there are two ways in which my analysis differs. One is its attempt to disentangle 
the role of nationality, race, and ethnicity. Labeling discrimination based on nationality as 
“racism” can be useful because it draws attention to the discriminatory practice of 
privileging some nationalities over other. However, from an academic and more scholarly 
perspective, lumping these very different prejudices together misses the opportunity to 
tease them apart and to analyze them in greater depth. Further comparative work could be 
done cross-nationally to tease apart the similar and differing processes through which 
nationality, race, and ethnicity both overlap and are articulated differently in different 
contexts.  
The second way my analysis of discriminatory factors differs is its attention to 
historical precedence. The UAE’s history of slavery and colonialism, and its 
contemporary embracing of neoliberal ideology perpetuates the structural violence 
created by their historic divisions and power relations and, in the process, maintains 
discriminatory divisions. It is also possible that there is simply universal distain for those 
with darker skin color; however, this would not account for greater respect and inclusion 
for those of certain nationalities. The composition of my sample as well as knowledge of 
the broader UAE context revealed that historically driven racial divisions played an 
important role in determining the degree of discrimination encountered and their overall 
rights and privileges. More historical and comparative research could help bolster this 
finding.  
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This research also addressed issues of sociality and spatiality, and how they 
intermingle. Bunnell and Kathiravelu (2016) identified the presence of friendship and 
sociality in the lives of low-wage migrants and the multiple purposes it serves. Friendship 
impacted this population emotionally and affectively, and performed practical functions 
in terms of access to the city and negotiating one’s way through it. The researchers 
explored “friendship, conviviality, and other forms of positive sociality” that act as 
resources, making life more livable (204).  They found that “friendship and other forms 
of convivial sociality act not just as social glue,” but that their presence acts “as a kind of 
balm that helps soothe and heal” the challenges of living in highly stratified cities and 
performing low-wage work (211). As discussed in chapter seven, the ability to access and 
engage in the sociality of the city is important because—along with life experiences, the 
emotional support of family, and religious beliefs—it helps one to endure his or her 
circumstances. However, my participants’ experiences revealed that access to this 
sociality was often limited through structural forces. 
Specifically, these limitations were due to the spatial dimension of discrimination. 
Attending to this dimension of the context, moves analysis beyond the “bodies” and 
focuses attention on the unique features of particular spaces and how they shape the 
experience of those living in them (Foner 2017). Focusing on the spatial dimension 
prompted me to theorize about zones of marginalization. Other forms of discrimination 
were very much driven by nationality, race, and ethnicity, while borders, boundaries, and 
spaces were often governed by socio-economic status. It determined the spaces within 
which one could move and the boundaries one could cross. My participants’ stories were 
about marginalization, exclusion, and limited mobility. Their stories revealed how space 
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and the relations that governed all aspects of their lives often resulted in zones of 
marginalization. Low-wage worker accommodation is the clearest example of these 
zones which can marginalize through their peripheral location and the physical conditions 
of the space. The location and conditions of the accommodation are a form of structural 
violence in that the harm they create is hidden and ambiguous. The limited ability of 
occupants to move in and out of these zones increases vulnerability to exploitation and 
abuse by employers. What happens when the sociality described by Bunnell and 
Kathiravelu is deemed relevant but inaccessible? Zones of marginalization offer 
conceptual avenues for examining how access to the sociality of the city is linked with 
access to institutional resources, and how together they can increase the vulnerability. 
Limitations 
This study sample’s strength was found in the great diversity of its sample. This 
may, however, also be considered one of its greatest weaknesses. As discussed in chapter 
four, a broad diversity of low-wage migrant workers meant that communication skills 
were extremely varied. Some participants were highly skilled in English, others were 
more analytically and self-reflexively skilled, and others were neither of these. There are, 
of course, always differences in the loquaciousness of interviewees; however, it is likely 
not to this extreme or in such socially segmented ways. Those with higher-level English 
language skills tended to be from Africa and were often more educated. Those from Asia 
tended on the whole to be more tentative. In the process of writing up this research, I 
often battled against the desire to use data which provided richer, more eloquent, and 
more quotable examples; however, doing so misrepresents my sample and their 
experiences. This was a challenge I was constantly aware of, but not one I would have 
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changed. It is the diversity of my sample population that led to some of the most notable 
conclusions.  
The findings from this study are not meant to be generalizable or representative of 
the entire population of low-wage workers earning less than Dh1500 (US$408) per 
month. This sample was hand-selected. I was put in contact with many participants 
because previous ones said they knew someone who had “a good story to tell,” typically 
meaning that the individual had encountered extremely difficult circumstances. There 
were some relatively “good” employers in the sense that although the pay was quite low, 
they covered the visa, flight, and other fees as they were supposed to by law, and 
employees had one day off a week and shared a room with “only” four to six co-workers. 
The general conditions of the accommodation and related facilities were acceptable, and 
the location was not too isolated. 
Yet, even though there are some relatively good employers, the salary (<Dh1500) 
makes it almost impossible to remit a sufficient amount of money and to have a life worth 
living, a life that is not confined by the perimeter of one’s labor camp, nor denied the 
sociality of the city. While my sample was hand-picked, their salaries were quite 
common and consistent with other sources. There is no minimum wage in the UAE and 
there are no official statistics on salaries among low-wage workers.170 A website that 
provides information about all aspects of living in Dubai and which seems to have the 
most comprehensive collection of data on salaries for low-wage occupations is 
DubaiFAQs (www.dubaifaqs.com). The website appears to base salary amounts on 
                                                
170. Charterhouse is a large recruitment agency in the UAE. It produces an annual salary guide to 
the UAE. The lowest salary amount provided is for a Transactional Accountant Dh6,000 per month 
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information gathered from the media, job advertisements, recruiters, and readers on their 
forum. For 2014, they stated that cleaners earn between Dh800 and 1300 per month, 
laborers between Dh600 and 1500, and maids and nannies between Dh700 and 3000. 
These amounts reflect for the most part the salaries of my participants (see Appendix B 
for participants’ occupations and salaries).  
My participants’ conditions are not necessarily representative of the entire 
population of migrants earning Dh1500 or less a month, and salary is not always 
indicative of working and living conditions. However, based on the experiences of my 
participants, the labor camp accommodation I observed while volunteering with the 
NGO, the accommodations I saw while visiting my participants, and the advertisements 
for bed space, accommodation with poor conditions is far from rare. Thus, I believe my 
findings clearly point to a larger problem. Those who earn the least in the UAE are forced 
to endure the least favorable conditions and suffer greater abuse. 
  Further, while these findings are not generalizable, they are transferable. This 
ethnographic research did not only examine low-wage migrants and their experiences, it 
also studied the city, it geography, and its history to better understand its unique features 
and how those features structured the experiences of those who migrated there. Other 
researchers can take these data and the context in which they are grounded, and 
determine the appropriateness of transferability (C. Marshall and Rossman 2015).  
Another limitation of the study was the absence of certain populations who were 
not represented in my sample. I know there are substantial numbers of extremely low-
wage Chinese, Vietnamese, and Indonesian workers. However, it was typically easier for 
other nationalities from the Global South to engage and gain the trust of potential 
 280 
interviewees, and I had no connections to these populations; thus, I was unable to engage 
with them. I do have a very good representation of the lowest paid occupations, apart 
from factory workers. Again, I lacked access. Finally, only one of my participants, Ras, a 
twenty-six-year-old Indian man, identified as gay, and much of his narrative was closely 
connected to his identity as a gay man. As a result, he was not included in my discussions 
in this dissertation. It is possible that there were other participants who might have 
identified as LGBTQ; however, the friend who put me in contact with Ras was also 
openly gay, so Ras likely presumed I already knew, and was therefore open about his 
sexuality.  
Finally, the greatest limitation of all was conducting ethnographic fieldwork in a 
politically sensitive context. As I discussed in the methodology chapter, the Dubai 
government is sensitive to any form of commentary that may present the city negatively. 
This includes negative comments about the economy as well as the weather. Classroom 
conversations that professors can hold are restricted and scholars whose work has been 
deemed threatening have had to leave the university. Due to the high level of surveillance 
and control, individuals who could have potentially connected me with workers felt 
unable to put themselves, their companies, and/or their employees in what they perceived 
would be a risky situation and some workers were unwilling to participate due to the fear 
of being deported and banned. The climate of fear and possible retribution was a barrier 
that increased the difficulty of this research. 
Policy Recommendations  
A recurring theme in the literature on low-wage migrant workers in the UAE is, 
as discussed in chapter four, the problematic and abusive nature of the kafala system. 
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This is without question one of the most significant problems facing foreigners in the 
UAE. However, another issue is equally in need of attention. It is in relationship to the 
enforcement of immigration and employment law and the non-compliance of Emirati 
officials whose job it is to do this. I offer one policy recommendation that would greatly 
improve the lives of low-wage migrant workers.  
Much of the exploitation my participants encountered was due to laws being 
poorly enforced and/or ignored by government officials. One example of this is 
employers who retain employee passports as discussed in chapter six.171 This is a 
common illegal practice and is discussed frequently in the media. In addition, on a UAE 
government website, one of the central points given for “spreading awareness amongst 
workers” is that workers are “entitled to keep possession of all … personal identification 
documents.” Yet, as described in chapter six, during my visit to Immigration with a 
domestic worker, the Immigration official told us quite blatantly that employers must 
retain domestic worker passports to prevent them from absconding. This is a clear 
example of non-compliance. 
Another example involves abuse by employers as well as non-compliance by 
officials.  Employers exploit low-wage workers when they force them to re-pay hiring 
and visa renewal costs. By law, employers of low-wage workers are to cover the cost of 
recruitment and hiring. These include the cost of entry visa and travel to the UAE, and 
the cost of medical tests, health insurance, and insurance of the employee’s residency 
permit. At the moment, as my participants’ experiences often showed, the government 
                                                
171. Both employers of domestic workers and companies who employ dozens or more workers 
commonly retain passports. 
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has difficulty enforcing these rights, making it extremely easy for employers to pass these 
costs on to their employees. One of the central reasons why it is easy for employers to 
exploit workers in this way is because of the government’s (current) inability to ensure 
the anonymity of low-wage migrant workers who wish to submit a complaint regarding 
such conditions to the Ministry of Labor. Workers are told to either submit complaints at 
the Ministry in person or through its “helpline number.” In theory, a worker’s identity is 
to be protected. However, as my participants’ experiences showed, this was not the case, 
and they will potentially face retribution by their employer. It could be that loss of 
anonymity occurs on rare occasions; however, stories such as these spread quickly. If 
workers cannot trust that their anonymity will be protected, then they are not going to risk 
raising complaints. As I discussed in much depth in chapter four, it is too easy for 
employers to terminate their employees.  
A final example of non-compliance and lack of anonymity is found in the process 
of submitting complaints against one’s employer to the Ministry of Labor. As discussed 
in chapter four, my participants learned that complaints were often not confidential and 
that employers could sometimes learn who submitted the complaint. When this happens, 
employees risk early termination of their employment. Further, it was also learned that if 
workers go to the Ministry of Labor to address contractual problems, such as being 
denied their end-of-contract gratuity that by law employers are required to pay, they may 
find that their Emirati sponsor/employer is the official sitting behind the desk. Again, this 
is a case of non-compliance as well as a conflict of interest and exploitation of one’s 
position of power.  
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The job of government officials in the Ministry of Labor and Immigration is to 
uphold the law. However, based on my participants’ experiences, the laws that have been 
designed to protect workers are often ignored by these officials. These acts of non-
compliance appear to be commonplace and widespread. Assuming that non-compliance 
of its laws runs counter to the desires of UAE rulers, then addressing where, how, when, 
and why these acts of non-compliance occur is essential. When they are not addressed, 
such non-compliance is deemed intentional and acceptable. Failing to address them 
results in the UAE government—and the UAE culture as a whole—being seen as 
indifferent to the exploitative practices that harm those who are most marginalized in 
society.  
Future Research 
As this was an exploratory story, it addressed a broad range of issues, and thus 
presents many potential avenues of inquiry that could be further explored. One is in 
regards to how issues of race, ethnicity, and nationality interact with age and with length 
of stay in the UAE. The length of my participants’ sojourns was quite varied. Some of 
them had arrived in the UAE within months of our interview and others had been there 
for decades. One man had been in the UAE for twenty-three years. In general, South 
Asians and Filipina participants were older on average and had stayed for much longer 
than African ones. I am uncertain as to the cause. It could be that sub-Saharan Africans 
stay for shorter periods because of a strong desire and ability to return home or move 
onwards, or that there is—likely because of their education—eventually a greater 
likelihood of upper mobility, thus disqualifying them from being in my sample. Or, it 
could be that because of their higher levels of education they were less willing to stay and 
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endure such low-paid, “unskilled” work, which most found extremely demoralizing. Of 
course, one possibility is that it is simply one of the limitations of having a small sample. 
Additional research could explore migration patterns and processes of this population. If 
many sub-Saharan Africans have remained in the UAE and managed to obtain upward 
mobility, perhaps greater effort could be made to understand the processes involved and 
how obstacles can be negotiated.   
Also, while I focused on the role of socio-economic status in determining zones of 
marginalization, the spatiality of racial and national discrimination could be further 
explored. Recently in follow-up conversations with black African participants, I have 
been told that racist behavior seems to be increasing despite new anti-discrimination 
legislation. Companies in the process of hiring will deny black Africans entry into their 
offices or physically eject them from their space. The Africans I know will do whatever 
possible to avoid placing themselves in spaces where they will have to endure blatant, 
demoralizing racist comments and behaviors. Unfortunately, however, during the job 
search, one does not know if he or she has entered a zone of marginalization until it is too 
late. More analysis could be given to the roles of nationality and race and how these two 
components limit physical movement into certain spaces and opportunities to particular 
jobs.172 Also related to the spatiality of the city is the design of new public spaces, their 
                                                
172. Recently I was told about a black African woman who sat for an Emirates Catering entry test. 
(Giving entry tests is a useful way for companies to quickly weed out job seekers who are not qualified.) 
After everyone finished the test, the tests were collected, and the names of those who had the highest scores 
were placed on the bulletin board. This woman had received the highest marks. When she approached the 
company personnel for the next step, he looked at her, did not ask her any questions, and told her she was 
not appropriate for the job. The introductory page of Emirates Flight Catering Careers webpage states that 
it is “a multicultural workplace” and that they “have taken pride in creating an inclusive” environment. 
Another story of racist treatment involved being yelled at on the phone by company personnel asking, 
“Why would we want to hire an African?!!!!”  
 285 
function, and how they target particular groups, most often tourists, and middle and upper 
class residents. Further research could explore how these spaces erase the traces of low-
wage migrant workers, even when they are present. This could then be the basis for a 
cross-national comparative analysis that examines how exclusionary practices work in 
different contexts.  
Further research on the spatial aspect of migrant bodies could also look at labor 
accommodation and unpack a more detailed and analytical examination of the bodily 
experience of sharing such confined spaces on a daily basis. Lucy Jackson (2016) has 
written on the territory of the body of domestic workers and how the individual 
demarcates it. Boundaries, according to Jackson (2016), are not random but are created in 
defense and in relation to particular experiences, and individuals choose to engage in 
specific activities that reinforce those aspects of their territory and its borders that are 
most important to the maintenance of self. The boundaries and zones of marginalization 
that impact those living in shared housing could be examined in relation to the scale of 
the body, how it experiences and interprets space and territory, and how this impacts its 
ability to cope and be productive. The outer limits of my participants’ territory seemed to 
be physical as well as imagined or symbolic. They spoke about others invading their 
space and the visceral effect of such intrusions on their emotional and physical health. 
My participants also spoke of the active ways in which employers attempted to dismantle 
boundaries to undermine and reduce workers’ agency. Further research could examine 
how the scale of the migrant body within the broader scope of the city can be 
strengthened or made more vulnerable. 
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Finally, some argue that it is not possible to draw comparisons between the US 
and UAE immigration policies and the treatment of low-wage workers because the UAE 
is not a “democracy.” I would argue that a comparative analysis is very much needed. 
Foreigners in the UAE and outside-observers of the region and its policies have little 
awareness of the parallels that can be drawn between the two countries. For example, 
studies addressing how employers use the threat of deportation as a mechanism of control 
among migrants who have regular—but temporary—status can be found in the US 
(Benz-Rogers 2014; Hahamovitch 2013; Johnston 2010) and in Europe (Bridget 
Anderson and Rogaly 2005). Further, the international community often condemns the 
unjust kafala system, viewing it as a deviant system. However, it is not. The diversity and 
scale to which temporary foreign workers are used in the UAE sets it far apart. However, 
systems tying low-wage temporary migrant workers to employers can also be found in 
the US (Apgar 2015; Bauder 2006; Benz-Rogers 2014; Delgado-Wise, Márquez, and 
Gaspar 2015; Hill 2011), Canada (Foster 2012; Hill 2011; Strauss and McGrath 2017; 
Valiani 2012), the UK (Bridget Anderson and Rogaly 2005; Scott 2015), and parts of 
Europe (Mannon et al. 2012; Pajnik 2012; Plewa 2013). Castle et al. (2015) argue that it 
is becoming more and more common for governments to revitalize old guestworker 
programs. They write, “governments everywhere seem to be looking back to the old 
guest worker model or the contract labour models used in Gulf oil economies and some 
Asian labour-importing countries, to introduce new systems of what is euphemistically 
labelled ‘circular migration’” (2380). 
Carrying out an exploratory study of the emotional well-being of low-wage 
migrant workers in Dubai is important because it sheds further light on the 
 287 
marginalization and oppression of this population and how it impacts their emotional 
well-being. As part of a comparative study, this research can serve a broader purpose by 
revealing the ways in which UAE practices are similarly engaged in by the US (and other 
democracies). Denying such parallels allows those in the US and elsewhere to presume 
that they have the moral high ground, to distance themselves from such practices, and to 
believe they are justified in their incrimination of the Gulf. As a result, the mechanisms 
that allow such social inequalities persist and spread. For Americans, the UAE is an 
important case study, not because of certain clear objectifiable differences, but because of 
the similarities it holds. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA BY REGION 
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1Percentages are rounded off to the nearest whole number. 
2Those earning over or less than 1500 or not earning add up to total participants by region.  
3This includes those earning Dh950 or less; it does not include those who are not earning a salary 
4Some participants are double counted. 
 
  
            Africa 
                          F:M 
        South Asia 
                          F:M 
     Asia Pacific 
F:M 
All       
Regions 
 Cameroon     
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Nigeria 
3 
3 
2 
3 
7 
2:1 
1:2 
0:2 
2:1 
1:6 
Bangladesh 
India 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
5 
5 
6 
6 
2 
0:5 
0:5 
3:3 
4:2 
2:0 
Philippines     2:0  
Total Participants1            18 (41%)         24 (55%) 2 (5%)         44 
Female : Male             6:12 9:15 2:0        17:27 
Age 
Average age 29.5 34 46.5         32.7 
Education 
HS + further edu.        13/18 (72%)       5/24 (21%)        2/2 (100%)        20/44 
Grade 6 through HS          4 (22%)         10 (42%)               0        14 
Grade 5 or less          1 (5%)          9 (38%)               0        10 
Monthly Salary in Dirhams 
Earned > 1500 ($408)2        3/18 (17%)      1/24 (.4%)        2/2 (100%)    6/44 (14%) 
Earned 1500 or less2, 3        12/18 (67%)         18/24 (75%)               0   30/44 (68%) 
Earned 950 or less         4/18 (22%)      8/24 (33%)               0   12/44 (27%) 
Not earning a salary2        3/18 (17%)      5/24 (21%)               0    8/44 (18%) 
Accommodation in Dubai  
Labor camp 10/18 11/24 0/2        21/44 
Live-in   2   4   1         7 
Provide bed space    3   3   0         6 
Rent bed space in city   3   4   1         8 
Rent bed in camp   0   1   0         1 
Currently homeless   0    1 (in labor camp)   0         1 
At some point homeless4   1   3   0         4 
Visa Status on Arrival 
Visit 16/18 4/24 1/2        21/44 
Employment   2   20   1         23 
Visa Status at Time of Interview 
Working on a visit visa   4   1   0          5 
Irregular   1   2   0          3 
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S = Searching for work; I = Irregular status; W = Working; NE = Not earning a salary; VV = Visitor Visa 
 
 Pseudonym Nationality Occupation at time of interview Age Salary AED US$ 
       
1 Rashma Nepali Cleaner - commercial 28 900 245 
2 Manish Nepali Cleaner - commercial 28 450 123 
3 Gabra Ethiopian Security Guard 35 900 245 
4 Wafa Pakistani Unemployed nurse 26 S / VV –   
5 Jasweer Pakistani  Bus Nanny 46 1500 408 
6 Rifat Bangladeshi Personal Driver 37 5000 1361 
7 Jean Filipina Nanny live-in: for Lebanese/Brit 45 3500 953 
8 Jilan Pakistani  DW live-in: for Pakistani 30 1500 408 
9 Ghaziyah Pakistani  “Businesswoman” – unemployed  29 S / VV –   
10 Ganiru Nigerian Construction 29 700 191 
11 Negasi Ethiopian Security Guard 30 1000 272 
12 Ras Indian Rest. Supervisor 26 1300 354 
13 Toben Nigerian Construction  35 1000 272 
14 Jason Indian No job; accountant temporarily  24 S / VV –   
15 Brice Cameroonian Security Guard 29 1000 272 
16 Yabani Nigerian Security Guard 30 1300 354 
17 Maya Nepali DW live-in: for Indian 27 600 163 
18 Sunita Nepali DW live-in: for Indian 28 600 163 
19 Nina Cameroonian No job; was live-in DW 1 week 28 S / VV –   
20 Nabin Nepali Cleaner - commercial 40 700 191 
21 Rabia Sri Lankan Cleaner - commercial 52 1000 272 
22 Tariq Pakistani Gardener 40 1500 408 
23 Michael Kenyan Car washer 32 1000 272 
24 Pachai India Shop Deliverer 23 1200 327 
25 Usman Pakistani Personal Driver for Emirati 30 1500 408 
26 Emu Ethiopian Salon worker, trained 24 1000 272 
27 Ankit Nepali Construction – not working; ill 48 NE –   
28 Sophie Cameroonian Salon worker, not trained 25 1000 272 
29 Analyn Filipina Security Guard 48 2200 599 
30 Muhamed Indian Construction 50 1050 286 
31 Kendra Kenyan DW live-in: for Egyptian; agent  24 1000 272 
32 Lisha Kenyan DW live-in: for Indian 35 1600 436 
33 Mike Nigerian Window washer 36 900 245 
34 Danjua Sri Lankan DW live-in; absconded; irregular 33 I  –  800 218 
35 Abir Bangladeshi Construction 42 1400 381 
36 Peter Nigerian Irregular - puts ads on cars  27 I  –  3000 817 
37 Gabriel Nigerian Cleaner – commercial 26 800 218 
38 Fardin Bangladeshi Cleaner – commercial –outdoor 35 1100 300 
39 Sumon Bangladeshi Cleaner – unemployed; irregular 32 I / NE –   
40 Joseph Ghanaian Cleaner - commercial 25 W / NE / VV –   
41 Godwin Ghanaian Cleaner - commercial 28 W / NE / VV –   
42 Ayaan  Indian Cleaner - commercial ? 950 259 
43 Rohan Bangladeshi Construction 27 600 163 
44 Mercy Nigerian Hair stylist 32 2300 626 
Participants are listed in the order interviewed.
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Page 1 of 2
APPROVAL:CONTINUATION
Takeyuki Tsuda
Human Evolution and Social Change, School of (SHESC)
480/965-7887
Takeyuki.Gaku.Tsuda@asu.edu
Dear Takeyuki Tsuda:
On 3/6/2018 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:
Type of Review: Continuing Review
Title: The emotional and psychological well-being of low-
wage migrant workers in the UAE
Investigator: Takeyuki Tsuda
IRB ID: STUDY00000840
Category of review: (7)(b) Social science methods, (7)(a) Behavioral 
research
Funding: Name: ASU: Graduate and Professional Student 
Association (GPSA)
Grant Title: None
Grant ID: None
Documents Reviewed: • Consent form for Focus Group, Category: Consent 
Form;
• Recruitment script for others, Category: Recruitment 
Materials;
• Consent forms for Participants, Category: Consent 
Form;
• Recruitment script for participants, Category: 
Recruitment Materials;
• Recruitment Script for FG, Category: Recruitment 
Materials;
The IRB approved the protocol from 3/6/2018 to 3/21/2019 inclusive.  Three weeks 
before 3/21/2019 you are to submit a completed Continuing Review application and 
required attachments to request continuing approval or closure. 
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If continuing review approval is not granted before the expiration date of 3/21/2019 
approval of this protocol expires on that date. When consent is appropriate, you must use 
final, watermarked versions available under the “Documents” tab in ERA-IRB.
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).
Sincerely,
IRB Administrator
cc: Elizabeth Reber-Rider
Elizabeth Reber-Rider
Takeyuki Tsuda
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Interview protocol: 
Interviewees are invited to start their story where they want. As much as possible, control 
of the narrative is given to them, allowing those who want, to freely tell their story with 
minimal interruption. During pauses, probing questions or encouragement to move on is 
given. At the end (see page 2), issues that did not arise organically or sufficiently, are 
explored in greater depth. 
 
Part I:  3 periods of migration 
 
1. Home country 
• Tell me about your home, where you come from. 
• Tell me about your family. …  
• Tell me about your community, village.  
• Tell me about the people in your life when you lived there. 
• Tell me about your schooling/education/work experience. 
• What effected / influenced you the most as a child? … as a teen? 
• Who …  
 
2. During 
• Tell me how you learned about the UAE, and what you knew about it.  
• Tell me about your expectations. 
• Tell me about your reasons for migrating.  
o Were there any other reasons? 
• Tell me about the process.  
• Tell me about how you paid the agent / for the ticket / for the plane ticket 
 
3. Host country 
• Tell me about your work. 
• Tell me about where you sleep / live.  
• Tell me about life is like there. 
• Tell me step-by-step what you do throughout the day. (ask if seems useful) 
• Tell me about your physical health, and whether it has changed. 
 
 
Probing questions for above: 
• Can you tell me more about that?  
• How did it make you feel? 
• What was most challenging/difficult about (that experience/event)?  
• How was it challenging/difficult? 
• Was there anyone or anything that helped you survive  (manage that period)?  
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Part II: Specific issues 
Keeping in mind the 3 parts of migration, after part I, questions are asked if suitable and 
appropriate.  
• Sources of emotional support  
o Tell me about your relationships with… family, friends, community. 
§ Tell me about the people in your family you are closest to. 
§ Tell me about the people in your village / neighborhood / 
community that you are closest to.  
• Tell me about what you did with them. … friendly, helpful,  
• Tell me about the economic level of the people where you 
lived.  
o Tell me about the people in your life now.  
o Tell me about what or who brings you emotional strength. 
§ Who do you share your worries with? 
o Who do you trust the most?   
o Who do you talk to when you feel stressed or worried? 
§ What do you talk about? 
o Probe about: 
§ relationships with family, friends, community 
§ isolation / feeling alone  
§ role/importance of religion/spirituality  
• Sources of stress 
o What were/are your biggest concerns/worries? 
o What about your everyday life do you find most stressful? * 
o What things in life seem too big, too difficult? 
o How do you feel about… 
§ shared accommodation (privacy, space); food 
§ work conditions, free time 
§ distance from family/community 
• Coping mechanisms – how stress and difficulties are dealt with 
o What helps you survive each day of work? ….  [try to be specific] 
o From where do you get your inner strength? 
o What motivates you? Gives you encouragement? 
• Emotional state 
o What do you usually think about when you are NOT working? 
o How do you usually feel during the day when you are working? 
o Do you feel safe? (especially for women) 
o How did it feel being here on a visit visa? … without a visa? 
o Are you easily discouraged? 
• Self-appraisal (self-assessment; and self-efficacy (belief) and self-esteem (view 
of)) 
o How do you feel about your life? … about the work you are doing? 
§ Are you satisfied/okay with … 
o Tell me about the future.  
o Tell me about your goals. 
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o Do you feel you have been treated fairly (here, during, with…) 
• Discrimination 
o Do people treat you badly because of your religion, or nationality or for 
other reasons? 
§ Tell me about it. 
o Can you give some examples of when you have experienced it? 
 
Suicide (might come end of part I or II)  … only ask if there is indication that it is a 
possibility 
• Does life ever seem like too much work / too difficult? 
• Tell me what you think about when life seems too difficult or cruel.  
• What do you want to do when it feels that way? 
 
Depending on responses, …. 
o Have you ever tried to hurt yourself? Tell me about it.  
§ Tell me about what happened to make you think about it.  
o Have you ever wanted to end your life?  
o If not… What stopped your from acting? 
o If yes…  Tell me about it.  
§ Tell me about what happened to make you do it.  
 
Do you think your life has improved since coming here? 
• If yes, tell me how it has improved. In what ways. 
 
End of interview, ask: 
• How do you feel now? 
• Why did you decide to be interviewed? Motivation? 
 
 
 
  
 328 
RECRUITMENT SCRIPT for INTERVIEWS with 
LOW-WAGE MIGRANT WORKERS 
 
Well-bing of Migrants in the UAE 
 
 
My name is Lisa Reber. I am a doctoral student under the direction of Professor Takeyuki 
Tsuda in the Department of Justice and Social Inquiry at Arizona State University. I 
would like to interview you because you about your experiences as a migrant.  
 
I would like to listen to the story of your life. I want to learn about life in your home 
country, the process of migrating here, life in the host country. I want to learn about your 
well-being, and the stresses and challenges you experience. 
.    
There will be one interview and it will last for about an hour. It will depend on how much 
time you have available. You have the right to not answer any question, and to stop 
participation at any time. I may ask to do another interview; however, you may choose 
not to.  
 
 I will not tell anyone else about you and what you tell me. Your identity will be kept 
secret.  
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to be interviewed. 
 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact me  
 
 
 
Lisa Reber 
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WRITTEN CONSENT FORM for INTERVIEWS  
with MIGRANTS WORKERING IN THE UAE, 
and with INDIVIDUALS WHO WORK WITH MIGRANTS 
 
 
Focus of interview: Well-being of migrants in the UAE 
 
Principle Investigator: Dr. Takeyuki Tsuda, Professor (and dissertation co-chair) 
 School of Human Evolution and Social Change 
 Arizona State University 
 Tempe, Arizona, 85287-2402 USA 
 
Co-Investigator:  Lisa Reber 
 In the US:       Justice & Social Inquiry 
   School of Social Transformation 
   Arizona State University 
   Tempe, Arizona, 85287-6403 USA 
 
 In the UAE:   Zayed University 
   Dubai, UAE 
 
Why am I being invited to take part in a research study? 
We invite you to take part in a research study because you are a migrant who is working 
in the UAE, and because I believe you have valuable information to share based on your 
experiences.  
 
Why is this research being done? 
This research is being done in order to obtain a better understanding of the experiences 
and conditions faced by migrants, and the suicidal thoughts that some migrants engage in.  
 
What will I be asked about? 
You will be asked to share your knowledge about the following: 
• the experiences and conditions that are faced in the migration process in the migrant’s 
country and here in the UAE, and views of these experiences,  
• thoughts about what helps/hurts the ability to have a positive experience as a migrant, 
• greatest concerns for migrants, and 
• future plans. 
 
How long will the research last? 
We expect that individual participants will spend between at least 30 minutes to an hour 
in an interview. Following the interview, you may be asked to participate in a further 
interview; however, you may choose not to. If we do another interview, we will do it at a 
location convenient to you.  
 
How many people will be studied? 
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We expect to interview between 30 and 80 migrant workers.  
 
What happens if I say yes, I want to be in this research? 
You are free to decide whether you wish to participate in this study. If you choose to 
participate, you will only be expected to do one interview. Following the interview, and if 
you agree, we may arrange a follow-up interview.   
 
Who will be present during the interview? 
The only people who will be present during the interview are you, the translator, and the 
interviewer, Lisa Reber.  
 
What happens if I say yes, but I change my mind later? 
You can leave the research at any time; it will not be held against you. 
 
What happens to the information collected for the research? 
Your responses will be confidential. The results of this study may be used in reports, 
presentations, or publications but your name will not be used.   
 
If you choose to not have a second interview, then no information identifying you will be 
kept. If you agree to future interviews, information identifying you and your contact 
information will be kept in a locked and secure place. All data will be deleted when the 
research ends. This will be no later than 2022.  
 
Will I be compensated? 
No compensation will be given for this interview. Compensation for future interviews 
will be provided in the form of phone cards.  
 
Who can I talk to if I have concerns? 
If you have questions or concerns, you can contact Lisa Reber who will be carrying out 
the interviews at lisareber@asu.edu, or contact the research team at 
takeyuki.gaku.tsuda@asu.edu 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Social Behavioral IRB. You may 
talk to them at (+1-480) 965-6788 or by email at research.integrity@asu.edu  if: 
 
• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by Lisa Reber. 
• You cannot reach the research team. 
• You want to talk to someone besides Lisa Reber. 
• You have questions about your rights as a research participant. 
• You want to get information or provide input about this research. 
 
By signing below I agree to participate in an interview for this study. 
 
 
__________________________         _____________________________ _________ 
Signature                                     Printed Name    Date 
